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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, the integration of labor markets around the world has increased
signicantly. Political and economic reforms but also new technologies have con-
tributed to open up China, India, and the former communist countries in Eastern
Europe to global trade. In particular, the globalized world has experienced a mas-
sive rise in the e¤ective global labor supply. The additional e¤ective supply has
been absorbed by advanced economies through various channels.1 The higher ef-
fective labor supply has also a¤ected labor demand in advanced economies. With
respect to trade being an important channel according to the IMF (2007a) and
its impact on labor demand, two factors have to be taken into account.2 First, trade
can change the level of demand for certain types of labor. In particular, trade with
emerging economies, where low-skilled labor is abundant, weakens the position of
low-skilled workers in advanced economies. Hence, low-skilled workers in advanced
economies are supposed to face high pressure on wages or  in the case of rigid
wages unemployment. Second, trade can also a¤ect the wage sensitivity of labor
demand. Due to a higher wage competition, employers in an open economy may
have a higher incentive to dismiss employees when they ask for higher wages than
employers in a closed economy. This line of reasoning has an important implication;
not only the e¤ective trade but also the mere possibility of trade a¤ects the wage
sensitivity of labor demand. If workers in particular low-skilled workers in ad-
vanced economies can be replaced more easily by workers in emerging economies due
to increased trade, the bargaining power of workers in advanced economies declines.3
Against this background, the ongoing globalization of the labor markets raises
important challenges for policy makers in advanced economies.4 First, on an aggre-
gate level, there is the question how an increasing e¤ective global labor supply a¤ects
wages, ination and macroeconomic activity. This link is of particular importance
for monetary policy. Second, in the eld of labor market policy, an important ques-
tion is what policies can help meet the challenges, which are caused by the ongoing
globalization of the labor markets. In particular, policy makers like to know how to
1See IMF (2007a) for a survey on how globalization has a¤ected labor markets.
2See Jansen and Lee (2007) for a survey of the literature concerning the relation between trade
and employment.
3See e.g. Bhagwati (1995) and Rodrik (1997).
4See e.g. Coe (2007), who analyzes the emergence of China and India on the world economy as
well as the implications for policy makers.
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react to the adverse impact of the increasing global labor supply on compensation
and employment of low-skilled workers.5 Against this background, the chapters of
this dissertation focus on three questions:
 What is the impact of an increasing global labor supply on wages, ination and
macroeconomic activity and what are the implications for monetary policy?
(Chapter 2)
 What is the impact of a low-wage subsidy, being a popular tool of labor market
policy, on skill formation, aggregate employment and welfare? (Chapter 3)
 How do the interactions between employment and training policies look like?
(Chapter 4)
The analysis in Chapter 2 is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model.
It is concerned with the impact of a labor supply impulse on wages, ination and
macroeconomic activity. To make the analysis as transparent as possible, it is based
on global variables, i.e. there is no disaggregation. The analyses of labor market
policies in Chapters 3 and 4 are based on a Markov model of the labor market. In
particular given the specic challenges for labor market policy , a more disaggre-
gated approach is used, i.e. it is distinguished among di¤erent types of labor. The
analyses are concerned with the decisions of labor market participants in response to
policy-induced incentives. Whereas Chapter 3 regards decisions on the labor supply
as well as on the labor demand side, and analyzes the impact of one special pol-
icy, Chapter 4 focuses on labor demand and analyzes the interaction between two
policies. Ignoring possible interactions could distort the evaluation of the policies.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
In detail, Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of an increasing e¤ective global labor
supply on wages, ination and macroeconomic activity. The integration of China,
India and countries from Eastern Europe has increased the e¤ective global labor
supply. This rise has put downward pressure on wages and ultimately ination.
The analysis shows that it was not simply the wisdom of the central banks, but
also the increase in global labor supply that has been responsible for the recent
years of low ination combined with high macroeconomic activity. In particular,
the analysis reveals that a main transmission channel was the development of the
bargaining power of the employees in combination with the initially lower bargaining
power of the employees in the emerging economies. Due to the rising e¤ective global
5The underlying challenge for economic policy has been analyzed comprehensively under the
heading "Making work pay" in recent years. See for a suvey e.g. OECD (2000a).
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labor supply, "employers can increasingly say in a global economy that they will pack
up their bags and leave" (Bhagwati, 1995). Hence, if workers in advanced economies
can be more easily replaced by workers in emerging economies due to increasing
opportunities for trade, the bargaining power of workers in advanced economies
declines and thereby also the global bargaining power. Then, also the wage and
nally ination decline. By implication, a slowing of labor supply growth in the
future combined with an increasing bargaining power of workers in the emerging
economies would reduce the dampening impact on wages and nally on ination.
Chapter 3 analyzes the implications of a popular tool of labor market policy, low-
wage subsidies. In particular, the impacts of low-wage subsidies on skill formation,
aggregate employment and welfare are examined. Low-wage subsidies have three
important e¤ects. First, they promote the employment of the low-skilled workers.
Second, by raising the payo¤ of low-skilled work relative to skilled work, low-wage
subsidies reduce the incentive to become skilled. So, they reduce the skilled labor
force, which, however, faces a relatively high employment rate. Third, the govern-
ment budget constraint is supposed to cause an additional tax burden on the skilled
workers; this amplies the negative e¤ect of low-wage subsidies on the incentive to
acquire human capital. Thus, the rst e¤ect on the one hand and the second and
third e¤ect on the other hand pull in opposite directions in terms of employment.
The labor market and the training system are described by a Markov model.
Then, the training decision on the part of the worker and the following e¤ects, in
particular the net impact on aggregate employment, can be analyzed. Moreover,
labor market institutions are taken into account as they a¤ect the functioning of the
labor market. In this context, the model features a variety of common labor market
imperfections like wage bargaining as well as hiring and ring costs. The numerical
analysis sheds light on the relative strengths of the three e¤ects and thereby assesses
the degree to which low-wage subsidies increase or decrease aggregate employment.
The simulation shows that low-wage subsidies have a negligible e¤ect on aggregate
employment. Although they do stimulate low-skilled employment, they also reduce
skilled employment.
Chapter 4 examines the interactions between employment and training policies,
more precisely, between hiring and training subsidies. The e¤ectiveness of these
policies in stimulating employment and income may be interdependent for various
reasons. For example, the more employment policies stimulate the employment rate,
the greater the length of time over which workers use the human capital whose ac-
quisition is supported by training policies. Moreover, the greater the government
3
expenditures on employment and training policies, the higher the taxes required to
nance these expenditures. Finally, aggregate income may be reduced. On account
of such e¤ects, employment and training policies may be complementary or substi-
tutive. The analysis is based on the model presented in Chapter 3. However, some
modications are necessary to be able to analyze the interactions of the policies,
which are regarded in this chapter.
The simulation shows that there are signicant interactions between both poli-
cies. However, only in the absence of the government budget constraint, there are
complementarities with respect to income. The analysis provides a methodology for
examining policy interactions, which may be useful well beyond the bounds of hiring
and training subsidies.
4
2 The Increasing Global Labor Supply and its
Macroeconomic Implications
2.1 Introduction
This chapter argues that changes in the e¤ective global labor supply have played an
important role in generating the golden years of low ination and booming macroeco-
nomic activity for much of the period from the early 1990s till around the beginning
of 2008. Our analysis suggests that the expansionary monetary policy over much of
this period was compatible with low ination because the rapid growth of the labor
supply put downward pressure on wages and prices. By implication, a slowing of
labor supply growth in the future would give monetary policy a more inationary
bias and thereby presumably lead monetary authorities to adopt a more restrictive
monetary policy stance. A slowing growth could be caused by bottlenecks in the
movement of people from rural to urban areas, bottlenecks in training these people,
a global recession leading to under-utilization of labor; moreover, the growth could
decline because the big push to integrate the emerging economies was run much of
its course and future integration is likely to proceed at a slower pace.
The account can be summarized straightforwardly as follows. Since the 1990s,
workers from the emerging economies e.g. from China, India and from Eastern
European countries, in particular Russia,  have joined the global labor market
by producing goods and services that are traded on international markets. In this
sense, the globalized world has experienced a massive rise in the e¤ective global
labor supply.
The increase in labor supply in these countries has put downward pressure, in the
rst instance, on wages there. Sluggishness in exchange rates China, for example,
has pegged its currency largely to the U.S. dollar has enabled this downward wage
pressure to spread to the developed countries such as the U.S., Western Europe and
Japan.6 This development has dampened ination worldwide.
While this was happening, many central banks pursued policies closely akin
to ination targeting, often aiming to keep ination at or below 2 percent. We
argue that, the deationary pressure arising from the growth of the e¤ective global
labor supply contributed to the period of low ination and booming macroeconomic
activity extending from the 1990s to recent years, interrupted only briey by the
bursting of the internet bubble at the beginning of this millennium. Our argument
suggests that it was not simply the wisdom of the central banks, but the increase
6Naturally this only holds in the absence of complete specialization.
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in global labor supply that has been responsible for the recent years of low ination
combined with high macroeconomic activity. Meanwhile, the long boom appears
to have come to an abrupt end with the nancial crisis of 2008. The e¤ect of this
crisis on global macroeconomic activity dwarfs any inuence the growing e¤ective
global labor supply may have had. But once the dust settles and the nancial
crisis is over, we will want to know whether we can return to the golden years of
booming macroeconomic activity and low ination again. Our analysis suggests that
the answer to this question will depend in part on whether the global labor supply
will continue its rapid growth. Should this growth rate slow, then this favorable
combination of a high level of macroeconomic activity and a low rate of ination
may no longer be sustainable.
Our analysis incorporates labor market search and matching frictions (along
the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000)) into a New
Keynesian macro model. To capture the e¤ect of labor supply growth on ination,
we assume that wages are sticky and that prices are a markup over wages. For this
purpose, we suppose that wages are set in a staggered multi-period setting, in the
spirit of Gertler and Trigari (2008), except that the latter is concerned with real
rigidities, whereas this analysis focuses on nominal rigidities.7
The chapter is organized as follows. After the preliminaries in Section 2:2, the
model is outlined in Section 2:3. Section 2:4 presents the numerical analysis. Section
2:5 concludes.
2.2 Preliminaries
Before presenting the model, we summarize briey how the analysis in this chap-
ter contributes to the macroeconomic literature on explaining the long boom that
started in the 1990s and then we provide some empirical background for our labor
supply transmission mechanism.
2.2.1 The Long Boom
There are several standard explanations of the approximately 15-year boom that
started in the 1990s.8 The rst is "good luck." Proponents argue that after the
two raw material price shocks of the 1970s, economic shocks happened to have been
7See Bodart et al. (2006) as well as Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008).
8This boom has also been referred to as "The Roaring Nineties", see e.g. Stiglitz (2003), Krueger
and Solow (2002), and the "The Great Moderation." Although the latter term generally alludes to
the fall in the volatility of output and ination, there is evidence that this reduction in volatility
is associated with higher output growth, see e.g. Ramey and Ramey (1995).
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weaker and less frequent, paving the way for a long boom.9 This hypothesis has
recently been called into question through the continued strong growth of global
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2007 and the rst half of 2008, despite the rapid
rise of raw material prices.
The second explanation is that nancial innovations and improved inventory
management techniques have increased economiescapacity to exploit economic op-
portunities and to match supply and demand, thereby enabling countries to operate
at higher levels of economic activity.10 Yet there is evidence that the contribution of
inventory management to the reduction in volatility is limited.11 The recent nancial
crisis has called into question the stabilizing e¤ects of various nancial innovations.
The third explanation is that the long boom is due to improved macroeconomic
policies, including both, a tighter scal policy12 as well as monetary policy focused
on price stability,13 along with improved design of central banks and better cen-
tral banking communication strategies.14 However, the empirical evidence on the
disinationary e¤ects of tight scal policy is mixed.15
To these mainstream explanations we add a further one, namely that the increase
in the e¤ective global labor supply has put downward pressure on wage and ination,
thereby permitting lower interest rates than would otherwise have been compatible
with central banksination targets.
2.2.2 The Global Labor Supply
Since the 1990s large numbers of workers from the emerging economies have joined
the e¤ective global labor market, in the sense that they have begun to produce
goods and services traded on international markets. As a result, the globalized
9See Ahmed et al. (2004) as well as Stock and Watson (2003) for emprical studies supporting
this hypothesis with respect to output.
10Concerning the inuence of inventory management, see, e.g. Kahn et al. (2002) as well as
McCarthy and Zakrajsek (2003). For the e¤ects of nancial innovations, see, e.g. Dynan et al.
(2006) as well as Jermann and Quadrini (2006).
11See IMF (2007b).
12See, e.g. Fatás and Mihov (2003).
13See, in particular, Bernanke (2004) and IMF (2006). Taylor (1998) and Clarida et al. (2000)
show that the U.S. Fed reacted more aggressively to ination in the 1980s and 1990s than before.
14See Rogo¤ (2003). Ball and Sheridan (2003) analyze the impact of ination targeting on the
economic performance for OECD countries. They show that countries that implemented ination
targeting improved their performance concerning output and ination compared to the period
before the implementation. However, countries without ination target improved their performance
at the same time.
15Regarding the theory that persistent scal decits are inationary, Catao and Terrones (2005)
nd empirical conrmation only for high-ination and developing countries, but not for low-
ination, advanced economies. Rogo¤ (2003) argues that whereas scal policy probably has sup-
ported the disination process particularly in Latin America and Africa, monetary policy played
the major role for this process in advanced economies.
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world has experienced a rise in the e¤ective labor supply of 81% between 1990 and
2005. Whereas Eastern Europe and Central Asia have contributed 7:6 percentage
points, India has contributed 14:2 percentage points. The biggest contribution came
from China (36:2 percentage points).16 Chinas contribution is a consequence of its
economic policy. This included liberalizing the legal framework17 and raising labor
productivity through foreign direct investment (FDI). Whereas FDI at the beginning
of the 1980s did not exist, it increased to more than 6% of GDP in the mid-1990s,
which corresponds to more than 10% of the total global FDI at that time.18
The economic literature indicates that the high economic growth in recent years
in China has been driven signicantly by an increasing labor supply19 and its more
e¢ cient integration in the production process, along the lines described in the Lewis
dual sector development model.20 Chinese economic growth in the reform area has
been associated with the transfer of large amounts of labor from agriculture to
the more productive non-agricultural sectors in urban areas. The elastic supply of
unskilled labor from the countryside allows rapid modern sector growth to proceed
for a long period without putting upward pressure on wages.
The integration of countries like China into the world economy also a¤ects wages
of employees in the Western industrialized countries.21 Bhagwati (1995) noted that
"the bargaining power of employers has increased vis-à-vis that of employees because
employers can increasingly say in a global economy that they will pack up their
bags and leave".22 However, it is questionable that such downward wage pressure
will continue, for the following reasons. First, there is evidence that migration to
urban areas is likely to slow down.23 Second, Chinas aggregate labor force is due to
contract for demographic reasons.24 The reduction in the labor supply will erode the
16See Appendix 7.1.7 for a survey of the underlying data.
17See e.g. Liang and Lauderdale (2006) for a survey on Chinas process of integration into
the world economy. Moreover, to facilitate labor market adjustment processes within China, the
government has also reduced restrictions on internal migration and given more discretion to rms.
See e.g. Knight and Song (2005) as well as Reutersward (2005).
18The calculations are based on data provided by the World Bank (2008).
19See e.g. Golley and Tyers (2006).
20See Lewis (1954). For an application to China, see Knight and Song (2005) and Knight (2007).
The Lewis model assumes that developing countries have dual economies with both a traditional
agricultural sector and a modern industrial sector. Initially, in the agricultural sector, there is
a huge labor surplus available at a subsistence wage. The industrial sector develops by drawing
labor from the agricultural sector. The existence of surplus labor in the agricultural sector ensures
that during an extended period of rapid modern sector growth, wages remain steady because the
supply of labor to the modern sectors exceeds demand at this wage. The surplus of output over
wages is captured by the owners of businesses as prot.
21See Freeman (1995) for a survey of the underlying debate at that time.
22See also Rodrik (1997). For a theoretical analysis of this e¤ect, see e.g. Zhao (1998); for
empirical conrmation see e.g. Abraham et al. (2007) with respect to Belgium.
23See e.g. Garnaut (2006).
24See e.g. Nielsen and Fang (2007). According to the baseline projection by Golley and Tyers
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comparative advantage of Chinas labor intensive production25 and have a negative
impact on its growth.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the medium variant projection of the development of the
working age population in China, India and Russia from 1965 to 2050.26 The black
line depicts the growth rate of the aggregate working age population in these coun-
tries. The bars in the graph show the regional composition of the growth rate. Two
aspects are noteworthy: rst, the growth rate of the aggregate working age popu-
lation will decrease signicantly in the following decades compared to the growth
rates in the 1990s and, second, the development in China is the main driving force.
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Figure 2.1: Growth of the Working Age Population and Contributions by States
Moreover, labor costs in China have increased signicantly. In the recent ten
years, the real wage has increased on average by more than 13% per year.27 In
addition to the economic development, labor market policy has also contributed to
the increase (e.g. via the minimum wage legislation).28
(2006), the labor supply will begin to decline in 2015. According to Peng and Fausten (2006),
labor supply contraction will accelerate from 2020 onwards in response to population aging and
the prospective reduction of the labor force participation rate of the young population. See also
Garnaut and Huang (2006).
25Nielsen and Fang (2007).
26United Nations (2009). The projection of the population until 2050 is based on assumptions
regarding future trends in fertility, mortality and international migration. Because of the uncer-
tainty with respect to these trends, a number of projection variants are produced. Here, "medium"
refers to the assumption concerning the future path of fertility.
27Between 1987 and 1997, the average wage increased by only 4:2% per year on average own
calculations based on data provided by the World Bank (2008).
28See Jiabao (2008).
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2.3 The Model
To keep the analysis as transparent as possible, we use a global model that describes
relations among global variables, such as the global labor supply and the global in-
ation rate. This extreme simplication allows us to depict the inuence of labor
supply growth on ination and macroeconomic activity in a very simple way. There-
fore, this model only gives us a broad picture. Detailed predictions would require
disaggregation with respect to countries and sectors but such extensions lie beyond
the scope of this chapter.
As noted, the process of globalization over the past two decades has involved
an increase in the e¤ective global labor supply. As the global economy becomes
more integrated, also the division of labor among countries and regions becomes
increasingly global. Goods and services that were non-tradable become tradable
and trade itself increases as production activities are relocated in accordance with
comparative advantage. In this process, increasing amounts of labor are integrated
in the global economy. This is the sense in which globalization leads to growth of
the e¤ective global labor supply.
We present a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, which is based on
Gertler and Trigari (2008).29 It features three types of agents: rms, households
and a government. First, a government issues bonds and imposes taxes and makes
transfers to the households. Second, a large number of identical rms produces
a homogeneous consumption good through labor. Third, there is a continuum of
households supplying labor, consuming goods and holding bonds. Wages are deter-
mined by Nash bargaining. As in Gertler and Trigari (2008), we assume that in
each period only a fraction of rms and workers reset their wages, but in this model
the labor supply grows.
2.3.1 Labor Market Dynamics
There is a continuum of workers and a continuum of rms, each of measure one.
Firms are indexed by i. Each rm i employs Nt(i) workers at time t. The number
of vacancies, posted by a rm to attract new workers in the next period, is denoted
by Vt(i). Along standard lines, we assume that the total number of matches, M ,
is a Cobb-Douglas function of the total number of unemployed, U , and the total
number of vacancies, V :
Mt = M U

t V
1 
t (2.1)
29The underlying working paper version is Gertler and Trigari (2006), which is the base of the
calculations that are illustrated in this chapter.
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where M is the e¢ ciency of matching,  is a positive constant (0 <  < 1). The
probability of a rm to ll a vacancy is:
qt =
Mt
Vt
= M

Ut
Vt

(2.2)
The probability of an unemployed person to nd a job is:
st =
Mt
Ut
= M

Vt
Ut
1 
(2.3)
Both, the rms and the workers take qt and st, respectively, as given. In any period,
each rm exogenously separates from a fraction ' of its workers. The dynamics of
total employment are:30
Nt+1 = (1  ') Nt + qt Vt (2.4)
The labor supply Lt grows at a constant rate, gL:
gL =
Lt+1
Lt
  1 (2.5)
The unemployment level is given by:
Ut = Lt  Nt (2.6)
By combining eq. (2.1), (2.2), (2.4) and (2.5), the dynamics of the employment rate
are given by:31
nt+1 =
1
1 + gL
[(1  ') nt + M ut v1 t ] (2.7)
The unemployment rate is:
ut = 1  nt (2.8)
2.3.2 Representative Firm
Firms use labor as the only input. In each period, they produce the output, Yt(i),
according to the following production function:
Yt(i) = A Nt(i) (2.9)
30This model ignores employment adjustment along the intensive margin and focuses on the
adjustment along the extensive margin.
31Note that nt+1 =
Nt+1
Lt+1
= (1  ')NtLt LtLt+1 + m(UtLt )( VLt )1  LtLt+1 :
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where A is the productivity, identical for all rms. The hiring rate, xt(i) is dened
as the ratio of newly hired people, qt Vt(i) = Mt(i), to the existing number of
employees, Nt(i):
xt(i) =
Mt(i)
Nt(i)
(2.10)
As in Gertler and Trigari (2008), we assume that labor adjustment costs are quadratic:

2
x2t (i) Nt(i). Let Wt(i) be the wage,  be the discount factor of the representative
household and  t;t+1 be the discount factor of the representative rm, where
t;t+1 =
u0(ct+1)
u0(ct) . Then the real prot of rm i, t(i), is:
32
t(i) = Yt(i) Wt(i) Nt(i)  
2
x2t (i) Nt(i) +  Et t;t+1t+1(i) (2.11)
At any time, the rm maximizes its prot by posting vacancies and hence by
choosing its hiring rate. In this context, rst, the value of adding an additional
employee at time t is calculated:33
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
= A Wt(i) + 
2
x2t (i) + (1  ')  Et t;t+1
@t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
!
= 0 (2.12)
Second, the rst-order condition for prot maximization with respect to the number
of vacancies is calculated:
 xt(i) =  Et t;t+1
@t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
(2.13)
By combining eq. (2.12) and eq. (2.13), we get the forward-looking di¤erence
equation for the hiring rate:
 xt(i) =  Et t;t+1[A Wt+1(i) + 
2
x2t+1(i) + (1  ')  xt+1(i)] (2.14)
2.3.3 Representative Household
We make the standard assumption following Merz (1995) and others  that the
representative household consists of a continuum of individuals who insure each other
completely against the idiosyncratic unemployment risk. A household pools the
incomes (including the prot income) of its members before choosing consumption
as well as bond holdings.
Let ct be the real consumption bundle per capita, Wt the real wage rate, which
is specied below, and znt the nominal bond holding per capita. The unemployment
32See Appendix 7.1.13 for a model with Rotemberg adjustment costs and a money growth rule.
33See Appendix 7.1.1 for the derivation of the following equations.
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benets are given by Bt, tt are lump-sum net taxes to the government and t are
prots. Moreover, it is the nominal interest rate. The household maximizes its
utility with respect to consumption and bonds:
Ut = Et
1P
j=0
j ln(ct+j) (2.15)
subject to the ow budget constraint:
Pt ct +
1
1 + it
znt + Pt tt = Pt Wt nt + Pt Bt ut + z
n
t 1 + Pt t (2.16)
The rst-order conditions for utility maximization are:34
@LH
@ct
:
1
ct
= Pt %t (2.17)
@LH
@znt
: %t
1
1 + it
= Et %t+1 (2.18)
where LH is the Lagrange function with respect to the household. By combining
eq. (2.17) and eq. (2.18), we get the standard consumption Euler equation:
1 = (1 + it)  Et
ct
ct+1
1
1 + t+1
(2.19)
2.3.4 Wage Determination
Surplus of the Worker Following Gertler and Trigari (2008), all existing and
newly hired workers employed at the rm receive the same wage, which is negotiated
in either the current or the previous period; and the unemployed workers are allo-
cated randomly to the posted vacancies (with wages set now or in the last period).
The surplus of the employee at rm i is
SEt (i) = 
N
t (i) Ut
whereas the surplus of the average employee, conditional on being a new hire, is
SEt = 
N
t  Ut
where Nt (i) is the expected present value of being employed at rm i:
Nt (i) =Wt(i) +  Et t;t+1 [(1  ') Nt+1(i) + ' Ut+1]
34See Appendix 7.1.2 for the derivation of the following equations.
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and Ut is the expected present value of being unemployed:
Ut = Bt +  Et t;t+1 [st 
N
t+1 + (1  st) Ut+1]
where Nt =
R 1
0
Nt (i)
xt 1(i)Nt 1(i)
xt 1Nt 1
di is the average value of employment conditional
on being a new worker at time t. Finally, the surplus of the worker is given by:
SEt (i) =Wt(i) Bt +  Et t;t+1[(1  ') SEt+1(i)  st SEt+1] (2.20)
Surplus of the Firm The surplus of the rm, which is renegotiating, SFt (i), is
given by:
SFt (i) =
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
= A Wt(i) + 
2
x2t (i) + (1  ')  Et t;t+1 SFt+1(i) (2.21)
Nash Bargaining Wages are determined through bargaining under staggered
wage setting à la Calvo (1983), with bargaining as in Gertler and Trigari (2008),
and nominal rigidities as in Bodart et al. (2006). Bargaining is conducted by the
rm and the worker. In each period a rm has a xed probability (1   w) that it
renegotiates the wage with its employees, where w determines the degree of wage
stickiness. Firms that do not renegotiate the wage, adjust the nominal wage just for
trend ination, . In the remainder, W t denotes the contract wage, i.e. the wage
of the rm that renegotiates at t. Then, the contract wage maximizes the Nash
bargaining product:
max
W t

 = [SEt (i)]
t [SFt (i)]
1 t
where  (0 <  < 1) is the relative bargaining power of the employee.
As the contract is multi-period, the impact of the contract wage on the expected
future path of rm and worker surplus has to be taken into account. In order to
do this, in a rst step, the employees discounted sum of expected wage receipts,
WEt (i), is calculated:
35
WEt (i) = t W

t + (1  w) Et
1P
j=1
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j t+j W t+j
35For a detailed derivation of the following equations see Appendix 7.1.3.
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where t is the workers cumulative discount factor:36
t = Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ')  w (1 + )]j Pt
Pt+j
t;t+j (2.22)
Second, the rms discounted sum of the expected future wage payments, W Ft , is
calculated:
W Ft (i) = 	t(i) W

t + (1  w) Et
1P
j=1
j
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+j 	t+j(i) W

t+j
where 	t is the rms cumulative discount factor:37
	t(i) = Et
1P
j=0
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
[  w (1 + 
)]j
Pt
Pt+j
t;t+j (2.23)
Third, using the expressions for WEt (i) and W
F
t (i), we can rewrite eq. (2.20) and
eq. (2.21), respectively. The solution of the Nash bargaining problem is given by:
t(i) S
F
t (i) = [1  t] SEt (i) with: t(i) =
t
t + (1  t) 	t(i) = t
(2.24)
Finally, the contract wage W t , being the result of the Nash bargaining, is:
W t =
1
t
[W Tt (i) + (1  ')  w Et t;t+1 t+1 W t+1] (2.25)
where W Tt (i) denotes the target wage:
W Tt (i) = t(i) [ A+

2
x2t (i)] + [1  t(i)] Bt + [1  t(i)] st  xt(i) Et
t+1(i)
1  t+1(i)
(2.26)
Following Bodart et al. (2006), we assume that the fraction w of rms adjusts its
nominal wage of the previous period (Pt 1Wt 1) by trend ination, 1 + , to get
the nominal wage W nt . Hence, the wage index, in nominal terms, can be calculated
36See Appendix 7.1.4 for an alternative expression oft. Observe that each term j in the workers
cumulative discount factor depends on the relative employment size (1 '), the probability w that
the contract survives to t+j, the households discount factor , and in addition to the determinants
included in Gertler and Trigari (2008), and following Bodart et al. (2006), as explained below a
further term: (1 + )j PtPt+j :
37See Appendix 7.1.4 for an alternative expression of 	t.
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as follows:
W nt = (1  w) W ;nt + w (1 + ) W nt 1
, W
n
t
Pt
= (1  w) W
;n
t
Pt
+ w (1 + 
)
W nt 1
Pt
In real terms, the wage index is calculated as follows:
Wt = (1  w) W t + w (1 + )
Pt 1
Pt
Wt 1
,Wt = (1  w) W t + w
1 + 
1 + t
Wt 1 (2.27)
Along standard lines, the real unemployment benet, Bt, is assumed to be propor-
tional to the average wage and calculated as follows:
Bt = b Wt (2.28)
Bargaining Power It is widely recognized that the integration of China and
other emerging economies into the world economy has reduced the bargaining power
of workers in the advanced economies. The reduction of the bargaining power can be
explained as follows.38 The integration of China and other emerging economies into
the world economy has increased the e¤ective global labor supply. The additional ef-
fective supply has been absorbed by advanced economies through various channels.39
The higher e¤ective labor supply also a¤ects labor demand in advanced economies.
With respect to trade being an important channel according to the IMF (2007a)
 and its impact on labor demand, two factors have to be taken into account.40
First, trade can change the level of demand for certain types of labor. In particular,
trade with emerging economies, where low-skilled labor is abundant, weakens the
position of low-skilled workers in advanced economies. Hence, low-skilled workers in
advanced economies are supposed to face a high pressure on wages or in the case
of rigid wages unemployment. Second, trade can also a¤ect the wage sensitivity of
labor demand. Due to the higher wage competition, employers in an open economy
may have a higher incentive to dismiss employees when they ask for higher wages
than in a closed economy. This line of reasoning has an important implication; not
38See for empirical evidence Dumont et al. (2006). In their analysis of ve EU countries (Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) they nd a signicant negative impact of
globalization on union bargaining power.
39See IMF (2007a) for a survey on how globalization has a¤ected labor markets.
40See Jansen and Lee (2007) for a survey of the literature concerning the relation between trade
and employment.
16
only the e¤ective trade but also the mere possibility of trade as a consequence of
outsourcing production a¤ects the wage sensitivity of labor demand. An increasing
substitutability of workers in particular of low-skilled workers could reduce their
bargaining power.41 If workers in advanced economies can be replaced more easily
by workers in emerging economies due to increased trade, the bargaining power of
workers in advanced economies declines.
We adopt this assumption here, with the proviso that the drop in bargaining
power is temporary. In particular, we assume that the bargaining power parameter
t is initially beneath its steady state value and gradually rises to that value,
42 as
workers in the emerging countries gradually gain bargaining power themselves.43
For the sake of simplicity, we model the development of the average global bar-
gaining power, t, as follows. Note that the global labor force is given by Lt being
calculated as the sum of the labor force in advanced economies (La, assumed to
be static) and that in the emerging economies (Le;t, assumed to be growing). The
bargaining power in the advanced economies is a (the base level), whereas the bar-
gaining power in the emerging economies is e;t (< a, but gradually catching up).
Thus the average global bargaining power, t, is calculated as follows:
t =
La a + Le;t e;t
La + Le;t
We normalize La = 1. Let Le;t = Lt   La and Lt = (1 + gL)t La. Then, we get:
t =
La a + ((1 + g
L)tLa   La) e;t
(1 + gL)tLa
, t =
a + ((1 + g
L)t   1) e;t
(1 + gL)t
, t =
a   e;t
(1 + gL)t
+ e;t (2.29)
The bargaining power in the emerging economies, is calculated as follows:
e;t = 0:5 t (2.30)
41See e.g. Bhagwati (1995) and Rodrik (1997).
42In the context of a model with alternating wage o¤ers, this assumption could be rationalized
by supposing that initially the frequency of rmso¤ers is large relative to that of the workers,
and the rmso¤er frequency gradually declines to its steady state value.
43This could, e.g., be due to the development of labor market laws in favour of employees, due
to the extension of the social security system in emerging economies or due to the fact that the
rate of unionization of workers in urban areas who are working in the industrial sector is probably
higher than the rate of unionization of workers in rural areas who are working in the agricultural
sector.
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with
t =  t 1 + (1  )  (1  0:5)(1  )(1 
gL
gLnew
) (2.31)
where  denotes the persistence in the development of bargaining power.
Note that in the initial steady state (i.e. gL = 0 ), there is (1   gL
gLnew
) = 1,
which guarantees that t=0 = 0:5. This value implies that e;t=0 = 0:25 in the initial
steady state. Afterwards, i.e. for gL = gLnew, there is (1   0:5)(1   )(1   g
L
gLnew
) =
0. Hence the value of t is determined only by the autoregressive process. In the
new steady state (for j ! 1), the autoregressive process implies that t = j
t j + (1  )=(1  ) = 1, as j ! 0.
Given the value for  in the initial and new steady state, respectively, allows
us to determine the bargaining power in the emerging economies according to eq.
(2.30) and the global bargaining power according to eq. (2.29).44
2.3.5 Monetary Policy
The monetary policy is based on the Taylor rule, with the target nominal interest
rate determined as follows:45
(1 + iTRt ) = (1 + i
)

1 + t
1 + 
a  Yt
Y t
ay
(2.32)
where i is the steady state nominal interest rate, with (1+ i) = (1+r)(1 + ), r
is the steady state real interest rate and  is the ination target. Y t is the steady
state output, y and  are positive constants. Moreover, we assume that the actual
nominal interest rate only gradually adjusts to the above target. This departure
from the simple Taylor rule is motivated by recent research on central bankspolicy
rule, e.g. by Christiano et al. (2008) and Rudebusch (2006):
(1 + it) = [ 1 + it 1]i [1 + iTRt ]
1 i
The greater is the parameter i, the higher is the sluggishness of the central banks
reaction to movements in the nominal interest rate target. Thus the central banks
reaction function is:
(1 + it) = [ 1 + it 1]i

(1 + i)

1 + t
1 + 
a  Yt
Y t
ay1 i
(2.33)
44For the initial steady state, we get: e;t=0 = 0:5  0:5 = 0:25 and t=0 = 0:5 0:25(1+gL)t + 0:25 = 0:5.
For the new steady state, we get: e;t!1 = 0:5  1 = 0:5 and t!1 = 0:5 e;t(1+gL)t + e;t = 0:5.
45See e.g. Ascari and Merkl (2007). See Taylor (1993) for the initial description of the equation.
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where Yt = nt Lt A and Y t = n
new Lt A.
2.3.6 Closing the Model
The model is closed by the following three equations.
Government budget constraint:46
Bt ut (1 + g
L) + zt 1 =
1
1 + it
zt (1 + g
L) + tt (1 + g
L) (2.34)
Product market equilibrium:
ct = A nt   
2
x2t nt (2.35)
Ination rate:
t =
Pt
Pt 1
  1 (2.36)
In total, the economic system in the transition period is described by 22 equations.47
2.4 Numerical Evaluation
2.4.1 Calibration
The calibration is based on monthly data. For the steady state (see Table 2.1 for a
summary, where GTstands for Gertler and Trigari), we choose a standard value
for the annual real steady state interest rate, which is set to 4%, or, on a monthly
base, r = 0:0033. We dene the replacement rate b as the ratio between the level
of unemployment benets and the wage and set b to 0:42 (see Gertler and Trigari,
2008). The renegotiation frequency, w, (i.e. the probability that the wage is not
renegotiated in period t) is set to 0:889. The ring rate  is set to 0:035 and
implies that the survival rate in the job is 0:965, which is the value reported by
Gertler and Trigari (2008). The elasticity of matches to unemployment, , is set
to 0:5. Moreover, we set M = 0:386, which implies a steady state lling rate of
q = 0:331 per month, which corresponds to a lling rate of 0:7 per quarter as in Den
Haan et al. (2000). The productivity, A, is normalized to 1. With respect to the
bargaining power, we assume that the bargaining power in the advanced economies
is time-invariant. Following the standard assumption, we set the bargaining power
of the employee, a, to 0:5. With respect to the bargaining power in the emerging
economies, we set the starting value to e;t=0 = 0:25. The parameter  that
46See Appendix 7.1.5 for the derivation.
47See Appendix 7.1.6.
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determines the speed of convergence, is set to  = 0:993. For the initial steady
state, the job nding rate, s, is set to 0:45 (see Gertler and Trigari, 2008). Moreover,
we set the ratio of real bond holding to output z = 0:6.
parameter / description value source
variable
r real interest rate 0:0033 to get  = 0:997
b replacement rate 0:42 GT (2008)
w renegotiation frequency 0:889 GT (2008)
' ring rate 0:035 GT (2008)
elasticity of matches
 to unemployment 0:5 GT (2008)
M normalization parameter 0:386 to get q = 0:338
bargaining power in the
a advanced economies 0:5 standard value
s job nding probability 0:45 GT (2008)
z ratio of bonds to output 0:6 assumption
 steady state ination rate 0:0 assumption
i interest rate smoothing parameter 0:8 to match estimates
y weight on output gap in Taylor rule 0:5=12 standard value
 weight on ination gap in Taylor rule 1:5 standard value
A productivity 1 normalization
bargaining power in the
e;t=0 emerging economies 0:25 assumption
 convergence parameter 0:993 assumption
Table 2.1: Calibration of the Initial Steady State
We set the steady state ination rate  = 0. Concerning the parameters in the
Taylor rule, we take the following values. The interest rate smoothing parameter, i,
it set to 0:8, which corresponds to the average of the values reported by Christiano
et al. (2008) and Rudebusch (2006) for the U.S. Following the standard calibration,
the weight on the output gap is set to y = 0:5=12 and the weight on the ination
gap is set to  = 1:5.
Given these values, it is possible to calculate the remaining parameters and
variables in the initial steady state (see Table 2.2).
The horizon adjusted bargaining power,  = 0:440, is lower than the non-
adjusted value,  = 0:5. As analyzed in detail by Gertler and Trigari (2008), the
"horizon e¤ect" reduces the bargaining power of the workers as it makes them more
impatient. Therefore, the adjusted bargaining power, , is lower than the bargaining
power, t.
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parameter / variable description value
n employment rate 0:928
u unemployment rate 0:072
v vacancy rate (number of vacancieslabor supply ) 0:098
x hiring rate 0:035
q job lling probability 0:331
 horizon adjusted bargaining power 0:440
c consumption per capita 0:904
z real bond holding per capita 0:557
W = W  = W T wage 0:970
 discount factor 0:997
 labor adjustment cost parameter 41:860
Table 2.2: Implied Values in the Initial Steady State
2.4.2 Understanding the Key Features of the Model
Next, the macroeconomic implications of the global labor supply impulse are an-
alyzed. The impulse represents the increase in the e¤ective global labor supply
caused by the integration of China, India, and the Eastern European countries into
the global economy. It is supposed that the labor supply is initially constant and
then grows permanently at 0:25% per month, which implies an annual growth rate
of around 3%.48 We show how the labor supply impulse contributed to the period of
low ination rates and booming macroeconomic activity. First, the dynamics of the
full model are analyzed; second, the contributions of the various lagged adjustment
processes are examined.
Dynamics of the Full Model49 The results of the simulations reveal that the
combination of the labor supply impulse and the dynamics of the bargaining power
is the main driving force of the model, in particular of the ination dynamics (see
Figure 2.2). In the following gures, the red line denotes the new steady state.
Given the initially lower bargaining power in the emerging economies, the increasing
integration of the labor supply of those countries into the global markets causes a
reduction of the adjusted bargaining power of the worker, . This  on its own
dampens the wage (the target wage, W T , and thereby the contract wage, W ).
However, a lower aggregate wage would increase the hiring rate, x, according to eq.
(2.14) and thereby the nding probability, s.50 Both, the increase of the hiring rate
and the increase of the job nding probability on their own cause an increase
48See Appendix 7.1.7.
49See Appendix 7.1.8 for a detailed analysis of the model dynamics and Appendix 7.1.9 for
further results.
50Combining eq. (2.3) and eq. (2.10) provides: s = x N=U .
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Figure 2.2: The Dynamics of the Main Variables in the Full Model
of the target wage in the same period according to eq. (2.26). Thus, with respect
to the target wage, there are two opposing e¤ects: rst, a negative e¤ect due to the
declining bargaining power, and second, a positive e¤ect due to the increasing hiring
rate and the increasing job nding probability.
In the early stage of the dynamic process after the initial reaction to the labor
supply impulse , the negative impact of the decreasing bargaining power domi-
nates.51 Moreover, after the initial decline, the employment rate, n, and therefore
also consumption per capita, c, increase. Then, the output gap is positive (as Yt = A
Lt nt > Y

t = A Lt n
new where nnew is the new steady state level of the employment
rate), which on its own  implies a higher interest rate, i, i.e. an interest rate
above steady state, according to the Taylor rule. However, the interest rate as
implied by the Euler equation is below the steady state level as ct
ct+1
> 1. Standard
macroeconomic models equate the interest rate targeted by the central bank with
51Given a constant productivity, the declining wage implies a declining share of labor in national
income. This result corresponds to the ndings by Jaumotte and Tytell (2007): "... labor glob-
alization has negatively a¤ected the share of income accruing to labor in the advanced economies
(the labor share)." Also in their analysis "labor globalization" refers to the integration of China,
India and the Eastern European countries into the global economy.
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the interest rate in the Euler equation.52 Against this background, the second factor
in the Taylor rule, the ination rate, , becomes relevant, as its development makes
the interest rate implication of the Taylor rule on the one hand and the implication
of the Euler equation on the other hand consistent. Finally, monetary policy follow-
ing a Taylor rule implies that the ination rate has to be below steady state (i.e.
negative in the given calibration). Hence, due to the deationary pressure arising
from the increasing e¤ective global labor supply, monetary policy is compatible with
an ination rate, which is lower than it would otherwise have been possible.
However, in the long run, the model dynamics are opposed to what has just been
described. The bargaining power in the emerging economies starts to increase, e.g.
due to labor market laws in favor of the employees. Here, it is assumed that the
increase causes a convergence of the bargaining power in the emerging economies
to the bargaining power in the advanced economies (e;t ! a = 0:5). Hence,
the global bargaining power also converges to the level of the bargaining power in
the advanced economies. Finally, the variables converge to their steady states. In
particular, the ination rate increases again.
By implication, also a slowing of labor supply growth in the future would give
monetary policy a more inationary bias and thereby presumably lead monetary
authorities to adopt a more restrictive monetary policy stance.
Contributions of the Di¤erent Lagged Adjustment Processes Next, we
regard three variations of the model, designed to illustrate the contribution of each
lagged adjustment process. To quantify the contribution of each process to the dy-
namics of the model, we simulate the dynamics of the model after having eliminated
the adjustment process. The comparison of the simulation results of the full model
with the simulation results in the absence of a specic adjustment process reveals
the relevance of the process.
Lagged Adjustment Process of the Bargaining Power First,  is set
to 0: The comparison reveals the signicance of the adjustment process as a driving
force of the long-term behavior of the model variables (see Figure 2.3).53 In the
full model, the development of the adjusted bargaining power, , is characterized
by some undershooting. However, for  = 0, the bargaining power, , remains
constant and the adjusted bargaining power, , almost immediately jumps down
52SeeWoodford (2003). Given this equalization, the Euler equation provides a direct link between
monetary policy and consumption demand.
53In the short term, the dynamics of the modied model ( = 0) are almost identical to the
dynamics of the full model. See Appendix 7.1.10 for further results.
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Figure 2.3: The Dynamics of the Main Variables in the Modied Model ( = 0)
to its new steady state.54 As already mentioned above, there are two opposing
e¤ects with respect to the target wage, W T . Here, given the di¤erent behavior
of the bargaining power compared to the full model, there is no undershooting of
the target wage, W T , and the contract wage, W , as well as no overshooting of
the job nding probability, s, in the medium term. Instead, there is only a short
undershooting at the very beginning of the dynamic process. However, the sharp
decline of the target wage and the contract wage, respectively, is also observed in the
full model; there, the sharp decline is followed by a further decrease. Thus,  = 0
can explain the missing further decrease of the wages but not the sharp decline at
the very beginning. Moreover, for  = 0, there is no overshooting of the hiring rate,
x, which is a consequence of the non-existing undershooting of the wage. Finally,
the employment rate does not overshoot. Consequently, consumption per capita
does not grow after the initial drop. Hence, the Euler equation implies a constant
interest rate shortly after the initial impulse. Moreover, the output gap disappears
54Recall that the adjusted bargaining power, , via 	 and  also depends on w and nally
on the hiring rate x. Like x also the adjusted bargaining power does not achieve the new steady
state level immediately.
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quickly. Given these factors, monetary policy following a Taylor rule generates an
ination rate being back on the steady state level rapidly.
Lagged Adjustment Process of the Wage Next, w is set to 0: Conse-
quently, the cumulative discount factor of the rm, 	, according to eq. (2.23), as
well as the cumulative discount factor of the worker, , according to eq. (2.22)
are equal to 1 and remain constant. This has two implications. First, there is in
contrast to the full model no horizon e¤ect. Second, the contract wage, W , is no
longer a¤ected by the dynamics of the cumulative discount factor of the worker, .
Due to the missing horizon e¤ect, the adjusted bargaining power of the worker, ,
equals the bargaining power, , and is therefore higher than in the full model (see
Figure 2.4).55 As a consequence of this level shift, the wage level is higher and the
employment level is lower than in the full model.
Moreover, there is almost no undershooting of the wages at the very beginning
of the dynamic process. The missing undershooting of target wage, W T , can be ex-
plained by the missing horizon e¤ect. For w > 0,  immediately drops signicantly
but achieves the lower new steady state level only after a certain period of time; at
the beginning of the dynamic process, an undershooting of the target wage can be
observed. The missing undershooting of the contract wage, W , can be explained
by two factors. One factor is the dynamics of the target wage, just described, which
have an impact on W  according to eq. (2.25). Another factor, already mentioned
above, is the fact that the contract wage, W , is no longer a¤ected by the dynamics
of the cumulative discount factor of the worker. In this context, it is useful to look
back to the full model. In the full model, the cumulative discount factor of the
worker, t, a¤ects the contract wage, W , in two ways according to eq. (2.25).
First, a higher discount factor t reduces the contract wage in the same period.
Second, an increasing discount factor, i.e. t+1 > t, on its own increases W t ;
however, the size of the second e¤ect is also inuenced by the development of W t+1.
The impact of the product t+1W t+1 on W

t is indenite, but the total impact of
 on W  is negative. The dynamics of  and W  in the full model are mirror
inverted. Given a constant , the contract wage is also almost constant after the
initial impulse.
The dynamics of the employment rate, consumption per capita and the interest
rate do not change compared to the full model, so the dynamics of the ination rate
also do not change.
55See Appendix 7.1.11 for further results.
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Figure 2.4: The Dynamics of the Main Variables in the Modied Model (w = 0)
Lagged Adjustment Process of the Interest Rate Finally, i is set to
0. Compared to the full model, the short-term dynamics of the cumulative discount
factor of the worker, , the cumulative discount factor of the rm, 	, the target
wage, W T , the contract wage, W , and in particular, the ination rate, , are
di¤erent (see Figure 2.5).56 Recall that in the full model, the positive output gap on
the one hand and the interest rate level below steady state on the other hand imply
that monetary policy following a Taylor rule generates a negative ination rate in
the rst phase and, in particular, a rapidly increasing ination rate in the second
phase (t = 2 up to t  10).
For i = 0, the increase of the ination rate after the initial decline takes more
time. The protraction is caused by the missing impact of the lagged interest rate,
it 1, in the Taylor rule. In the second phase, the output gap is still positive and
the Euler equation implies an interest rate level below steady state. Like in the full
model, monetary policy following the Taylor rule generates a negative ination rate.
However, in the full model, also the term it 1 being below its steady state level,
contributes to guarantee the consistency between the positive output gap (which
56See Appendix 7.1.12 for further results.
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Figure 2.5: The Dynamics of the Main Variables in the Modied Model (i = 0)
 on its own  implies a positive interest rate) and the negative interest rate as
implied by the Euler equation. For i = 0, the term it 1 does not exist. Therefore,
the positive output gap has to be overcompensated by an even higher negative
ination rate. Hence, for i = 0, monetary policy following a Taylor rule generates
a slower adjustment of the ination rate after the initial impulse. Conversely, the
missing lagged interest rate term also causes the overshooting of the ination rate.
2.5 Concluding Thoughts
The analysis shows that it was not only the wisdom of the central banks, but the
increase in global labor supply that has been responsible for the recent years of high
macroeconomic activity combined with low ination.
Since the 1990s, workers from the emerging economies, in particular from China,
have joined the global labor market, producing goods and services that are traded on
international markets. In this sense, the globalized world has experienced a massive
rise in the e¤ective global labor supply. Thereby, the increase in labor supply has
put downward pressure on wages and nally ination.
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The analysis reveals that the main transmission channel was the development
of the bargaining power of the employees in combination with the initially lower
bargaining power in emerging economies. Due to the increasing volume of available
labor and the increasing trade, workers in advanced economies can be more easily
replaced by workers in emerging economies. Hence, the bargaining power of workers
in advanced economies declines. Finally, also the wage declines.
By implication, a slowing of labor supply growth in the future in combination
with an increasing bargaining power would reduce the dampening impact on wages,
and nally on ination. A slowing growth could be caused by bottlenecks in the
movement of people from rural to urban areas, bottlenecks in training these people,
a global recession leading to underutilization of labor; moreover, the growth could
decline because the big push to integrate the emerging economies was run much of
its course and future integration is likely to proceed at a slower pace. An increasing
bargaining power could be caused by the development of labor market laws in favor
of employees or due to the extension of the social security system in the emerging
countries.
Finally, monetary policy would get a more inationary bias and thereby lead
monetary authorities to adopt a more restrictive monetary stance.
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3 The E¤ect of Low-Wage Subsidies on Skill For-
mation, Aggregate Employment and Welfare
3.1 Introduction
Whereas the analysis in the previous chapter was based on global variables and
nally focused on the implications of an increasing global labor supply for monetary
policy, this and also the following chapter focuses on the implications for labor
market policy. The main challenge policy makers face in this eld is the deteriorating
position of low-skilled people. Therefore, the following analyses are no longer based
on aggregated variables; instead, di¤erent types of labor are considered.57
In many advanced economies, the relative position of employees at the bottom
of the wage distribution has deteriorated over the past decades. Whereas in the
U.S. this worsening has taken the form of a higher wage inequality between skilled
and low-skilled labor, in continental European countries the deterioration appears
in a higher relative unemployment rate of the low-skilled labor force. Against this
background, policy makers and economists have been searching for labor market
instruments that reduce unemployment while avoiding large disparities in income.
These e¤orts can be summarized under the heading "Making work pay".58
A popular tool are low-wage subsidies (LWS), which have been widely advocated,
in particular by Phelps (1997a). The central policy problem of low-skilled workers is
that they are associated with low wages or low employment opportunities or both.
Raising their wages would reduce rmsdemand for them, while lowering their wages
would be socially unacceptable. LWS respond to this policy problem by driving
a wedge between the income these workers receive and their labor costs.59 These
subsidies, in various guises, have been implemented in many countries, including e.g.
France (Prime pour lEmploi),60 Germany (Kombi-Lohn),61 Great Britain (Working
Families Tax Credit)62 and the U.S. (Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC)63.
In this chapter the e¤ects of LWS on skill formation, aggregate employment and
welfare are modeled. Whereas low-skilled employment is expected to increase in the
presence of LWS, it is doubtable whether also aggregate employment and welfare
increase. The impact on aggregate employment may be lower or even negative if
57For a di¤erent version of this chapter see Oskamp and Snower (2006).
58See for an early contribution OECD (2000a).
59See, for an analysis, Hamermesh (1978) as well as Haveman and Palmer (1982).
60See Stancanelli and Sterdyniak (2004).
61See Boss (2006) for a survey of di¤erent proposals and existing models.
62See, e.g. Dilnot and McCrae (2000) for a description and an analysis of the program.
63See Hotz and Scholz (2003) for a detailed description and an exhaustive review of the literature.
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LWS cause a reduction in skilled employment. In order to analyze the e¤ect on
aggregate employment, a particular focus is on the e¤ect of LWS on skill formation.
The possible negative e¤ect on the incentives to acquire human capital and thereby
on skilled employment is often ignored in the macroeconomic literature. Therefore,
it is commonly supposed that since LWS reduce the labor cost of low-wage workers,
they must stimulate aggregate employment. This chapter calls this presumption
into question. There are three important employment e¤ects of LWS, which will be
considered:
 The direct employment e¤ect : The demand for low-skilled labor rises, since
the cost of this type of labor falls.
 The skill-acquisition e¤ect : The incentive to acquire skills falls, because when
people acquire skills, their wages rise and consequently, they lose their enti-
tlement to the LWS. This negative impact on skill formation reduces employ-
ment, since low-skilled workers have a lower employment rate than their skilled
counterparts.
 The government budget e¤ect : The LWS are generally nanced through taxes.
An increased tax burden, in particular for the skilled labor force, amplies the
negative impact on skill formation and nally on skilled employment.
This chapter presents a macro model of the labor market and the training system
as well as the corresponding states, which allows us to analyze and quantify each
of these three e¤ects. The transition probabilities between the di¤erent states are
governed by a Markov process. The transition probabilities, which are a¤ected by
LWS, in particular the transition rate between school and training, are analyzed in
detail. Then, the model is calibrated for the German labor market and training
system to reveal the relative signicance of each e¤ect and thereby to assess how
LWS a¤ect aggregate employment.
It is shown that LWS can signicantly reduce medium-skilled employment. Thus,
the positive e¤ect of LWS on low-skilled employment does not cause an increase
in aggregate employment to the same extent; rather, the net e¤ect is very small.
Thus, ignoring the e¤ect on medium-skilled employment would cause an essential
overstatement of the benets of LWS. Furthermore, the shift from medium-skilled
to low-skilled employment reduces aggregate welfare. The calibration also reveals
that the size of the di¤erent e¤ects depends on the hiring elasticity, the training
elasticity and the degree of risk aversion.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3:2, the relation to the literature
is illustrated. Section 3:3 presents the theoretical model. In Section 3:4, the model
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is calibrated and the impact of LWS on skill formation, employment and welfare is
analyzed. Section 3:5 concludes.
3.2 Relation to the Literature
Pioneered by the work of Pigou (1933) and Kaldor (1936), a huge strand of the
theoretical and empirical literature has focused on the impact and optimal design
of LWS.64 Often, the search and matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) has been used to analyze the e¤ects of labor market policies.65 However, the
matching technology66 is assumed to be stable over time; but this assumption is not
totally conrmed by empirical studies. Some of the studies, which estimate search
and matching functions have found a negative time trend.67 Moreover, given that the
matching process itself may not be invariant to a policy change, it is not reasonable
to use a policy-invariant matching function to analyze labor market policies. To
prevent running afoul of the Lucas Critique, the analysis is not based on a policy-
invariant matching function. Instead, similar to Brown et al. (2007), it is analyzed
explicitly how policies a¤ect peoples incentives given an intertemporal maximization
of economic agents.
Many theoretical papers use static analytical frameworks and thus have the dis-
advantage that they can only analyze the short-run impact of the policy but not the
long-run e¤ects.68 However, there are reasons to suppose that longer-run e¤ects are
signicant.69 In this context, this study di¤ers from the literature, as the dynamic
e¤ects of the LWS in the long run are captured by specifying the e¤ect of LWS on
the transition rates between the di¤erent states.
The existing dynamic frameworks for evaluating subsidies, e.g. Hoon and Phelps
64See furthermore Phelps (1994, 1997b) as well as Orszag and Snower (2003b). With respect
to existing subsidy schemes, especially the EITC in the U.S. has been analyzed intensely, see e.g.,
Eissa and Hoynes (2005), Meyer (2002) as well as Liebman (2001). Bassanini et al. (1999) analyze
the impact of a simplied EITC model for di¤erent countries. Concering Germany, see in particular
Brown et al. (2007), SVR (2006), Sinn et al. (2006), Spermann (2003), Riphahn et al. (1999) as
well as Buslei and Steiner (1999).
65See, e.g. Danthine (2005) as well as Boone and van Ours (2004). Charlot et al. (2005) use the
framework to analyze the links between the labor market and the training sector.
66Like a production function, the matching technology describes the relation between input the
number of unemployed and the number of vacancies and output given by the number of matches.
Often, a Cobb-Douglas function is used: number of matches = (unemployment)#1(vacancies)#2 .
67See Blanchard and Diamond (1989) for the U.S. as well as Fahr and Sunde (2001, 2004) for
Germany. Besides, many empirical studies reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, see
e.g. Warren (1996) for the U.S. and Fahr and Sunde (2001) for Germany.
68See, e.g. Layard and Nickell (1980) and Layard et al. (1991).
69Orszag and Snower (2000) show that the dynamic long-run e¤ects of employment subsidies
di¤er from what may be expected in the short run, once the corresponding lagged adjustment
processes have worked themselves out.
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(2003),70 are not well-suited to analyze the impact of the policy. Mortensen and
Pissarides (2003) explore the e¤ects of taxes and subsidies on job creation, job
destruction, employment and wages in a search and matching equilibrium model.
However, in their model, like in the models of Albrecht and Vroman (2002) as well
as Cardullo and van der Linden (2006), migration between skill groups, which is an
essential component in the model, does not take place. In this context, the analysis
contributes to the existing literature by explicitly allowing for migration from the
low-skilled to the medium-skilled labor force. Taking migration into account allows
us to illustrate the skill-acquisition e¤ect, which is of particular importance for an
overall assessment of LWS.
Nickell and Bell (1997) as well as Siebert and Stähler (1994) have already men-
tioned the problem that raising the income of low-skilled people may reduce the
incentive to acquire skills. However, none of these studies use a theoretical frame-
work to analyze the problem. In this context, the paper by Heckman et al. (2003)
is closest to this model as they examine the impact of wage subsidies on skill forma-
tion. In particular, they focus on the EITC and analyze its impact on the incentives
to accumulate skills in two di¤erent models of human capital formation. Di¤erent
to Heckman et al. (2003), this analysis is not based on the EITC structure but on
a more general version of a LWS. Furthermore, the focus is not only on skill forma-
tion but also on the e¤ects of subsidies on employment and welfare. In contrast to
Heckman et al. (2003), the wage bargaining process is also modeled explicitly and
thereby the impact of subsidies on employment via the wage is examined.
3.3 The Model
The model is meant to provide a framework for analyzing the impact of LWS on
skill formation, employment and welfare. In this context, it features a variety of
common labor market imperfections like insider wage bargaining as well as hiring
and ring costs. The model involves some judicious compromises between analytical
simplicity and the depiction of heterogeneous labor market behaviors.
In particular, the analysis is based on a Markov model of the labor market and
the training system. Similar to Brown et al. (2007), the dynamics are governed
by a Markov matrix that summarizes the transition probabilities between the dif-
ferent states. However, in addition to Brown et al. (2007), we integrate a training
state into the model and allow for active transition from the low-skilled state to the
medium-skilled state. The transition probabilities are the solutions of an optimiza-
70Their analysis is limited to the impact of subsidies on the workers decision to quit the rm
and thereby on the rms incentive to invest in rm-specic training.
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tion problem of the rms and the individuals, respectively.
The labor force is di¤erentiated according to its di¤erent skill levels, which are
dened by the level of educational attainment. It is assumed that each skill level
corresponds to a certain productivity level. Total population is divided into eight
groups (see Table 3.1): people being in school, S, people joining vocational training,
T , and those being either employed, Ni, or unemployed, Ui. The employed and
unemployed, respectively, are divided into three subgroups according to the skill
level i = l;m; h. Here, as well as for other variables below, the subscript l stands for
"low-skilled", the subscript m for "medium-skilled" and the subscript h for "high-
skilled".
state variable
low-skilled employment Nl
low-skilled unemployment Ul
medium-skilled employment Nm
medium-skilled unemployment Um
high-skilled employment Nh
high-skilled unemployment Uh
vocational training T
school S
Table 3.1: The States in the Model
Vocational training takes p periods, so that there are p cohorts. In each period,
a fraction +  leaves the vocational training where  is the death rate and  is the
drop-out rate with respect to training. So, given the inow into vocational training,
T1, the outow, p periods later, is given by T1(1  )p. The stock of people being
in vocational training is given by T = T1
Pp
c=1(1    )c 1.
For simplicity, there is no capital. Moreover, returns to labor are assumed to be
constant. Let ai be the productivity of an employee with a skill level i = l;m; h.
The rms face a random cost t, which is iid across workers and time.71 The cost
can be regarded as an operating cost or a productivity shock. With respect to all
employees, its mean is normalized to zero and its cumulative distribution  (t) is
time-invariant.
In the model, training takes place within the dual system of vocational training,
the dominant form in Germany. In this context, it is assumed that the people being
in training also receive a wage and that the rms pay for the non-wage costs of
training.72 In the following, for the sake of simplicity, the transition from school to
71See Brown et al. (2007).
72See chapter 4 for a discussion of the distribution of training costs between the rm and the
apprentice within the dual system of vocational training.
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training is assumed to be totally supply-driven.73
3.3.1 The Transitions between the States
The transitions between the di¤erent states are illustrated in Figure 3.1. In all states
apart from S, people face a probability  of dying. With respect to the people leaving
school, a fraction S decides to enter training. In the remainder, S is called "training
rate". The residual fraction (1 S) tries to get a job as a low-skilled employee; only
a fraction l is hired. A low-skilled employee faces a probability 'l of being red; a
fraction N decides to enter training. A fraction U of the low-skilled unemployed
decides to enter training; the remaining part, (1 U), faces a probability l of being
hired as low-skilled employee. With a probability  per period, an apprentice drops
out of training. By assumption, apprentices cannot be red. In this case, she is
either hired as a low-skilled employee with a probability l, or becomes a low-skilled
unemployed. An apprentice, who has nished training successfully and survives,
is hired as a medium-skilled employee with a probability T;Nm. A medium-skilled
employee faces a probability 'm of being red. An unemployed medium-skilled is
hired with a probability m.
The high-skilled labor force (Nh + Uh) is treated as a quasi-x factor, i.e. these
states are assumed to be una¤ected by the introduction of LWS. However, given
the government budget constraint, it is necessary to take these states into account,
because Nh also carries a part of the scal burden and Uh is responsible for a part of
the scal burden. Ignoring this aspect would bias the amount of the scal burden,
which has to be carried by the low-skilled and medium-skilled employees. Moreover,
the number of deaths is assumed to be equal to the number of people entering state
S, so that the relevant population (Nl +Ul +Nm +Um + T + S) is constant. Given
this, the labor market system can be described as follows:
Zt+1 =MTt+1 Zt (3.1)
where Zt is a vector of the di¤erent states:
Zt = (Nm;t, Um;t, Nl;t, Ul;t, T1;t, St) (3.2)
73See chapter 4 for a demand-driven transition. Both perspectives can be justied given the
mismatch in the market for vocational training. On the one hand, not all vacancies for vocational
training are lled (15,387 open vacancies at the end of september 2006). On the other hand, at
the same time, 49,453 applicants have no training position, see BMBF (2007).
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Figure 3.1: The Transitions between the States
andMT is a Markov matrix of the transition probabilities:
(3.3)
MT =
Ý1 ? jm ? _Þ Rm 0 0 RT,NmÝ1 ? _ ? SÞp 0
jm Ý1 ? Rm ? _Þ 0 0 Ý1 ? RT,NmÞÝ1 ? _ ? SÞp 0
0 0 Ý1 ? j l ? bN ? _Þ Ý1 ? bUÞ Rl S Rl >c=1
p
Ý1 ? _ ? SÞc?1 Ý1 ? bSÞ Rl
0 0 j l Ý1 ? Ý1 ? bUÞ Rl ? _ ? bUÞ S Ý1 ? RlÞ>c=1
p
Ý1 ? _ ? SÞc?1 Ý1 ? bSÞÝ1 ? RlÞ
0 0 bN bU 0 bS
_ _ _ _ _>c=1
p
Ý1 ? _ ? SÞc?1 0
3.3.2 The Characteristics of the Low-Wage Subsidies
Low-wages subsidies are directly paid to the low-skilled employee over the whole
period of employment. In the bargaining process, the low-wage subsidy is considered
as a constant . However, in the steady state, the subsidies are expressed in relation
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to the producer wage for the low-skilled, wl:
 =  wl (3.4)
where  is the subsidy rate. Moreover, as the subsidy is supposed to support the
income of low-skilled people, the low-wage subsidy is assumed to a¤ect not only
the level of the wage but also the level of the unemployment benet bl = l (wl
(1  tl)+) where l is the net replacement rate and tl is the tax rate, a low-skilled
worker is confronted with.
Generally speaking, there are three types of e¤ects of LWS on employment:
(i) direct employment e¤ect: Due to the Nash bargaining process, LWS reduce
the producer wage for low-skilled employment, wl. Hence, they increase the hiring
rate, l, and decrease the ring rate, 'l. Thus, the demand for low-skilled labor
rises and low-skilled employment, Nl, increases.
(ii) skill-acquisition e¤ect: LWS increase the consumer wages for low-skilled em-
ployees, !l = wl (1  tl + ). Thus, they reduce the incentive to acquire skills. The
training rate, S, decreases. Finally, the medium-skilled labor force declines. Every-
thing else equal, low-skilled employment increases and medium-skilled employment
decreases.
(iii) government budget e¤ect: LWS have to be nanced via taxes on wages.
This may cause an increasing tax burden, in particular for the skilled labor force.
Consequently, the negative impact of LWS on skill formation and nally on skilled
employment is amplied. However, it may be possible that due to the implementa-
tion of LWS the tax burden will decline. As a consequence of the LWS, the number
of people requiring unemployment benets may decrease and the number of people
paying taxes may increase. In total, the LWS may induce revenues, which can be
used to reduce the tax rates.
Naturally however, the e¤ects are interdependent, i.e. the direct employment
e¤ect has an impact on the skill-acquisition e¤ect because a variation of the hiring
and ring rate, respectively, also inuences the expected lifetime utility of a low-
skilled and thereby the decision of people being in state S whether to remain low-
skilled or not.
The agents follow  similar to Brown et al. (2007)  a certain sequence of
decisions. First, the government sets the tax rates to ensure that the tax receipts
are equal to its expenditures, which are the sum of unemployment benets and
LWS. Second, the random costs are detected. Third, wages are determined through
Nash bargaining. Fourth, employment decisions are made and nally, the training
decision is made.
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3.3.3 Government Budget Constraint
When analyzing the government budget constraint, three policy instruments have
to be taken into account: (i) the payroll tax with a rate ti, (ii) the unemployment
benet bi and (iii) the low-wage subsidy  =  wl, where  is the subsidy rate.
The tax rate has three levels to match a progressive tax system (th > tm > tl).
The ratios are assumed to be exogenous, whereas the levels are set so that the tax
receipts are equal to the governments expenditures. When LWS are implemented,
also the tax rate of the low-skilled, tl, is assumed to be a¤ected. Moreover, it is
assumed that people being engaged in vocational training do not pay taxes. The
government budget constraint is expressed as follows:
P
i=l;m;h ti wi Ni =
P
i=l;m;h bi Ui +  wl Nl (3.5)
The left-hand side stands for the tax receipts of the government, generated by the
tax on labor income. The term on the right-hand side represents the sum of the
unemployment benets and the amount of LWS paid to all low-skilled employees
over the whole period of employment.
3.3.4 Wage Determination
The producer wage wi;t for each skill level i is assumed to be the outcome of a Nash
bargain between the median insider of that skill level and the rm in period t.74
The median insider faces no risk of dismissal at the negotiated wage. The wage
is renegotiated in each period. First, the relevant surplus of the employee and the
rm, respectively, is calculated. Second, the wage for the low-skilled worker, wl;t,
is calculated to illustrate the impact of the low-wage subsidy. Then, by setting the
subsidy rate  = 0, it is easy to derive the wage for the medium-skilled and the
high-skilled worker.
Surplus of the Employee Each low-skilled person has the following utility func-
tion:
ul;t(Cl;t) =
1
1   [Cl;t]
1  (3.6)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. Utility depends positively on
consumption Cl;t. In this model, for simplicity, workers consume all their income,
i.e. either the consumer wage in the case of employment or the unemployment
benet in the case of unemployment. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no
74The wage of the apprentice, wv, is assumed to be set unilaterally by the rm.
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disutility of labor. Under bargaining agreement, the employee receives the consumer
wage !l = wl(1 tl)+ in each period. The present value of the employees expected
lifetime utility in period t, V Nl;t , is:
V Nl;t =
1
1   [wl;t (1  tl;t)+]
1 + Et [(1 'l  N) V Nl;t+1+'l V Ul;t+1+N V Tt+1]
(3.7)
where  is the discount factor and V Ul;t+1 is the expected lifetime utility for an unem-
ployed in period t + 1. (Here, as well as for other variables below, the superscript
N stands for "employed" and the superscript U for "unemployed"). V Tt+1 is the ex-
pected lifetime utility given that the person starts a vocational training. In the case
of disagreement, the employees fallback position is assumed to be equal to the un-
employment benet, bl;t. It is assumed that disagreement in the current period does
not a¤ect the expected future lifetime utility. Thus, in the case of disagreement, the
present value of the expected lifetime utility in period t, V d;Nl;t , is:
V d;Nl;t =
1
1   [bl;t]
1  +  Et [(1  'l     N) V Nl;t+1 + 'l V Ul;t+1 + N V Tt+1] (3.8)
Given the expected present value in the case of agreement and disagreement, respec-
tively, the bargaining surplus of the employee, SEl;t (= V
N
l;t  V d;Nl;t ), can be calculated:
SEl;t =
1
1   [wl;t (1  tl;t) + ]
1    1
1   [bl;t]
1  (3.9)
Surplus of the Firm Under bargaining agreement, the rm, which employs a
low-skilled worker, receives the expected prot (al   wl;t) in each period t. The
present value of the expected prots in time t, l;t, is:
l;t = (al   wl;t) +  Et (1  'l     N) l;t+1 +  'l ( & l;t+1) (3.10)
where & l are the ring costs.75 In the case of disagreement the employee imposes
the maximal cost on the rm (e.g. by strike, work-to-rule, sabotage) short of in-
ducing dismissal. The rms fallback position is negative; it is approximated by the
ring costs. Again, it is assumed that disagreement in the current period does not
a¤ect future prots. Thus, the present value of the expected prots in the case of
75The way, in which the transition rate N is introduced into the calculation implies that the
transition is linked to a change of the rm. A low-skilled worker, who decides to enter training,
has to leave the rm. This is based on the assumption that there are two types of rms: (i) rms,
which only employ low-skilled workers and (ii) rms, which are engaged in training and employ
medium-skilled workers. This can be justied by the assumption that the rms are engaged in
di¤erent sectors with di¤erent requirements with respect to human capital.
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disagreement is:
dl;t =  & l;t +  Et (1  'l     N) l;t+1 +  'l ( & l;t+1) (3.11)
Finally, the bargaining surplus of the rm, SFl;t (= l;t   dl;t) can be calculated:
SFl;t = (al;t   wl;t) + & l;t (3.12)
Nash Bargaining The negotiated wage wl;t maximizes the Nash product, l;t,
which is given by:
l;t = (S
E
l;t)
 (SFl;t)
1  (3.13)
where  2 h0; 1i denotes the bargaining power of the employee and 1  represents
the bargaining power of the rm.
To determine the wage, the following equation has to be solved:
@ l;t
@ wl;t
!
= 0
The result is:
(1 tl) (al wl+& l) (wl tl wl+) 1+   = (1 ) ( bl +(wl tl wl+)) (3.14)
with  = (1   ). In the steady state, (i) the ring costs are given by & l = c' wl,
(ii) the low-wage subsidy is given by  =  wl and (iii) the unemployment benet
level is dened on the basis of the economy-wide average net wage for this skill level:
bl = l wl (1  tl + ). Finally, the negotiated wage is:
wl = al (1  tl)   =
"
1  tl (1  l (1  )   (1   + c' ))
+   l (1  )(1 + )   (1  (1  c')l + )
#
(3.15)
It can be shown that: @wl
@
< 0, i.e. an increasing low-wage subsidy rate reduces the
producer wage of the low-skilled.
Concerning medium-skilled and high-skilled employment, respectively, the wage
is calculated in the same way, but with one exception:  = 0 = . Hence, the wage
is given by:
wi =
ai  (1  )
(1  1 i ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  c')
for i = m;h (3.16)
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3.3.5 Transition Rates
Having analyzed the impact of LWS on the wage, wl, next, the relevant transition
rates are derived, i.e. the hiring rate and the ring rate concerning low-skilled
employment, l and 'l, respectively, as well as the training rate, S.
76 They are
inuenced by the implementation of LWS.
Hiring and Firing Rates According to eq. (3.15), LWS reduce the producer
wage and thereby have a positive impact on the ring and the hiring rate, respec-
tively. In a rst step, consider the present value of the expected prots in period t,
generated by a low-skilled employee:
l;t =  k;t + (al   wl)
1X
j=0
j (1  'l     N)j
   'l & l
1X
j=0
j (1  'l     N)j
with k = l; 'l (3.17)
Recall that the hiring and ring decision, respectively, is made after the random
cost, k;t, is revealed. The random cost can be interpreted as an operating cost or a
productivity shock. Its mean is normalized to zero and its cumulative distribution
 k(k;t), with k = l; 'l, is time-invariant. After rewriting eq. (3.17), the prot is
given by:
l;t =  k;t + (al   wl)   'l c' wl
1  (1  'l     N)
with k = l; 'l (3.18)
For a given hiring cost per worker, l, an unemployed is hired whenever l > l.
After substituting l according to eq. (3.18), and taking into account that l = c
wl, the hiring rate is given by:77
l =  l(
(al   wl)   'l c' wl
1  (1  'l     N)
  c wl) (3.19)
For a given ring cost per worker, & l, an employee is red whenever l <  & l. After
substituting l according to eq. (3.18), and taking into account that & l = c' wl, the
76In the following, the transition rates N and U are treated as constants. Thus, these rates
are assumed to be not a¤ected by the low-wage subsidies. As N and U are small compared to
S , the quantitative impact is low. However, taking this impact into account, would signicantly
increase the complexity of the model.
77See Appendix 7.2.1 for a derivation of the hiring rate.
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ring rate is given by:78
'l = 1   'l(
(al   wl)    'l c' wl
1  (1  'l     N)
+ c' wl) (3.20)
Training Rate The training rate, S, quanties the transition from school, S,
to training, T . It is modeled as a function of the di¤erence between the expected
lifetime utility of being low-skilled and the expected lifetime utility of being medium-
skilled. Therefore, the relevant utility equations are described and then, the training
rate, S, is derived.
Each person being in stage S has to decide whether to enter training or whether
to remain low-skilled. In the rst case, the person will be hired as a medium-
skilled employee with a probability, T;Nm, after having nished vocational training
successfully. In the second case, the person will be hired as a low-skilled employee
with a probability l immediately.
Each worker maximizes the expected lifetime utility, V , given the wages as well
as the hiring and ring rates when being low-skilled or medium-skilled, respectively.
The notations for the utilities in the di¤erent states are listed in Table 3.2.
expected lifetime utility of a ... variable
low-skilled employee V Nl
low-skilled unemployed person V Ul
medium-skilled employee V Nm
medium-skilled unemployed person V Um
person entering training V T
Table 3.2: The Expected Lifetime Utility in the Di¤erent States
The expected lifetime utility of remaining low-skilled is:
Vl;t = l V
N
l;t + (1  l) V Ul;t (3.21)
A person, who decides to enter the low-skilled labor market, will be hired with
probability l. In this case, the expected lifetime utility is given by V
N
l;t :
79
V Nl;t =
1
1   (!l)
1  +  Et [(1  'l   ) V Nl;t+1 + 'l V Ul;t+1] (3.22)
78See Appendix 7.2.2 for a derivation of the ring rate.
79In the following, it is in contrast to eq. (3.7) not taken into account that also a low-skilled
person can decide to enter training (which is illustrated by the rate N for the low-skilled employed
and by the rate U for the low-skilled unemployed). This is justied by the idea that the decision-
making in state S is the motivation of this calculation. A person being in state S is assumed to
not take into account the possiblity to enter training at a later point in time. Moreover, addressing
also this e¤ect would signicantly increase the complexity of the model.
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With a probability (1   l), the person will be unemployed and will realize an
expected lifetime utility V Ul;t , which is given by:
V Ul;t =
1
1   (bl)
1  +  Et [(1  l   ) V Ul;t+1 + l V Nl;t+1] (3.23)
In the steady state, V Nl;t = V
N
l;t+1 and V
U
l;t = V
U
l+1. By substituting V
N
l;t and V
U
l;t in eq.
(3.21) by the corresponding eq. (3.22) and eq. (3.23), respectively, the steady state
expression for the expected lifetime utility of remaining low-skilled is obtained:
Vl =
bl (1  l    ((1  l) (1  )  'l)) + l (1 +  ) !l
 (1   (1  )) (1   (1  l     'l))
with:  = 1  
(3.24)
A person, who decides to enter training, realizes the following expected lifetime
utility in the steady state:
V T =
1
1   (wv)
1  Pp
c=1 
c 1(1    )c 1 (3.25)
+   [l V
N
l + (1  l) V Ul ]
Pp
c=1 
c 1 (1    )c 1
+ p (1    ) [T;Nm V Nm + (1  T;Nm) V Um ]
The expression in the rst row on the right-hand side illustrates the utility generated
by the income in the phase of vocational training. The second row shows the utility
generated by the expected income in the case of dropping out of training. Finally,
the third row illustrates the utility generated by the expected income in the case of
being a medium-skilled person after having nished training successfully.
People are assumed to face a disutility of training, e, i.e. some people e.g. face
high mobility costs if the place of training is far away from home.80 People are
assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of their disutility of training. A person in S
only decides to enter training, if
V T   e  Vl (3.26)
By substituting V T and Vl by the expressions given in eq. (3.25) and eq. (3.24),
respectively, an equation for e = V T   Vl, is obtained, where e represents the
costs of the marginal worker, i.e. the costs of the worker who is indi¤erent between
entering training and remaining low-skilled. Only people with e < e decide to enter
training. As the fraction of the people in S, who enter training (i.e. the training
rate S), is of special interest, the relationship between e and S has to be modeled.
80Here, it is assumed that disutility of training is only caused by the individuals intrinsic costs.
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The higher the marginal costs, e, the higher is S. The workers are ordered in terms
of their individual disutility e, from the lowest to the highest. The training rate,
S, is given by the following function: S(e), with (@S=@e) > 0. For simplicity,
it is assumed that S = x (e) with x;  > 0, where  denotes the elasticity of the
training rate with respect to the utility di¤erence. Finally, the training rate, S, is
given by:
S = x (V
T   Vl) (3.27)
The intuition is straightforward. The implementation of LWS, with a rate , in-
creases the consumer wage of the low-skilled worker, !l. According to eq. (3.24),
the expected utility in the case of remaining low-skilled, Vl, increases. So, the value
on the right-hand side in eq. (3.27) and nally S declines. The higher the ex-
pected utility being associated with remaining low-skilled, the lower is the disutility
of training of the marginal worker (i.e. the disutility for which V T   e = Vl) for a
given value of V T . Thus, the fraction of people for which entering training is still
protable declines and S decreases.
It may be possible that varying the di¤erence in utility (V T Vl) does not cause a
linear reduction in the training rate. Therefore, a parameter  is introduced, which
is the elasticity of the training rate S with respect to the di¤erence (V T  Vl). The
lower , the lower is the reduction in S for a given variation of (V T   Vl).
3.3.6 Labor Market Equilibrium
The following system of equations constitutes the labor market equilibrium:
 the steady state expressions of the six dynamic equations given by the transi-
tion matrix (3.3),81
 the government budget constraint: eq. (3.5),82
 the equation for the wage of the low-skilled wl: eq. (3.15),
 the equation determining the transition rate S: eq. (3.27), and nally
 the equations determining the hiring rate l and the ring rate 'l: eq. (3.19)
and eq. (3.20), respectively.
81Recall that the total number of people being in training is given by T = T1
Pp
c=1(1  )c 1.
Moreover, the relevant population is normalized to 1: S + T +Nl + Ul +Nm + Um = 1.
82As the equation, which describes the government budget constraint contains three tax rates,
it is necessary to introduce two additional equations in order to close the model. They describe
the ratios between the tax rates, th, tm and tl.
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3.4 Numerical Evaluation
3.4.1 Calibration
In the initial steady state (i.e. in the absence of LWS), some variables are treated as
exogenous, but in the presence of subsidies, they are treated as endogenous. One ex-
ample is the training rate S. In the initial steady state, the training rate is treated
as an exogenous variable so that the necessary parameter of the corresponding dis-
tribution for the random costs can be derived. However, in the presence of subsidies,
the parameter will be treated as given and the training rate will be a function of
the subsidies.
The model is calibrated for Germany with a year as unit of time (see Table 3.3
for a summary of the calibration). The real annual interest rate is set at 4:0%, which
leads to a discount factor of  = 0:962. For simplicity, the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion (CRRA) is set at  = 0.83 The death rate is set at 0:023, which corresponds
to an average working lifetime of about 44 years.84 The number of periods, p, a
person is engaged in vocational training is set at 3.85 The drop-out rate, , is set
at 0:037. The value of the death rate and the value of the drop-out rate imply that
roughly 17% of the apprentices do not nish vocational training successfully, which
is in line with the empirical data.86 According to Wilkes Kaplan-Meier functions for
Germany (Wilke, 2005), the hiring rates for the high-skilled, the medium-skilled and
the low-skilled are set at h = 0:55, m = 0:59 and l = 0:49. Moreover, according
to the BMBF (2004, 2007) about 25% of the people who have successfully nished
vocational training become unemployed, thus the corresponding hiring rate, T;Nm
is set at 0:75.
The labor market states are dened and quantied as follows. The low-skilled
labor force (Nl +Ul) includes people with an educational attainment corresponding
to less than upper-secondary education.87 The medium-skilled labor force (Nm+Um)
contains all people with vocational upper secondary education. People with post-
secondary and tertiary education are considered as being high-skilled (Nh + Uh).
The corresponding values can be calculated on the basis of data from the OECD
83This value implies risk neutrality.
84The value is roughly in line with the empirical data. Working life begins at the age of 17 and
according to Brussig and Wojtkowski (2006), retirement takes places between 62 and 63 years.
85This corresponds to the typical length of training within the dual system in Germany.
86Given the data for the number of new apprentices and the number of successful apprentices
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006), the value can be conrmed.
87This classication corresponds to the conventional denition, which classies people with an
educational attainment corresponding to at most level 2 of the International Standard Classication
of Education as low-skilled.
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(1999 to 2005).88
Based on data from the German national accounts, the aggregate productivity,
a, is set at 54; 243 EUR and the aggregate producer wage, w, which is calculated as
average gross wage per employee plus social security contributions, is set at 32; 520
EUR.89 In order to get the wages for the di¤erent skill groups, the corresponding
OECD indices for the relative earnings of the population with income from employ-
ment for di¤erent skill groups are used. They yield the following ratios: wh=w = 1:27,
wm=w = 0:92 and wl=w = 0:72.90 According to Beicht and Walden (2002), the wage
of a person being engaged in vocational training is set at wv = 8; 269 EUR and the
productivity of an apprentice is set at av = 7; 730 EUR. Moreover, according to
Beicht and Walden (2002) the annual, non-wage costs of training are 8; 166 EUR.
As 30% (see Dohmen and Hoi, 2004) are tax-deductible, the relevant costs are set
at kv = 5; 717 EUR.
The net replacement rates are set at l = 0:7825, m = 0:6825 and h = 0:6467.
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According to Chen and Funke (2005), the hiring cost is set at 10% of the wage and
the ring cost is set at 60% of the wage, thus the corresponding parameters are
c = 0:1 and c' = 0:6. In order to calculate the tax rates, the income tax scale
of the year 2002, described in Boss and Elendner (2003), is used. It illustrates the
progressive character of the German tax system. The following ratios are obtained:
th=tl = 1:437 and tm=tl = 1:178. Given the data for the transition rates between the
training system and the labor market according to Reinberg and Hummel (2006),
the training rate, S = 0:70, and the ratio U=N = 3:6, can be calculated.
Based on these values and the equations of the model, also the bargaining power,
the productivities for the di¤erent skill levels, the tax rates and the missing transition
rates for the initial steady state can be calculated. Then, V T can be determined
according to eq. (3.25), Vl according to eq. (3.24) and nally e = V T   Vl for
the initial state state. Setting the training elasticity  = 1 and given the initial
values for e and S, it is possible to calculate the value of the parameter x. It is
independent of the level of subsidies and thus remains constant.
Finally, the values of the rst derivative of the cumulative density functions in
the model,  0l and  
0
'l
, are calculated. They determine the elasticity of the hiring
and ring rate, respectively, with respect to the wage of the low-skilled. In this
88See Appendix 7.2.3.
89Statistisches Bundesamt (2008). The values are calculated as the averages of the corresponding
annual data for the period 2000 - 2007.
90See OECD (1999-2005). These values imply a ratio wm=wl = 1:26, which is in line with the
corresponding data reported by Wienert (2006).
91The values are net replacement rates (unweighted average across six family types) of workers
with 67, 100 and 150 percent of average productivity, see OECD (2006).
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variable /
parameter description value source
 discount factor 0:962 standard value
 CRRA 0:0 assumption
p periods of vocational training 3 standard value for Germany
 death rate 0:023 to match the working life
 drop-out rate of training 0:037 to match the empirical data
h hiring rate (high-skilled) 0:55
m hiring rate (medium-skilled) 0:59 Wilke (2005)
l hiring rate (low-skilled) 0:49
T;Nm hiring rate after training 0:75 BMBF (2004, 2007)
S training rate 0:70 own calculations based on
U = N ratio of transition rates 3:6 Reinberg and Hummel (2006)
a aggregate productivity 54; 243 Statistisches
w aggregate producer wage 32; 520 Bundesamt (2008)
wh=w relative earnings (high-skilled) 1:27
wm=w relative earnings (medium-skilled) 0:92 OECD (1999-2005)
wl=w relative earnings (low-skilled) 0:72
av productivity of an apprentice 7; 730 Beicht and Walden (2002)
wv wage of an apprentice 8; 269
kv non-wage costs of training 5; 717 Beicht and Walden (2002),
Dohmen and Hoi (2004)
h replacement rate (high-skilled) 0:6467
m replacement rate (medium-skilled) 0:6825 OECD (2006)
l replacement rate (low-skilled) 0:7825
c hiring cost in relation to the wage 0:1 Chen and Funke (2005)
c' ring cost in relation to the wage 0:6
th = tl ratio of tax rates (1) 1:437 Boss and Elendner (2003)
tm = tl ratio of tax rates (2) 1:178
 elasticity of the training rate 1 assumption
Table 3.3: Exogenous Values in the Initial Steady State
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context, the model is linearized around the initial steady state,92 and the long-run
e¤ect of the wage reduction, as permanent deviation from the initial steady state,
is calculated. The wage reduction corresponds to the implementation of LWS and
illustrates the new steady state. For this purpose, empirical estimates summarized in
Orszag and Snower (1999b) are used. The rst derivative of the cumulative function
for the hiring rate,  0l;0, is set in such a way that the hiring elasticity with respect
to the wage, ela(l), is equal to  2:25.93 Also in line with the aforementioned
literature, the rst derivative of the cumulative density function with respect to the
ring rate,  0'l;0, is set in such a way that the ring elasticity with respect to the
wage, ela('l), is 1. The derived values are summarized in Table 3.4.
variable / basis of
parameter description value calculation
Ul low-skilled unemployment 0:034
Nl low-skilled employment 0:150
Um medium-skilled unemployment 0:067 see Appendix 7.2.3
Nm medium-skilled employment 0:670
T people in vocational training 0:057
S people in school 0:022
 bargaining power 0:200 eq. (3.16)
ah productivity (high-skilled) 75; 877 for i = l;m; h
am productivity (medium-skilled) 50; 621 and a =
al productivity (low-skilled) 30; 364
alNl+amNm+ahNh+av T
Nl+Nm+Nh+T
th tax rate (high-skilled) 0:070 ratios of tax rates
tm tax rate (medium-skilled) 0:057 and eq. (3.5)
tl tax rate (low-skilled) 0:049 with  = 0
'm ring rate (medium-skilled) 0:055 see Appendix 7.2.3
3rd and 4th eq.
'l ring rate (low-skilled) 0:094 of matrix MT and
U training rate (low-skilled unempl.) 0:061 and ratio of the
N training rate (low-skilled empl.) 0:017 transition rates
x parameter of the S - function 2:03  10 5 x = S(e)
1st derivative of the cumulative
 0l;0 density function (hiring rate) 6:24  10 6 eq. (A2.1.2a)
1st derivative of the cumulative
 0'l;0 density function (ring rate) 5:85  10 7 eq. (A2.2.2a)
Table 3.4: Derived Values in the Initial Steady State
The calibration implies that the employment rate of the low-skilled labor force
is erl = 0:815 and that the employment rate of the medium-skilled labor force is
92See Appendix 7.2.1 for the hiring rate and Appendix 7.2.2 for the ring rate.
93According to Orszag and Snower (1999b), the elasticity of the hiring rate with respect to a
permanent change in wage ranges between  4:0 and  0:5.
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erm = 0:910. In the following simulations the employment rate of the low-skilled
will increase signicantly but will not exceed erm = 0:910.
3.4.2 Numerical Results
Next, the impact of LWS on skill formation, employment and welfare is analyzed in
detail. Concerning the hiring rate and the ring rate, the linearized versions of the
corresponding equations are used.94
Impact on Skill Formation and Employment Figure 3.2 illustrates the impact
of the LWS on employment for di¤erent subsidy rates,  (benchmark simulation).
Recall that the relevant population (Nl + Ul + Nm + Um + T + S) is normalized
to 1. As expected, low-skilled employment rises with an increasing subsidy rate, .
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Figure 3.2: Employment as a Function of 
However, medium-skilled employment decreases simultaneously. The introduction of
LWS reduces the di¤erence between the relevant consumer wages as !l increases and
!m decreases. Thus, the incentive to enter training and thereby the transition rate,
S, decreases. As a consequence of the skill-acquisition e¤ect, the medium-skilled
labor force and nally medium-skilled employment decreases signicantly. However,
the low-skilled labor force increases strongly. Moreover, also the demand for low-
skilled labor increases, as the introduction of the LWS increases the hiring rate, l,
and reduces the ring rate, 'l. Altogether, the e¤ect on aggregate employment is
imperceptible.95
94See Appendix 7.2.1 and Appendix 7.2.2.
95In the graph, the sum only contains low-skilled and medium-skilled employment as well as
people being in training. To get total employment, high-skilled employment has to be added.
However, this component is assumed to be constant, so the dynamics do not change.
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E¢ ciency of the Subsidies
When analyzing the impact of LWS, the impact on the tax rates is important to
know. In this context, there are two opposing e¤ects of LWS. On the one hand, the
implementation of LWS increases the expenditures of the government and therefore
requires higher tax rates, given the government budget constraint. However, on the
other hand, it has to be taken into account that LWS also reduce the number of
unemployed people and so the number of people requiring unemployment benets.
Hence, the tax rates may decrease if the reduction in the payment of unemployment
benets is higher than the expenditures for LWS. The numerical analysis reveals that
the expenditures for unemployment benets decrease when LWS are implemented.
However the reduction is not su¢ cient to compensate the expenditures for LWS.
Thus, LWS are not self-nancing and their implementation raises the tax rates.
The missing self-nancing of LWS can be explained by two factors.
First, there is a deadweight e¤ect (DW), which is dened as follows:96
DW = 1  additional employment
subsidized employment
The implementation of low-skilled subsidies causes a high deadweight e¤ect. The
reason is that in the absence of LWS, a high fraction of the low-skilled labor force
(erl = 0:815) is already employed, which however also gets LWS.
Second, there is the wage e¤ect. LWS can contribute to a reduction of unem-
ployment if they cause a reduction in the producer wage, which would increase the
hiring incentives. However, in the wage bargaining process, the rms are able to reap
only a part of the additional surplus caused by the subsidies. So the decline of the
producer wage (in absolute terms) is lower than the amount of the subsidy. Hence,
the increase in low-skilled employment is lower than it could be. The wage e¤ect not
only reduces the positive impact of subsidies on the demand side. It also a¤ects the
supply side, as LWS reduce the incentive to become medium-skilled and therefore
reduce skilled employment. Thus, the increase in low-skilled employment has to be
adjusted by the decline in medium-skilled employment. This is done by calculating
the additional aggregate employment. In this case the deadweight e¤ect is roughly
94% (for  = 0:3). When taking only the additional low-skilled employment into
account, the deadweight e¤ect is only 31%.
96If the implementation of subsidies does not create additional employment, i.e. subsidies are
only paid to people who would have been employed also in the absence of subsidies, then there
is only deadweight (i.e. DW = 1). If the implementation of subsidies causes an increase in
employment that is equal to the number of subsidized persons, only persons get subsidies who
would not have been employed in the absence of subsidies (i.e. DW = 0).
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Robustness of the Results
In the benchmark simulation, the results are based on the exogenously given values
for the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion,  = 0, the elasticity of the hiring rate,
ela(l) =  2:25, and the elasticity of the training rate,  = 1. The robustness of
the simulation results is checked by modifying these parameter values. In all cases,
the subsidy rate is set at  = 0:1.
For the elasticity of the hiring rate, Orszag and Snower (1999b) report a range,
 4  ela(l)   0:5. Therefore, the impact of LWS on employment is calculated
for these boundary values (see Table 3.5).
transition rates employment employment
rate
ela(l) l 'l S erl Nl T Nm sum
 0:5 0:5068 0:0873 0:4576 0:8290 0:2442 0:0493 0:5763 0:8698
 2:25 0:5655 0:0873 0:4283 0:8469 0:2647 0:0480 0:5611 0:8738
 4 0:6242 0:0873 0:4037 0:8620 0:2829 0:0469 0:5479 0:8777
Table 3.5: Robustness Check with Respect to the Hiring Elasticity
The higher ela(l) in absolute terms, the higher is the hiring rate l. The positive
impact on the demand for low-skilled labor is illustrated by the employment rate
erl.97 Moreover, the increase in the hiring rate also increases the expected lifetime
utility in the case of remaining low-skilled relative to the expected lifetime utility
in the case of being trained. Thus, the training rate, S, decreases with an  in
absolute terms increasing hiring elasticity. Therefore the low-skilled labor force
increases. Finally, the higher ela(l), the higher is the low-skilled employment and
the lower is the medium-skilled employment. The robustness check reveals that the
positive direct employment e¤ect is strengthened relative to the other e¤ects. So, a
higher ela(l) increases aggregate employment.
With respect to risk aversion, a second value,  = 0:5, is assumed, which implies
risk aversion instead of risk neutrality. First, in the case of risk aversion, the relative
transition rates employment employment
rate
 l 'l S erl Nl T Nm sum
0 0:5655 0:0873 0:4283 0:8469 0:2647 0:0480 0:5611 0:8738
0:5 0:5651 0:0873 0:2743 0:8467 0:3239 0:0430 0:5021 0:8690
Table 3.6: Robustness Check with Respect to the Degree of Risk Aversion
di¤erence between the expected lifetime utility being associated with remaining low-
97Recall that in absence of LWS the employment rate of the low-skilled labor force is 0:815.
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skilled, Vl, and the expected lifetime utility being associated with being medium-
skilled, V T , is lower than in the benchmark simulation. Risk aversion reinforces the
negative impact of LWS on the transition rate S (see Table 3.6). Hence, low-skilled
employment increases, training as well as medium-skilled employment decrease more
strongly compared to the benchmark simulation. However, total employment is
relatively robust.
Finally, a robustness check with respect to the elasticity of the training rate, ,
is conducted. According to eq. (3.27),  determines to which extent a variation of
the utility di¤erence (V T   Vl) is translated into a variation of the training rate S.
A lower elasticity of the training rate, , reduces the impact of a given low-wage
subsidy on the training rate and thereby the skill-acquisition e¤ect. The e¤ect of
the LWS on employment, given two di¤erent values of , is shown in Table 3.7.
transition rates employment employment
rate
 l 'l S erl Nl T Nm sum
1 0:5655 0:0873 0:4283 0:8469 0:2647 0:0480 0:5611 0:8738
0:5 0:5652 0:0873 0:5515 0:8468 0:2173 0:0520 0:6083 0:8777
Table 3.7: Robustness Check with Respect to Training Elasticity
LWS raise low-skilled employment and reduce medium-skilled employment. For
 = 0:5, both movements are signicantly weaker than in the benchmark simulation
( = 1). However, aggregate employment is again quite robust.
Summing up, the introduction of LWS, low-skilled employment increases and
medium-skilled employment decreases. The size of the positive direct employment
e¤ect (illustrated by the impact on the employment rate, erl) depends in particular
on the elasticity of the hiring rate. The size of the negative skill-acquisition e¤ect
(illustrated by the impact on the training rate, S) depends on the elasticity of the
hiring rate, the degree of risk aversion and the elasticity of the training rate.
Impact on Aggregate Employment over Di¤erent Channels
In the following the relative strengths of the di¤erent channels, through which
LWS a¤ect aggregate employment, are analyzed in detail. This is done by conducting
the same calculation as in the previous section; however, in each calculation, one
e¤ect is suppressed.
In the following it has to be taken into account that the di¤erent channels do
overlap, as there are several interactions between the channels, i.e. the employment
e¤ect has a strong impact on the skill-acquisition e¤ect because a variation of the
hiring and ring rate also inuences the expected lifetime utility of a low-skilled
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and thereby a¤ects the decision of people being in state S whether to remain low-
skilled. Moreover, the government budget constraint can be regarded as part of
the skill-acquisition e¤ect. Finally, due to the overlapping, the cumulative e¤ect of
the di¤erent channels is not equal to the total e¤ect. Figure 3.3 shows aggregate
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Figure 3.3: Employment as Function of  in the Absence of Di¤erent E¤ects
employment as a function of LWS for four di¤erent types of modeling. The black line
corresponds to the black line in Figure 3.2 and serves as a benchmark. In addition,
three modications are considered. In order to explain the results, it is also helpful
to regard Table 3.8, which shows the results for  = 0:2.
parameter benchmark without direct without without
simulation employment skill-acquisition government
e¤ect e¤ect budget e¤ect
l 0:634098 0:49000 0:630925 0:629565
'l 0:081433 0:09400 0:081703 0:081819
erl 0:871053 0:814692 0:870024 0:869580
tm 0:097542 0:097496 0:069558 0:069749
!m 26924:7 26926:1 27759:6 27753:9
!l 22890:2 22891:2 23454:4 23526:0
S 0:18429 0:27549 0:70000 0:23649
wl 20489:0 20489:1 20556:8 20585:9
Nm 0:45972 0:51159 0:66184 0:48063
Nl 0:37695 0:30248 0:16810 0:35477
T 0:03933 0:04377 0:056626 0:041122
Nm +Nl + T 0:87601 0:85784 0:88656 0:87652
Table 3.8: Strengths of the Di¤erent E¤ects
For the analysis, it is useful to distinguish between the e¤ects on the demand
side and the e¤ects on the supply side. The direct employment e¤ect a¤ects in
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particular the demand for low-skilled labor. The e¤ect is illustrated by a variation
of the employment rate erl. Recall that LWS reduce the producer wage according to
eq. (3.15) and therefore a¤ect the hiring rate, l, and the ring rate, 'l, and nally
the employment rate. The e¤ect on the supply side is illustrated by a variation of
the training rate, S, i.e. the fraction of people in state S who decide to become
medium-skilled. Recall that the training rate, S, is a function of the di¤erence
between the expected lifetime utility being associated with becoming medium-skilled
and the expected lifetime utility being associated with remaining low-skilled. The
di¤erence, again, is also a function of the consumer wages, !m and !l. Given this,
two e¤ects can be identied on the supply side. The di¤erence between the consumer
wages and ultimately the training rate is directly inuenced by the subsidies (skill-
acquisition e¤ect) but also indirectly as the taxes have to be adjusted (government
budget e¤ect). As the subsidies inuence unemployment and nally the number of
people requiring unemployment benets, the tax rates have to be adjusted due to
the implementation of LWS. Finally, it has to be taken into account that also on the
supply side, the direct employment e¤ect is working, as the variation of the hiring
rate, l, and the ring rate, 'l, respectively, a¤ects the expected lifetime utilities
and ultimately the training rate, S.
In order to analyze and quantify the size of the di¤erent e¤ects separately, one
e¤ect after the other is suppressed in the remainder. Comparing each result with
the benchmark simulation allows us to quantify the size of each e¤ect.
First, the direct employment e¤ect is suppressed.98 Compared to the benchmark
simulation, the demand for low-skilled workers (illustrated by erl) is lower because
the hiring rate, l, remains on the lower initial level (i.e. level in the absence of
subsidies: 0:49) and the ring rate remains on the higher initial level. Moreover,
the supply of low-killed labor is lower; as the training rate, S, does not decrease as
much as in the benchmark simulation, the reduction in medium-skilled labor supply
is lower. The second impact on the supply side is quantitatively negligible. Due
to the absence of the direct employment e¤ect, the unemployment and nally the
number of people requiring unemployment benets is higher. Therefore, the tax
rates are supposed to be higher and the consumer wages, !m and !l, are supposed
to be lower than in the benchmark simulation. However, here, this e¤ect is almost
nonexistent as the variations of tax rates and thereby of the consumer wages are
roughly the same. In total, medium-skilled employment is higher and low-skilled
employment is lower than in the benchmark simulation, aggregate employment is
98Here, the hiring rate, l, and the rng rate, 'l, are assumed to be una¤ected by the presence
of subsidies.
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lower. The e¤ect of LWS on aggregate employment in the absence of the direct
employment e¤ect is illustrated by the gray dashed line in Figure 3.3. Thus, the
direct employment e¤ect (i.e. the di¤erence between the black and the gray dashed
line), has a signicantly positive e¤ect on aggregate employment. Recall that the
size of the e¤ect is strongly inuenced by the hiring elasticity.
In a second case, the skill-acquisition e¤ect is suppressed.99 Compared to the
benchmark simulation, there is with respect to the demand side no perceptible
di¤erence, i.e. the employment rate of the low-skilled hardly changes. However,
there is a crucial di¤erence on the supply side. The training rate, S, remains
on the higher initial level. Thus, the medium-skilled labor force is not reduced in
favor of the low-skilled labor force. Given the same employment rates but a higher
medium-skilled labor force as in the benchmark simulation, now, medium-skilled
employment is higher and low-skilled employment is lower than in the benchmark
simulation. As the labor force component with the higher employment rate has a
higher weight than in the benchmark simulation, aggregate employment is higher
than in the benchmark simulation. In other words, the skill-acquisition e¤ect, if
considered separately, has a signicantly negative e¤ect on aggregate employment
(di¤erence between black line and black dashed line in Figure 3.3). Recall that the
size of the e¤ect is inuenced by the elasticity of the hiring rate, the degree of risk
aversion and the elasticity of the training rate.
In a third case, the government budget e¤ect is suppressed.100 This e¤ect can
be regarded as a part of the skill-acquisition e¤ect. When analyzing this e¤ect,
a direct and an indirect e¤ect of LWS have to be taken into account. First, the
implementation of LWS increases the expenditures of the government and therefore
requires on its own higher tax rates. Second, it has to be taken into account
that LWS may also reduce the number of unemployed people and so the number
of people requiring unemployment benets. If the reduction in the payment of
unemployment benets is higher than the expenditures for LWS, the tax rates can
be reduced. However, the results reveal that the reduction in the expenditures for
unemployment benets is not su¢ cient to compensate the expenditures for LWS.
Ultimately, the implementation of LWS causes an increase in the tax rates.
In the absence of the government budget constraint, the result with respect to
the demand side (illustrated by the employment rate erl) hardly changes compared
to the benchmark simulation. With respect to the supply side, there is a small
variation. Due to the constant tax rates in the absence of the government budget
99Here, the training rate, S , is assumed to be una¤ected by low-wage subsidies. It remains
constant.
100Here, the tax rates ti (with i = l; m; h) are assumed to be constant.
54
constraint, the scal burden for the employees does not increase with the imple-
mentation of subsidies. Due to the progressive tax system, the tax relief is higher
for the medium-skilled employees than for the low-skilled employee. In the absence
of the government budget constraint, the expected lifetime utility of the medium-
skilled relative to the expected lifetime utility of the low-skilled is higher than in the
benchmark simulation. Therefore the training rate, S, does not decrease as much
as in the benchmark simulation. Finally, medium-skilled employment is higher and
low-skilled employment is lower than in the benchmark simulation. Again, as in the
previous simulation, the labor force component with the higher employment rate has
a higher weight than in the benchmark simulation. Hence, aggregate employment is
higher compared to the benchmark simulation. However, the e¤ect is quite small, so
that the result for aggregate employment (see the gray line in Figure 3.3) is almost
the same as in the benchmark simulation, which is illustrated by the black line.
Figure 3.4 illustrates to which extent each e¤ect contributes to the change of
aggregate employment compared to the initial steady state (absence of subsidies).
Recall that the e¤ects do overlap, so the contributions of the di¤erent e¤ects do
not add up to the total e¤ect (illustrated by the black line). The (positive) direct
employment e¤ect is the most important. However, the (negative) skill-acquisition
e¤ect is too signicant to be ignored.
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Figure 3.4: The Contribution of Each E¤ect on Employment for Di¤erent 
Impact on Welfare Next, the impact of LWS on welfare is analyzed. The impact
on welfare is quantied by using the concept of "consumption equivalents",101 i.e.
101This is a common concept in the literature. See, e.g. Conesa and Krueger (1999).
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it is examined by how much an individuals consumption has to be adjusted in the
initial steady state (i.e. in the absence of subsidies) so that the expected present
value of utility is equal to the utility in the presence of subsidies. In the following,
the variable  denotes the consumption equivalent, i.e. it gives the change (in %)
of consumption that makes utility in the new steady state equal to the utility in
the initial steady state. For example,  = 0:1 implies that for a given level of LWS,
a person in the population considered will experience an increase in welfare due to
the subsidies, which is equivalent to a 10% higher consumption in the initial steady
state. The welfare of the population, 
, is calculated as follows:

 =
1
1   [(1+) wv]
1  T+
P
i=l;m;h
1
1   [(1+) !i]
1  Ni+
1
1   [(1+) bi]
1  Ui
(3.28)
Figure 3.5 illustrates the results for di¤erent levels of LWS (given by ) and for
 = 0 and  = 0:5. The implementation of LWS reduces welfare; e.g. for  = 0:3,
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Figure 3.5: The Impact of LWS on Welfare for Di¤erent 
per capita consumption in the initial steady state has to be reduced by about 9%
(for  = 0) to be equal to the per capita consumption in the new steady state
(i.e. in the presence of the subsidies). In contrast to aggregate employment (see
Figure 3.2) welfare declines signicantly. This decline can be explained by the fact
that the quality of employment decreases. As low-skilled employment increases
and medium-skilled employment decreases, the average wage per person and nally,
given an almost robust level of aggregate employment, welfare decreases.
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Robustness of the Results
The calculations also reveal that the negative impact of LWS on welfare increases
with a higher degree of risk aversion, . In this context, two opposing e¤ects have
to be taken into account. First, as already mentioned, the higher the degree of risk
aversion, the higher is the utility of remaining low-skilled relative to the utility of
becoming medium-skilled. Therefore a higher risk aversion amplies the negative
impact of LWS on the training rate S. There are less people with a higher, medium-
skilled income. Hence, this e¤ect on its own reduces welfare. Second, there is an
aggregation e¤ect, which goes into the opposite direction. When calculating welfare
according to eq. (3.28), a higher degree of risk aversion is equal to a relatively
higher weight on low income. Due to the rst e¤ect, there are more people earning
a low wage. Given a higher degree of risk aversion, the low wage is translated into a
relatively higher utility compared to the utility being generated by a medium-skilled
wage. Hence, the aggregation e¤ect on its own increases welfare. In total, the
rst, negative impact is larger.
With respect to the elasticity of the hiring rate, ela(l), the results are quite
robust (see Figure 3.6). Within the range  4  ela(l)   0:5, the results for a
certain level of  are almost identical. Again, the result is caused by two opposing
e¤ects. On the one hand, a higher hiring elasticity in absolute terms has a positive
impact on aggregate employment (see Table 3.5). On the other hand, there are more
people with a low-skilled wage and less people with a medium-skilled wage. Hence,
the average wage per person declines. In total, both e¤ects almost compensate each
other.
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With respect to a variation of the training elasticity , the impact of LWS on
welfare is illustrated in Figure 3.7. For a lower training elasticity ( = 0:5), the
negative impact of LWS on welfare is smaller. As already mentioned, a lower training
elasticity causes a lower increase in low-skilled employment and a lower decrease in
medium-skilled employment for a given subsidy rate . Finally, the negative impact
on welfare is smaller.
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3.5 Concluding Thoughts
Unemployment, in particular of low-skilled people, is a big problem in advanced
economies. It is often argued that low-wage subsidies (LWS) improve the situation
of the low-skilled labor force as they assure a certain income level for low-skilled
and at the same time support the employment situation of the low-skilled labor
force. However, the crucial dimension of the labor market performance is aggregate
employment. In this context, it is also important to take the impact of LWS on the
skilled labor force into account.
In particular, three channels whereby LWS a¤ect aggregate employment are ex-
amined: (i) the direct employment e¤ect, (ii) the skill-acquisition e¤ect and (iii) the
government budget e¤ect. LWS raise low-skilled employment because of the direct
employment e¤ect. At the same time, they reduce the incentives to acquire human
capital because the payment of LWS directly reduces the wage di¤erential between
the low-skilled and the skilled employees. This e¤ect is amplied by the fact that
the subsidies need to be nanced through taxes, which increase in particular the tax
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burden of the skilled employees. These latter two e¤ects imply that LWS reduce the
skilled labor force. This implication is important for aggregate employment since
skilled workers have a much higher employment probability than low-skilled workers.
To analyze the impact of LWS on aggregate employment, a Markov model of
the labor market and the training system is built. The dynamics are governed by
a Markov matrix that summarizes the transition probabilities between the di¤erent
states. The transition probabilities are the result of an optimization principle of the
people, who have to decide whether to become skilled, and the rms, respectively.
The model features a variety of common labor market imperfections like insider
wage bargaining as well as hiring and ring costs. Moreover, the labor force is
di¤erentiated according to its di¤erent skill levels, which are dened by the level of
educational attainment. It is assumed that each skill level corresponds to a certain
productivity level.
The model is calibrated for Germany. The numerical analysis reveals that LWS
signicantly reduce medium-skilled employment. Thus, the positive e¤ect of LWS
on low-skilled employment does not cause an increase in aggregate employment to
the same extent; rather the net e¤ect is small. Thus, ignoring the negative e¤ect on
medium-skilled employment would cause an essential overstatement of the benets
of LWS. Furthermore, the shift from medium-skilled to low-skilled employment re-
duces aggregate welfare. However, the size of the e¤ects depends on several aspects.
Whereas the size of the direct employment e¤ect is in particular inuenced by the
hiring elasticity, the size of the skill-acquisition e¤ect depends on the elasticity of
the hiring rate, the degree of risk aversion and the elasticity of the training rate.
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4 Interactions between Employment and Training
Policies
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the impact of one special policy was analyzed. However,
when analyzing the impact of labor market policies, it is also important to take
possible interactions between di¤erent policies into account.102 In this context, one
important aspect are complementarities between two policies, i.e. the fact that the
impact of each policy, e.g. on aggregate income, is larger when it is implemented
in conjunction with the other policy than in isolation. However, two policies, like
training subsidies and hiring subsidies, may be substitutes because (i) they both
raise the trained labor force and (ii)  in the presence of the government budget
constraint they both may cause an increase in the tax rate, which reduces aggregate
income. Ignoring possible interactions could distort the evaluation of these policies.
This chapter o¤ers a methodology that captures potential interactions between
labor market policies. As an example, two important policies are considered: training
subsidies and hiring subsidies.103 In the following analysis hiring subsidies are paid
to rms, which hire successful apprentices as employees; training subsidies are paid
to rms, which hire school leavers as apprentices.
Most OECD countries have implemented such policies to encourage both, em-
ployment and training. To varying degrees, both policies serve a similar purpose,
namely, to improve the employment and income perspectives, particularly for low-
skilled workers. However, the policies focus on di¤erent transitions in the labor
market. Whereas training policies are meant to ease the transition from school to
training, hiring subsidies are meant to facilitate the transition from training to work.
Against this background, this chapter deals with two questions:
 How do the interactions between hiring subsidies and training subsidies look?
 Given the existence of complementarities, on what institutional and policy
features of the economy does the size of complementarities depend?
One possible channel whereby both policies are complementary is the following:
hiring subsidies facilitate the transition from training to work and thereby stimulate
102For a di¤erent version of this chapter see Oskamp and Snower (2007).
103Sometimes, "hiring subsidies" are also called "employment subsidies" or "employment vouch-
ers" and are implemented through a wide variety of policy instruments, such as tax breaks or
grants. As they all given that they are awarded only for a limited period of time have anal-
ogous e¤ects on labor market activities and government expenditures, this chapter groups them
together under the heading "hiring subsidies".
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the employment rate, as they raise the probability that an apprentice continues
working after having nished training successfully. Hence, hiring subsidies improve
the e¤ectiveness of training policies. As hiring subsidies increase the expected prots
being generated by a former apprentice, the training incentives of the rms rise.
Thus, hiring subsidies increase the number of people being hired as apprentices.
This broadens the target group for training subsidies.
However, both subsidies may be substitutes because they both raise the trained
labor force and reduce the non-trained labor force. They only di¤er with respect to
the transition they are targeted at. Whereas training subsidies aim at increasing the
number of people being in training (rst transition), hiring subsidies aim at increas-
ing the hiring of successful apprentices as trained employees (second transition).
Moreover, the higher the government expenditures for hiring subsidies and training
subsidies, the higher the taxes, which are necessary to nance these expenditures,
could be. Higher taxes reduce the expected lifetime income. On account of these
e¤ects, employment and training policies may be complementary policies or they are
substitutes with respect to employment and expected lifetime income, respectively.
Again, as in the previous chapter, the analysis in this chapter is based on a
macro model of the labor market and the training system, in which the transition
probabilities between the di¤erent states are governed by a Markov process. The
transition probabilities that are a¤ected by the subsidies are analyzed in detail.
Moreover, the model takes some important labor market imperfections  such as
wage bargaining, hiring and ring costs as well as imperfections related to the tax
and transfer system as given. The impact of the two subsidies is analyzed in the
presence of these institutions. The model is calibrated for the German labor market
and training system.
The main message of the chapter is that there are signicant interactions be-
tween both policies. In the absence of the government budget constraint, there are
complementarities with respect to aggregate income. However, in the presence of
the government budget constraint, the policies become substitutes. The analysis
provides a methodology for examining policy interactions, which may be useful well
beyond the bounds of hiring and training subsidies.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4:2 presents the relation to the
literature. Section 4:3 describes the theoretical model of the labor market and the
training system. Section 4:4 presents a purely analytical evaluation of a simpli-
ed model. In Section 4:5, the model is calibrated and the numerical results are
discussed. Finally, Section 4:6 concludes.
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4.2 Relation to the Literature
The analysis of complementarities between labor market institutions and policies is
prevalent in the literature (see e.g. Belot and van Ours, 2001). Theoretical analyses
of complementarities can be found in Coe and Snower (1997), Orszag and Snower
(1999a) as well as Burda and Weder (2002). However, they focus on complementar-
ities between institutions or policies other than in this chapter. In particular, they
do not deal with the question by how far the size of complementarities is a¤ected
by other features of the economy.
This chapter investigates the interactions between employment and training poli-
cies. As an example, the impacts of hiring subsidies and training subsidies are an-
alyzed because they play a prominent role within the active labor market policy in
OECD countries. Both, hiring subsidies and training subsidies, have been studied in
detail in the literature, in particular the hiring subsidies. In this context, this study
is related to a variety of previous studies analyzing the impact and optimal design
of employment subsidies. The initial work was done by Pigou (1933) and Kaldor
(1936).104
Again, to prevent running afoul of the Lucas Critique, this analysis  as the
previous one  is not based on a policy-invariant matching function. Instead, it
is explicitly analyzed how policies a¤ect peoples incentives given an intertemporal
maximization of the economic agents. In this analysis, the focus is on the rms.
This has two reasons: (i) labor demand, especially with respect to the low-skilled
labor force, is the short side of the market in economies with high unemployment
and (ii) the subsidies, which are analyzed, are paid to rms. The households get
involved through the wage bargaining.
Again, the dynamic e¤ects of subsidies are explicitly captured by specifying the
transition rates between employment, unemployment and training as a function of
the hiring and training incentives of the rms. This approach allows us to capture
the adjustment processes and thereby to analyze the long-run e¤ects of training and
hiring subsidies as well as their interactions.105
104For a survey of the empirical literature, see e.g. Katz (1998). For U.S. evidence, see Woodbury
and Spiegelman (1987) and OLeary et al. (2005). For British evidence, see Bell et al. (1999). For
an analysis of training subsidies, see e.g. Görg and Strobl (2006) as well as Filges et al. (2007).
105Orszag and Snower (2003a and 2003b) stress that the literature has disregarded the total
impact of employment subsidies on the government budget constraint. On the one hand, aggregate
payroll taxes nance subsidies but on the other hand, payroll taxes can be reduced if the subsidies
reduce unemployment and thereby unemployment benet payments. In this chapter, their line of
reasoning is pursued.
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4.3 The Model
The model is meant to provide a framework for analyzing interactions between hiring
and training subsidies with respect to employment, income and welfare. Even though
the intention of the analysis is di¤erent, the model is almost similar to the model in
the previous chapter; however, there are some di¤erences, in particular concerning
the transition rates. Given this and for the sake of traceability, the total model is
illustrated in detail.
The analysis is based on a Markov model of the labor market and the training
system. The dynamics are governed by a Markov matrix that summarizes the tran-
sition probabilities between the di¤erent states. The transition probabilities are the
result of an optimization principle of the rms. People in the labor force are di¤er-
entiated according to their skill levels, which are dened by the level of educational
attainment. Each skill level is assumed to correspond to a certain productivity level.
The population is divided into eight groups (see also Table 3.1 in the previous chap-
ter): people being in school, S, people joining vocational training, T , and those
being either employed, Ni, or unemployed, Ui. The employed and unemployed, re-
spectively, are divided into three subgroups according to the skill level i = l;m; h.
Here, as well as for other variables below, the subscript l stands for "low-skilled",
the subscript m for "medium-skilled" and the subscript h for "high-skilled". The
transitions between the di¤erent states, i.e. the dynamic structure of the model, are
described below. Vocational training takes p periods, so that there are p cohorts. In
each period, a fraction +  leaves the vocational training where  is the death rate
and  is the drop-out rate of training. So, given the inow into vocational training,
T1, the outow, p periods later, is given by T1(1  )p. The stock of people being
in vocational training is given by T = T1
Pp
c=1(1    )c 1. People who drop out
of training or die are assumed to leave the labor force. However, it is assumed that
the number of births equals the number of deaths. As the newborn as well as the
people who have dropped out of training are assumed to enter state S before going
back to the labor market or to training, the population remains constant.
For simplicity, there is no capital. Moreover, returns to labor are assumed to
be constant. Let ai be the productivity of an employee with a skill level i = l; m;
h. When making their employment decisions, rms face a random cost t, which is
iid across workers and time. The cost may be interpreted as an operating cost or a
productivity shock. With respect to all employees, its mean is normalized to zero
and its cumulative distribution  (t) is time-invariant.
In the model, training takes place within a dual system of vocational training.
This is a combination of vocational training provided by a private employer (on-
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the-job-training) and theoretical education in vocational schools. With respect to
the latter, the associated costs (e.g. for school buildings, salaries of the teachers)
are distributed among the population. These costs are assumed to be x, so that a
change in the number of apprentices does not inuence their level. For the sake of
simplicity, these costs are ignored in the remainder. The costs, which are important
in the model are the direct costs for the employers that are caused by their engage-
ment in vocational training (e.g. wages of additional employees being in charge of
the instruction of apprentices within the rm). With respect to the distribution
of these costs, it is necessary to distinguish two types of training: general training
and specic training.106 Against the background of the German system of vocational
training, one can argue that training has a mostly general character. Due to compre-
hensive curricula determining the content of training and centralized examinations,
vocational training within the dual system is highly standardized.107 According to
the original theory by Becker (1964), in the presence of competitive markets, the
employee receives all the returns from general training and thus also has to pay for
training. However, German employers also invest in the training of apprentices and
thus from a theoretical point of view also pay for general training.108 It can be
shown that rms have an incentive to invest in general vocational training, given
that there are imperfections in the labor market.109
4.3.1 The Dynamic Structure
The transitions between the di¤erent states are summarized in Figure 4.1. In all
states apart from S, people face a probability  of dying. With respect to the school
leavers, a fraction S;T is hired as apprentice. The residual part, (1   S;T ), tries
to get a job as a low-skilled employee; only a fraction l is hired. A low-skilled
employee faces a probability 'l of being red and a probability N;T of being hired
as an apprentice. A low-skilled unemployed faces a probability U;T of being hired
as an apprentice and a probability (1   U;T ) l of being hired as a low-skilled
employee. With a probability  per period, an apprentice drops out of training.
It is assumed that an apprentice cannot be red. An apprentice who has nished
training successfully and survives,110 is hired as a medium-skilled employee with
106See Becker (1964). For a survey of the literature on private sector training see Leuven (2005).
107See for further details Harho¤ and Kane (1993) and Lindner (1998).
108According to an analysis of Beicht and Walden (2002) for the year 2000, the costs caused by
vocational training are signicantly higher than the benets, i.e. the output of the apprentice.
109See e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) as well as Harho¤ and Kane (1993). Appendix 7.3.1
shows that rms have an incentive to invest in general vocational training.
110Every apprentice who survives and did not drop out of training nishes training successfully
after p periods.
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probability T;Nm. A medium-skilled employee faces a probability 'm of being red.
An unemployed medium-skilled is hired with probability m.
In order to keep the model simple, the sum of apprentices dropping out of training
and deaths is assumed to be equal to the number of people being in state S. Hence,
the relevant population (Nl + Ul + Nm + Um + T + S) is constant. Moreover, the
high-skilled labor force (Nh + Uh) is treated as a quasi-x factor, i.e. these states
are assumed to be una¤ected by the implementation of subsidies. However, given
the government budget constraint, it is necessary to take these states into account,
because Nh also carries a part of the scal burden and Uh is responsible for a part of
the scal burden. Ignoring this aspect would bias the amount of the scal burden,
which has to be carried by the low-skilled and medium-skilled employees. Given
Nm Um
Nl Ul
?m
?l
(1 – ?U,T )?l
?m
?T,Nm (1 – ? – ?) (1 – ?T,Nm ) (1 – ? – ?)
?U,T?N,T
Tp
?
?
? ?
(1 – ?S,T ) ?l
S
(1 – ?S,T ) (1 – ?l )
?S,T
T1
(1 – ? – ?)p-1
? + ?
? + ?
Figure 4.1: The Transitions between the States
this, the model can be described as follows:
Zt+1 =MTt+1 Zt (4.1)
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where Zt is a vector of the di¤erent states:
Zt = (Nm;t; Um;t; Nl;t; Ul;t; T1;t; St) (4.2)
and MT is a Markov matrix of the transition probabilities:
(4.3)
MT =
Ý1 ? jm ? _Þ Rm 0 0 RT,Nm Ý1 ? _ ? SÞp 0
jm Ý1 ? Rm ? _Þ 0 0 Ý1 ? RT,NmÞÝ1 ? _ ? SÞp 0
0 0 Ý1 ? j l ? RN,T ? _Þ Ý1 ? RU,TÞ Rl 0 Ý1 ? RS,TÞ Rl
0 0 j l Ý1 ? Ý1 ? RU,TÞ Rl ? RU,T ? _Þ 0 Ý1 ? RS,TÞÝ1 ? RlÞ
0 0 RN,T RU,T 0 RS,T
_ _ _ _ 1 ? Ý1 ? _ ? SÞp 0
It is assumed that a transition from low-skilled employment to training is linked
with a change of the rm. This is based on the assumption that there are two
types of rms: (i) rms that employ only low-skilled and (ii) rms that employ only
medium-skilled and are engaged in vocational training.111 Moreover, it has to be
noted that not all transition rates are exogenous. The transition rates, which are
a¤ected by the subsidies, are endogenous. They are analyzed in detail below.
Agents in the model pursue the following sequence of decisions. First, the govern-
ment sets the income tax rate to ensure that its tax receipts equal its expenditures.
Second, the random costs are revealed. Third, wages are determined through bar-
gaining and nally employment decisions are made.
4.3.2 The Characteristics of the Subsidies
In the following, two kinds of subsidies are analyzed:
 The hiring subsidy, T;Nm, is paid to rms, which hire successful apprentices as
medium-skilled employees. It is paid during the rst period of the employment
spell.
 The training subsidy, S;T , is paid to rms, which hire school leavers as ap-
prentices. It is paid per apprentice and per period over the whole phase of
vocational training.
The hiring subsidy aims at improving the employment situation of the successful
apprentices by increasing the hiring incentive of the rms. The training subsidy
111This can be justied by the assumption that the rms are engaged in di¤erent sectors with
di¤erent requirements with respect to human capital.
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aims at improving the human capital in a rst step and then, in a second step, the
long-term employment perspective, given that the employment rate of the medium-
skilled labor force is higher than the employment rate of the low-skilled labor force.
4.3.3 Government Budget Constraint
When analyzing the government budget constraint, four policy instruments have to
be taken into account: (i) the payroll tax with a rate ti, (ii) the unemployment
benet bi, (iii) the hiring subsidy, T;Nm and (iv) the training subsidy, S;T . The
tax rate has three levels to match a progressive tax system (th > tm > tl). The ratios
are assumed to be exogenous, whereas the levels are set so that the tax receipts
equal the governments expenditures. It is assumed that people being engaged in
vocational training do not pay taxes. Given the presence of the subsidies, the
government budget constraint is expressed as follows:
P
i=l;m;h ti wi Ni =
P
i=l;m;h i wi (1  ti) Ui (4.4)
+ S;T S;T S
Pp
c=1(1    )c 1
+ T;Nm T;Nm T1 (1    )p
The left-hand side stands for the tax receipts of the government that are generated
by the taxes on labor income. The term on the right-hand side represents the sum of
the unemployment benets with the net replacement rate i, the training subsidies
S;T , paid to rms for hiring school leavers as apprentices, and nally the hiring
subsidies, T;Nm , paid to rms for hiring successful apprentices as medium-skilled
employees.112
4.3.4 Wage Determination
For simplicity, the wage of the apprentice, wv, is assumed to be set unilaterally by
the rm. In the remainder, the focus is therefore on the wage wi for each skill level
i, which is the outcome of a Nash bargain between the median insider of that skill
level and the rm. The median insider faces no risk of dismissal at the negotiated
wage. The wage is renegotiated in each period.
Surplus of the Employee A person with a skill level i has the following utility
function:
ui;t(Ci;t) =
1
1   [Ci;t]
1  (4.5)
112Recall that T1 is the inow into training and T1 (1    )p is the outow from training.
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where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. Utility depends positively on
consumption Ci;t. For simplicity, workers consume all their income, i.e. either the
consumer wage in the case of employment or the unemployment benet in the case
of unemployment. Moreover, it is assumed that there is no disutility of labor. Under
bargaining agreement, the employee receives the consumer wage, !i = wi(1  ti), in
each period. The present value of the employees expected lifetime utility in period
t, V Ni;t , is:
V Ni;t =
1
1   [wi (1 ti;t)]
1 + Et [(1 'i   N;T|{z}
only for i=l
)V Ni;t+1+'i V
U
i;t+1+ N;T V
T
t+1| {z }
only for i=l
]
(4.6)
where  is the discount factor and V Ui;t+1 is the present value of the expected future
lifetime utility for an unemployed. (Here, as well as for other variables below, the
superscript N stands for "employed" and the superscript U for "unemployed").
Given that the person is a low-skilled employee, also the transition into training,
being illustrated by N;T , has to be taken into account. Training is associated with
an expected future lifetime utility V Tt+1. In the case of disagreement, the employees
fallback position is assumed to be equal to the unemployment benet, bi;t. It is
assumed that disagreement in the current period does not a¤ect the expected future
lifetime utility. Hence, in the case of disagreement, the present value of the expected
lifetime utility in period t, V d;Ni;t , is:
V d;Ni;t =
1
1   [bi]
1  +  Et [(1  'i     N;T|{z}
only for i=l
) V Ni;t+1 + 'i V
U
i;t+1 + N;T V
T
t+1| {z }
only for i=l
]
(4.7)
Given the expected present value in the case of agreement and disagreement, respec-
tively, the bargaining surplus of the employee, SEi;t (= V
N
i;t  V d;Ni;t ) can be calculated
as follows:
SEi =
1
1   [wi (1  ti)]
1    1
1   [bi]
1  (4.8)
Surplus of the Firm Under bargaining agreement, the rm receives the prot
(ai   wi) per period. The present value of the expected prots i;t with respect to
an employee with skill level i is therefore:
i;t = (ai   wi) +  Et (1  'i     N;T|{z}
only for i=l
) i;t+1 +  'i ( & i) (4.9)
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where & i are the ring costs. Again, in the case of a low-skilled employee, also the
transition into training has to be taken into account.113 In the case of disagreement
the employee imposes the maximal cost on the rm (e.g. by strike, work-to-rule,
sabotage) short of inducing dismissal. The rms fallback position is negative; it
is approximated by the ring costs. Again, it is assumed that disagreement in the
current period does not a¤ect future prots. Thus, in the case of disagreement, the
present value of the expected prots in period t, di;t, is given by:
di;t =  & i +  Et (1  'i     N;T|{z}
only for i=l
) i;t+1 +  'i ( & i) (4.10)
Finally, the bargaining surplus of the rm, SFi;t (= i;t   di;t) can be calculated as
follows:
SFi = (ai   wi) + & i (4.11)
Nash Bargaining The negotiated wage wi maximizes the Nash product, i:
i = (S
E
i )
 (SFi )
1  (4.12)
where  2 h0; 1i denotes the bargaining power of the employee and 1  represents
the bargaining power of the rm. Thus, the following equation has to be solved:
@ i
@ wi
!
= 0
The result is given by:
(1 ti) (ai wi+& i) (wi ti wi)   (1 ) = (1 ) ( b1 i +(wi ti wi)1 ) (4.13)
In the steady state, the ring costs are given by & i = c' wi, and the unemployment
benet level is dened on the basis of the economy-wide average net wage: bi = i
wi (1  ti). Finally, the negotiated wage, wi, is given by:
wi =
ai  (1  )
(1  1 i ) (1  ) +  (1  c') (1  )
for i = l;m; h (4.14)
113The way, in which the transition rate, N;T , is introduced into the calculation of the prot
implies that  as mentioned above  the transition from low-skilled employment to training is
linked with a change of the rm.
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4.3.5 Transition Rates
Next, the two transition rates, which are a¤ected by the subsidies, are analyzed in
detail. Although both transition rates can be regarded as hiring rates, in the remain-
der, S;T is called training rate to avoid confusion with the other hiring rate T;Nm.
Whereas the hiring rate, T;Nm, is only a¤ected by the hiring subsidy, the training
rate, S;T , is a¤ected by the training subsidy but also by the hiring subsidy.
114 All
remaining transition rates, especially the hiring and ring rates of the low-skilled
and the medium-skilled, respectively, (i and 'i with i = l;m) are not a¤ected by
the implementation of subsidies. They are treated as constants.
Hiring Rate The present value of the expected prots (after the random cost
T;Nm;t is revealed), generated by a medium-skilled employee, who was an apprentice
before, is given by:115
T;Nm;t =  T;Nm;t + T;Nm (4.15)
+ (am   wm)
1X
j=0
j (1  'm   )j    'm &m
1X
j=0
j (1  'm   )j
As by assumption the hiring decision is made by the rm, which has also con-
ducted the vocational training, the hiring costs are zero because the apprentice to be
hired as a medium-skilled employee is already in the rm. Given this, the person is
taken over, if the present value of the expected prots is positive: T;Nm;t > 0. After
substituting T;Nm;t according to eq. (4.15), the equation is solved for the random
cost:
T;Nm;t < 
T;Nm +
am   wm    'm &m
1   (1  'm   )
(4.16)
The random cost, T;Nm;t, is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 
 
T;Nm
and +T;Nm. Then, the hiring rate is:
T;Nm =
(T;Nm + am  wm   'm &m
1  (1 'm ) )  
 
T;Nm
+T;Nm    T;Nm
(4.17)
The critical reader may argue that not all successful apprentices are taken over
by the rm, which has conducted the vocational training. Some of the successful
114Recall that training subsidies are not paid for hiring low-skilled employees, Nl, and low-skilled
unemployed, Ul, respectively, as apprentices. Hence, the corresponding transition rates, N;T and
U;T , are not a¤ected by the low-wage subsidies. As N;T and U;T , are small compared to S;T ,
the quantitative impact would be low. However, addressing also this e¤ect would signicantly
increase the complexity of the model.
115Recall that eq. (4.15) is equal to eq. (4.9) for i = m, T;Nm = 0 and  T;Nm;t = 0.
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apprentices will get a job in a rm, which is not engaged in vocational training. So
far, it has been assumed that the hiring rate, T;Nm, equals the take-over rate. In
the remainder, it will be assumed that there are two hiring rates: (i) 1T;Nm being
associated with the rm that is engaged in vocational training, and (ii) 2T;Nm being
associated with the rm that is not engaged in vocational training. Now, only 1T;Nm
can be interpreted as take-over rate and is given by eq. (4.17) for T;Nm = 
1
T;Nm
.
With respect to 2T;Nm and in contrast to eq. (4.17), hiring costs, T;Nm, have to be
taken into account, as the apprentice is hired by another rm for which the successful
apprentice is an outsider. Therefore, the hiring rate, 2T;Nm, is calculated as follows:
2T;Nm =
( T;Nm + T;Nm + am  wm   'm &m1 (1 'm ) )  
 
2T;Nm
+
2T;Nm
   
2T;Nm
(4.18)
Training Rate Next, the training rate is considered, i.e. the probability for a
school leaver of being hired as apprentices. If the training rate would only depend
on the prot in the phase of vocational training, there would be no hiring. As the
output av generated by the apprentice is supposed to be smaller than the sum of the
wage, wv, and the additional, non-wage costs of vocational training, kv, the prot of
the rm in the training phase is negative. However, the training decision is not only
based on the nancial outcome in the training phase. In fact, the rms regard the
costs of vocational training as an investment, which causes the prot T;Nm, once the
person, who has started training p periods before, continues working in the rm as a
medium-skilled employee with the probability 1T;Nm(1   )p. Therefore, also the
expected prot in the latter phase has to be taken into account when deriving the
training rate. The present value of the expected prots, generated by an apprentice,
who was in school before, S;T;t, is given by:116
S;T;t =  S;T ;t + (av   wv   kv + S;T )
p 1X
j=0
j (1    )j (4.19)
+ 1T;Nm (1    )p p Et T;Nm
116Note that Et T;Nm is given by eq. (4.15) with  T;Nm;t = 0.
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Given the hiring costs, S;T , a school leaver is hired as apprentice if S;T > S;T .
After solving eq. (4.19) for S;T ;t, the random cost is given by:
S;T ;t <  S;T + (av   wv   kv + S;T )
p 1X
j=0
j (1    )j (4.20)
+ 1T;Nm (1    )p p Et T;Nm
The random cost, S;T ;t, is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 
 
S;T
and
+S;T . The corresponding hiring rate is:
S;T =
264  S;T + (av   wv   kv + S;T )
p 1P
j=0
j (1    )j
+1T;Nm(1    )p p Et T;Nm ]   S;T
375 = h+S;T    S;T i
(4.21)
Whereas training subsidies only have a direct e¤ect  they increase the training
rate S;T , hiring subsidies have a direct and an indirect e¤ect. Primarily, hiring
subsidies aim at easing the transition from training to work, i.e. they increase the
hiring rates 1T;Nm and 
2
T;Nm
according to eq. (4.17) for T;Nm = 
1
T;Nm
and eq.
(4.18) for 2T;Nm. Moreover, hiring subsidies also have an indirect e¤ect. They also
increase the training rate due to their impact on the hiring rate, 1T;Nm, which 
according to eq. (4.21) has an impact on the training rate, S;T . The decision to
hire an apprentice also depends on the probability that the person continues working
in the rm as medium-skilled. The higher the hiring rate, 1T;Nm, the higher is this
probability and the higher is the incentive to hire a person as apprentice. Thus,
hiring subsidies do not only increase the fraction of apprentices who are hired as
medium-skilled employees, they also increase the number of apprentices.
4.3.6 Labor Market Equilibrium
The following system of equations constitutes the equilibrium of the model:117
 the steady state expressions of the six dynamic equations given by the transi-
tion matrix (4.3),118
 the government budget constraint, eq. (4.4),119 and nally
117As the producer wages are not a¤ected by the subsidies, the corresponding equations are
not necessary to describe the model. However, the wage equations are necessary for the initial
calibration.
118Recall that the total number of people being in training is given by T = T1
Pp
c=1(1  )c 1.
Moreover, the population (S + T +Nl + Ul +Nm + Um) is normalized to 1.
119As the equation that describes the government budget constraint contains three tax rates, it
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 the equations determining the hiring rates, eq. (4.17) with T;Nm = 1T;Nm, eq.
(4.18), and eq. (4.21).
4.4 A Simple Analytical Evaluation
In the following, a simple model is presented, which allows for an analytical solution.
The simplied model, is after the calibration in the following section used as a
starting point for the numerical analysis.
4.4.1 The Simplied Model
In order to get an analytically traceable solution, the model is simplied as follows:
(i) there are no taxes:120 ti = 0 with i = l; m; h, (ii) training takes one period:
p = 1, (iii) apprentices do not drop out of training:  = 0 and (iv) agents are risk
neutral:  = 0.
According to Coe and Snower (1997) "policies are complementary in the sense
that the e¤ect of each policy is greater when implemented in conjunction with the
other policy than in isolation". In the following, it is examined whether there are
complementarities with respect to aggregate income, , i.e. the income over all
states:121
 = T wv +
P
i=m;l;h Ni wi (1  ti) + Ui i wi (1  ti) (4.22)
The cross derivative of  for the two subsidies, S;T and T;Nm , is calculated as
follows:122
@2 
@ S;T @ T;Nm
(4.23)
=[ am(1  m)  m (1  ) 2 (l + N;T (1  l) + + 'l)| {z }
<0
] =
[  (1  m(1  m)  c m)(1 + )| {z }
<0
(l (1  U;T ) (N;T + ) + (U;T + )(N;T + + 'l))| {z }
>0
(m + + 'm)| {z }
>0
]
with:
 = (
 
1T;Nm
  +
1T;Nm
+  
2T;Nm
  +
2T;Nm
) < 0 and
is necessary to introduce two additional equations in order to close the model. They describe the
ratios between the tax rates, th, tm and tl.
120In the presence of taxes, a purely analytically examination is not possible. Therefore, a di¤er-
ent, 2-period-model is constructed, which is presented in Appendix 7.3.2.
121The income in state S is 0.
122See Appendix 7.3.3 for the derivation.
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 = (
 
1T;Nm
  +
1T;Nm
)( 
2T;Nm
  +
2T;Nm
)( S;T   +S;T ) < 0.
The cross derivative is unambiguously positive. Hence, the result reveals at
least for a very simple version of the model  the existence of complementarities
with respect to aggregate income in the sense that the impact of each subsidy on
aggregate income is higher when it is implemented together with the other policy
than in isolation.
The intuition behind this is as follows: hiring subsidies facilitate the transition
from vocational training to work. They increase the probability that an apprentice
continues working in the rm as a medium-skilled employee after having nished
vocational training successfully. Thereby, hiring subsidies improve the e¤ectiveness
of training policies, as the higher probability will amplify the positive impact of
training subsidies. Hiring subsidies indirectly increase the number of people being
hired as apprentices. This broadens the target group for training subsidies.
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
Next, the impact of di¤erent parameter values on the size of the complementarity
is discussed. In this context, the derivative of the cross derivative, @
2 
@ 
S;T @ 
T;Nm ,
rst, with respect to the elasticity of the hiring rate and second, with respect to the
elasticity of the training rate, is calculated.
Hiring Elasticity When analyzing the impact of the elasticity of the hiring rate
with respect to the wage, ela(T;Nm) = (@T;Nm=T;Nm)=(@wm=wm), it has to be
taken into account that the elasticity does not directly enter eq. (4.17) and eq.
(4.18), respectively, which determine the hiring rates. Rather the hiring elasticity
is implicitly xed by the choice of the limits,  
qT;Nm
and +
qT;Nm
(for q = 1; 2) of the
uniform distribution. A higher  
qT;Nm
implies a higher hiring elasticity (in absolute
terms). In the following, the impact of  
qT;Nm
(with q = 1; 2) on the size of the
complementarity is calculated:
@(
@2 
@ S;T @ T;Nm
)=@ 
qT;Nm
=
@2 
@ S;T @ T;Nm
 1

 

2=q
T;Nm
  +

2=q
T;Nm
 
qT;Nm
  +
qT;Nm
(4.24)
> 0
The impact of a higher  
qT;Nm
on the size of the complementarity is unambiguously
positive. Hence, a higher elasticity of the hiring rate with respect to the wage
amplies the size of the complementarity for a given level of the subsidy.
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Training Elasticity Also the elasticity of the training rate with respect to the
wage, ela(S;T ) = (@S;T=S;T )=(@wv=wv), does not directly a¤ect the size of the
complementarity. However, there is an indirect impact via the limits of the uniform
distribution. Therefore, the impact the parameter  S;T on the size of the comple-
mentarity is calculated:
@(
@2 
@ S;T @ T;Nm
)=@ S;T =
@2 
@ S;T @ T;Nm
 1
 S;T   +S;T
> 0 (4.25)
Again, the impact of a higher  S;T on the size of the complementarity is unambigu-
ously positive. Hence, a higher elasticity of the training rate with respect to the
wage amplies the size of the complementarity for a given level of the subsidy.
4.5 Numerical Evaluation
4.5.1 Calibration
The calibration is almost similar to the calibration in the previous chapter. However,
there are di¤erences, in particular with respect to the transition rates. Given this
and for the sake of traceability, the full calibration is illustrated.
In the initial steady state (i.e. in the absence of subsidies), some variables are
treated as exogenous. However, in the presence of subsidies, these variables are
treated as endogenous. One example is the training rate S;T . With respect to the
initial steady state, the training rate is treated as an exogenous variable so that
the limits of the corresponding distribution for the random costs can be derived.
However, in the presence of subsidies, the limits are treated as given and the training
rate is a function of the subsidies. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 summarize all variables
and parameters, which are set exogenously in the initial steady state.
The model is calibrated for Germany with a year as unit of time. The real
annual interest rate is set at 4:0%, which leads to a discount factor of  = 0:962.
For simplicity, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is set at  = 0. The death rate
is set at  = 0:023, which corresponds to an average working lifetime of about 44
years.123 The number of periods, p, a person is engaged in vocational training is set
at 3.124 The drop-out rate , is set at 0:037. The value for the death rate and the
drop-out rate imply that roughly 17% of the apprentices do not nish vocational
training successfully, which is in line with the empirical data.125 According toWilkes
123The value is roughly in line with the empirical data. Working life begins at the age of 17 and
according to Brussig and Wojtkowski (2006), retirement takes places between 62 and 63.
124This corresponds to the typical length of training within the dual system in Germany.
125Given the data for the number of new apprentices and the number of successful apprentices
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Kaplan-Meier functions for Germany (Wilke, 2005), the hiring rates for the high-
skilled, medium-skilled and the low-skilled are set at h = 0:55, m = 0:59 and
l = 0:49, respectively. Moreover, according to the BMBF (2004, 2007) about 25%
of the people who have successfully nished vocational training become unemployed,
thus the corresponding hiring rate, T;Nm is set at 0:75. However, about 53% of all
successful apprentices stay in the rm in which they have been trained,126 this part
of the hiring rate, 1T;Nm = 0:3975, can be regarded as take-over rate. The residual
fraction is hired by another rm, 2T;Nm = 0:3525.
The labor market states are dened and quantied as in the previous chapter.
The low-skilled labor force (Nl+Ul) includes people with an educational attainment
corresponding to less than upper-secondary education.127 The medium-skilled labor
force (Nm + Um) contains all people with vocational upper secondary education.
People with post-secondary and tertiary education are considered as being high-
skilled (Nh + Uh). The corresponding values can be calculated on the basis of data
from the OECD (1999 to 2005).128
Based on data from the German national accounts, the aggregate productivity,
a, is set at 54; 243 EUR and the aggregate producer wage, w, which is calculated as
average gross wage per employee plus social security contributions, is set at 32; 520
EUR.129 In order to get the wages for di¤erent skill groups, the corresponding OECD
indices for the relative earnings of the population with income from employment
are used. They yield the following ratios: wh=w = 1:27, wm=w = 0:92 and wl=w =
0:72.130 According to Beicht and Walden (2002), the wage of a person being engaged
in vocational training is set at wv = 8; 269 EUR and the productivity of an apprentice
is set at av = 7; 730 EUR. Moreover, according to Beicht and Walden (2002) the
annual non-wage costs of training are 8; 166 EUR. As 30% (see Dohmen and Hoi,
2004) are tax-deductible, the relevant costs are set at kv = 5; 717 EUR.
The net replacement rates are set at l = 0:7825, m = 0:6825 and h =
0:6467.131 According to Chen and Funke (2005), the hiring cost is set at 10% of the
wage and the ring cost is set at 60% of the wage, thus the corresponding parameters
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006), the value can be conrmed.
126BMBF (2004, 2007).
127This classication corresponds to the conventional denition which classies people with an
educational attainment corresponding to at most level 2 of the International Standard Classication
of Education as low-skilled.
128See Appendix 7.2.3.
129Statistisches Bundesamt (2008). The values are calculated as averages of the corresponding
annual data for the period 2000-2007.
130See OECD (1999-2005). These values imply a ratio wm=wl = 1:26, which is in line with the
corresponding data reported by Wienert (2006).
131The values are net replacement rates (unweighted average across six family types) of workers
with 67, 100 and 150 percent of average productivity, see OECD (2006).
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are c = 0:1 and c' = 0:6. In order to calculate the tax rates, the income tax scale
of the year 2002, described in Boss and Elendner (2003), is used. It illustrates the
progressive character of the German tax system. The following ratios are obtained:
th=tl = 1:437 and tm=tl = 1:178. Given the data for the transition rates between the
training system and the labor market according to Reinberg and Hummel (2006),
the training rate, S;T = 0:70, and the ratio U;T=N;T = 3:6, can be calculated.
variable / description value source
parameter
 discount factor 0:962 standard value
 CRRA 0 assumption
p periods of vocational training 3 standard value
to match the
 death rate 0:023 working life
to match the
 drop-out rate of training 0:037 empirical data
h hiring rate (high-skilled) 0:55
m hiring rate (medium-skilled) 0:59 Wilke (2005)
l hiring rate (low-skilled) 0:49
1T;Nm take-over rate 0:3975 BMBF (2004, 2007)
to match the
2T;Nm hiring rate after training 0:3525 empirical data
own calculations
S;T training rate 0:70 based on Reinberg
U;T =N;T ratio of the training rates 3:6 and Hummel (2006)
a aggregate productivity 54; 243 Statistisches
w aggregate producer wage 32; 520 Bundesamt (2008)
wh=w relative earnings (high-skilled) 1:27
wm=w relative earnings (medium-skilled) 0:92 OECD (1999-2005)
wl=w relative earnings (low-skilled) 0:72
Table 4.1: Exogenous Values in the Initial Steady State (1)
Based on these values and the equations of the model, the bargaining power, the
productivities for the di¤erent skill levels, the tax rates, and the missing transition
rates for the initial steady state, can be calculated. Finally, the parameters with
respect to the uniform distribution of the random costs t, have to be determined, e.g.
the lower and upper limits of the distribution functions. For the sake of simplicity,
the lower limits,  S;T and 
 
qT;Nm
for q = 1; 2, are set at 0. The upper limits are
not set exogenously; rather they are the implied results of the calibration. As all
other variables and parameters of the equations determining the hiring rates and the
training rate, respectively, as well as the hiring rates and the training rate themselves
are given for the initial steady state, one can easily solve the equations determining
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variable / description value source
parameter
av productivity of an apprentice 7; 730 Beicht and
wv wage of an apprentice 8; 269 Walden (2002)
Beicht and Walden
(2002), Dohmen
kv non-wage costs of training 5; 717 and Hoi (2004)
h replacement rate (high-skilled) 0:6467
m replacement rate (medium-skilled) 0:6825 OECD (2006)
l replacement rate (low-skilled) 0:7825
c hiring cost in relation to the wage 0:1 Chen and
c' ring cost in relation to the wage 0:6 Funke (2005)
th = tl tax rate ratio (1) 1:437 Boss and
tm = tl tax rate ratio (2) 1:178 Elendner (2003)
 S;T lower limit of the distribution 0
 
1T;Nm
lower limit of the distribution 0 assumptions
 
2T;Nm
lower limit of the distribution 0
Table 4.2: Exogenous Values in the Initial Steady State (2)
the transition rates to get the corresponding upper limits: eq. (4.21) for +S;T , eq.
(4.17) for +
1T;Nm
and eq. (4.18) for +
2T;Nm
.
To check, whether the values of the limits are appropriate, the corresponding
elasticities with respect to the subsidies (i.e. temporary wage reductions) are calcu-
lated: ela(1T;Nm) =  0:170, ela(2T;Nm) =  0:173 and ela(S;T ) =  0:669. Given the
empirical estimates, as summarized in Orszag and Snower (1999b) the elasticities
range between  4:0 and  0:5. However, these values refer to a permanent change of
the wage. The elasticities with respect to the short-term subsidies are signicantly
smaller.132 Thus, the calculated elasticities can be justied.
All derived values are summarized in Table 4.3.
4.5.2 Numerical Results
In the following calculations it is assumed that for each subsidy either 0 or 5; 000
EUR per person can be spent. As the hiring subsidy is paid only for one period the
possible amounts are therefore also 0 or 5; 000 EUR. In contrast, the training subsidy
is paid over the whole phase of vocational training, therefore the annual payment for
each apprentice is 1; 771 EUR, which implies for the full model a total amount
of 5; 000 EUR over the whole phase of training.133 Then, the impact of the subsidies
132See Snower (1996).
133Recall that an apprentice continues training with a probability of (1   ) after each period.
Given the values for  and  as well as the fact that training takes 3 periods, there is: 5; 000 = [
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variable / description value basis of calculation
parameter
Ul low-skilled unemployment 0:034
Nl low-skilled employment 0:150
Um medium-skilled unemployment 0:067 see Appendix 7.2.3
Nm medium-skilled employment 0:668
T people in vocational training 0:057
S people in school 0:024
 bargaining power 0:20 eq. (4.14)
ah productivity (high-skilled) 75; 877 for i = l;m; h
am productivity (medium-skilled) 50; 621 and a =
al productivity (low-skilled) 30; 364
alNl+amNm+ahNh+av T
Nl+Nm+Nh+T
th tax rate (high-skilled) 0:070 ratios of tax rates
tm tax rate (medium-skilled) 0:057 and eq. (4.4), with:
tl tax rate (low-skilled) 0:049 S;T = T;Nm = 0
'm ring rate (medium-skilled) 0:055 see Appendix 7.2.3
'l ring rate (low-skilled) 0:096 3rd and 4th eq. of
U;T training rate (low-skilled unempl.) 0:041 matrix MT and ratio
N;T training rate (low-skilled empl.) 0:012 of the training rates
eq. for the transition
+S;T upper limit of the distribution 48; 063 rate for 2 di¤erent
+
1T;Nm
upper limit of the distribution 441; 211 wage levels and
+
2T;Nm
upper limit of the distribution 489; 072 eq. for the elasticity
Table 4.3: Derived Values in the Initial Steady State
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on aggregate income is calculated for three alternatives: either only one subsidy is
implemented or both subsidies are implemented simultaneously. The size of the
complementarity is calculated as follows: First, the percentage increase in aggregate
income is calculated for the two cases, in which only one subsidy is implemented, and
then, the sum is calculated. Second, the percentage increase in aggregate income
is calculated given that both subsidies are implemented simultaneously. Third, it
is calculated by how much (in percent) the increase in aggregate income, given
that both subsidies are implemented simultaneously, is higher than the sum of the
separate e¤ects. Moreover, a similar calculation is conducted for employment.
Next, the interactions (illustrated by the size of the complementarity) between
the hiring and training subsidy are analyzed for the simplied model, presented
in Section 4:4:1. Then, the complexity of the model is gradually increased. The
approach allows us to analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent components of the model.
Simplied Model First, the numerical solution of the simplied model, presented
in Section 4:4:1, is calculated, i.e. it is assumed that (i) there are no taxes: ti = 0
with i = l;m; h, (ii) training takes only one period: p = 1, (iii) apprentices do not
drop out of training:  = 0, and (iv) agents are risk neutral:  = 0.134 For this
case, the impact of the subsidies on aggregate income and employment is shown in
Table 4.4.135 The analytical solution is conrmed by the numerical results. The
S;T = 1; 771 S;T = 0 S;T = 1; 771 size of the
T;Nm = 0 T;Nm = 5; 000 T;Nm = 5; 000 complementarity
increase in ... in % in %
income 0:693245 1:2743 1:9703 0:139917
employment 0:486976 1:01081 1:50759 0:654614
Table 4.4: The Size of the Complementarity for a Simplied Version of the Model
two subsidies are complementary concerning aggregate income. However, the size of
the complementarity is quite weak. The size of the complementarity is signicantly
higher concerning employment.
To explain the result, in a rst step, the e¤ect of the three policies on the incomeP3
c=1(1    )c 1] = 1; 771.
134Recall that the elasticities of the hiring rates and the training rate are not set exogenously but
they are the result of the calibration. However, for  = 0 and p = 1, the values would change. In
order to avoid this e¤ect, the lower limits of the distribution with respect to the random costs are
modied so that the initial values for the elasticities are achieved.
135With respect to the full model, S;T = 1; 771 EUR implies that the total amout of training
subsidies corresponds to the total amout of hiring subsidies. For  = 0 and p = 1, this is not the
case. Setting also S;T = 5; 000 EUR increases the size of complementarity to 1:2 % with respect
to employment and to 0:2 % with respect to income.
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of the employed only is analyzed. For every policy, the increase in income of the
employed is higher than the increase in employment. The result is not surprising as
the group of employees, which has the higher weight (i.e. income) when calculating
aggregate income, increases (i.e. the medium-skilled employees). However, the size
of the complementarity with respect to the income of the employees is lower than
the size of the complementarity with respect to employment. This can be explained
by the impact of the subsidies on the average income per employee. The increase
in the average income given a simultaneous implementation of the two subsidies is
lower than in sum of the separate e¤ects.
Second, it has to be taken into account that aggregate income also contains the
income of the unemployed. Therefore, also the impact of the three policies on the
income of the unemployed only is analyzed. All three policies have a negative e¤ect
on unemployment and thereby a negative e¤ect on the income of the unemployed.
Moreover, the negative impact (in absolute terms) in the case of a simultaneous
implementation is higher than the sum of the separate e¤ects.
Finally, both factors the lower complementarity concerning the income of the
employed and the negative impact with respect to the income of the unemployed
explain, why the complementarity of the policies concerning aggregate income is
lower than concerning employment.
Model with Realistic Calibration of the Training Phase Next, the absence
of taxes is still assumed. However, with respect to vocational training, the values
are adjusted to realistic ones ( = 0:037 and p = 3). The impact of the subsidies
on aggregate income and employment, respectively, is shown in Table 4.5. As in the
S;T = 1; 771 S;T = 0 S;T = 1; 771 size of the
T;Nm = 0 T;Nm = 5; 000 T;Nm = 5; 000 complementarity
increase in ... in % in %
income 0:674265 0:428262 1:10883 0:572237
employment 0:469391 0:334023 0:81044 0:874502
Table 4.5: The Size of the Complementarity for a Realistic Calibration of the Train-
ing Phase
previous simulation, there are complementarities with respect to employment and
aggregate income. Moreover, the complementarity with respect to employment is
again lower than the complementarity with respect to aggregate income. However,
now, the complementarities are signicantly higher than in the previous simulation.
The di¤erence can be explained as follows. Now, as training takes p = 3 periods
and training subsidies are paid in every period of training, the amount of training
81
subsidies is higher than in the simplied model (with p = 1). In particular, the
total e¤ective amount of training subsidies per person corresponds to the amount of
hiring subsidies per person; hence the total e¤ective amount of training subsidies is
larger than in the previous simulation. Given this, one may expect that the e¤ect of
training subsidies on employment and aggregate income is signicantly higher than
in the previous simulation. However, this is not the case. It has to be taken into
account that  for p = 3 also the total decit of the employer with respect to
vocational training is higher as the phase of training is longer. In contrast to the
higher amount of training subsidies, this e¤ect on its own has a negative impact
on the training rate, S;T . The analysis of the training rate, S;T , reveals that in
total, both e¤ects almost compensate each other. Finally, the modied calibration
also inuences the initial levels of the di¤erent labor market states, which explains
the di¤erence of the growth rates of employment and nally of income compared to
the previous simulation.
The critical reader may argue that the fraction of apprentices, which drops out
of vocational training, , is not exogenous but has to be treated as a function of
the hiring subsidy, T;Nm , i.e. hiring subsidies do not only inuence the demand
for successful apprentices but via  they also inuence the number of apprentices.
The reasoning would be as follows: a subsidy rate raises the hiring rates 1T;Nm and
2T;Nm and thereby the probability of the apprentice to get a medium-skilled job. The
improvement of the income perspective could be expected to reduce the incentive
to drop out of training. Therefore  should be treated as an endogenous variable
with @ 
@ 
T;Nm
< 0. However, studies trying to explain, why apprentices drop out of
training, do not give any argument to think that nancial incentives would reduce
.136 Thus,  is not treated as a function of the hiring subsidy.
Model with Taxes The next step is the introduction of taxes. For the moment, it
is assumed that only the expenditures for unemployment benets have to be nanced
via taxes. According to eq. (4.4), the tax rates are set in a way, which ensures that
the tax receipts of the government equal its expenditures for unemployment benets;
however, the expenditures for subsidies do not a¤ect the tax rates, i.e. subsidies are
assumed to be 0 in eq. (4.4). The impact of the subsidies on aggregate income and
employment is shown in Table 4.6. Again, there are complementarities and the com-
plementarities with respect to employment are higher than the complementarities
136See BMBF (2003) for a survey of reasons and their importance. One main reason to drop out
of training is a problem in the relationship between the apprentice and the instructor in the rm.
Many apprentices who drop out of training do not intend to nally stop training but they try to
get a training position somewhere else.
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S;T = 1; 771 S;T = 0 S;T = 1; 771 size of the
T;Nm = 0 T;Nm = 5; 000 T;Nm = 5; 000 complementarity
increase in ... in % in %
income 0:974119 0:642619 1:62761 0:67228
employment 0:469391 0:334023 0:81044 0:874502
Table 4.6: The Size of the Complementarity in the Presence of Taxes
with respect to aggregate income. For employment, the results are absolutely equal
to the results in the previous simulation. The introduction of taxes does not a¤ect
the producer wages according to eq. (4.14). Hence, also the hiring rates, 1T;Nm and
2T;Nm, as well as the training rate, S;T , are not a¤ected. Finally, the introduction of
taxes has no impact on employment. With respect to aggregate income, the e¤ect
of all three policies is higher than in the previous simulation. The result is not sur-
prising because only the unemployment benets have to be nanced via taxes but
not the subsidies. As in the previous simulation, the implementation of subsidies
increases aggregate employment and reduces aggregate unemployment. Thus, the
number of people getting (higher) wages increases and the number of people requir-
ing the lower unemployment benets decreases. Moreover, and in contrast to the
previous simulation, there is an additional positive e¤ect on aggregate income. By
leading to a fall in the number of people requiring unemployment benets, subsidies
generate a revenue for the government. Consequently, compared to the previous
simulation, in which tax rates were ignored and therefore not directly a¤ected by
subsidies the tax rates can be reduced, so the consumer wages and nally aggre-
gate income increases. Finally, also the size of the complementarity with respect to
aggregate income is higher than in the previous simulation.
Model with a Government Budget Constraint In the next step, the impact
of the government budget constraint is analyzed. In contrast to the previous sim-
ulation, also subsidies have to be nanced by taxes. According to eq. (4.4), the
tax rates are set in a way, which ensures that the tax receipts of the government
equal its total expenditures, i.e. the sum of unemployment benets and subsidies.
The impact of the subsidies on aggregate income and employment is shown in Table
4.7. With respect to employment, the results are absolutely equal to the results in
the previous simulation for the same reason as before. With respect to aggregate
income, there are two di¤erences.
First, the e¤ects of the three policies are smaller than in the previous simula-
tion. As before, the subsidies induce a reduction in the tax rates, as they (i) reduce
unemployment and thereby the number of unemployment benet recipients and (ii)
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S;T = 1; 771 S;T = 0 S;T = 1; 771 size of the
T;Nm = 0 T;Nm = 5; 000 T;Nm = 5; 000 complementarity
increase in ... in % in %
income 0:730406 0:474419 1:18343  1:77584
employment 0:469391 0:334023 0:81044 0:874502
Table 4.7: The Size of the Complementarity in the Presence of the Government
Budget Constraint
raise employment and thereby the number of tax payers. Hence, aggregate income
increases. However, the positive e¤ect is now reduced by a negative e¤ect. In the
presence of the government budget constraint and in contrast to the previous simula-
tion, not only the unemployment benets but also the subsidies have to be nanced
by taxes. The subsidy-induced reduction of the expenditures for unemployment
benets can be reduced or even overcompensated by the expenditures for the subsi-
dies. As in the previous simulation, the tax rates are reduced, but the reduction of
the tax rates and thus the increase in aggregate income are lower. In the previous
simulation the implementation of subsidies created a government budget decit as
the tax receipts only had to cover the expenditures for the unemployment benets
but not the expenditures for subsidies. If the aggregate income in the previous sim-
ulation would have been adjusted by the government decit, the e¤ect of the three
policies on aggregate income would be the same as in the simulation being based on
a government budget constraint.
The second di¤erence is the absence of the complementarity with respect to
aggregate income. To explain this result, the impact of the subsidies on the subsidy-
induced revenues for the government is analyzed. As the revenues are transfered
to the people via a tax reduction, the size of the revenues equals the increase in
aggregate income. The absence of the complementarity is caused by the non-linearity
of the subsidy-induced revenues for the government (see Figure 4.2).137 The higher
the level of one subsidy, the lower is the additional revenue caused by the other
subsidy. Moreover, the additional impact of the second subsidy on the revenues can
also be negative. Moreover, for higher levels, the subsidies do not create revenues
and thereby they do not contribute to an increase in income; instead, they are no
more self-nancing. In particular, the full implementation of both subsidies requires
additional tax receipts. Hence, the tax rates cannot decrease as much as in the
previous simulation. Therefore, the increase in aggregate income in the case of a
simultaneous implementation of the subsidies is lower than the sum of the increases
137Recall that the relevant population is normalized to 1, which has an impact on the size of the
revenues. The relevant aspect being illustrated by the gure is not the absolute size of the revenues
but the relative size for di¤erent combinations of the subsidies.
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Figure 4.2: Subsidy-Induced Revenues (in EUR) for Di¤erent Subsidy Levels
in the case of a separate implementation of each subsidy.
4.5.3 Robustness Checks
Next, robustness checks with respect to the hiring elasticities and the training elas-
ticity are conducted.138
Hiring Elasticities First, we regard the hiring rate, 1T;Nm (take-over rate), and
modify its elasticity with respect to the subsidy. The results for the e¤ects of the
three di¤erent policies on aggregate income and employment are illustrated in Table
4.8. A higher elasticity (in absolute terms),139 ela(1T;Nm), increases the e¤ect of the
ela S;T = 1; 771 S;T = 0 S;T = 1; 771 size of the
(1T;Nm) increase 
T;Nm = 0 T;Nm = 5; 000 T;Nm = 5; 000 complementarity
in ... in % in %
 0:170 0:730406 0:474419 1:18343  1:77584
 0:500 income 0:730406 1:10374 1:80350  1:67113
 0:170 employ- 0:469391 0:334023 0:81044 0:874502
 0:500 ment 0:469391 0:670322 1:15386 1:24144
Table 4.8: The E¤ect of Subsidies for Di¤erent Levels of the Hiring Elasticity (1)
hiring subsidy on aggregate income and employment. However, the impact of the
training subsidy on income and employment is independent of the elasticity of the
138The elasticities are modied indirectly. With respect to the initial steady state, the lower limit
of the corresponding uniform distribution is modied so that the new value for the elasticity is
obtained. The same procedure has been used in section 4:4:2.
139Also in the following the notion "elasticity" stands for elasticity in absolute terms.
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hiring rate. With respect to employment, the size of the complementarity increases.
With respect to aggregate income the negative size of the complementarity decreases.
Second, the elasticity of the hiring rate, 2T;Nm, is modied. It determines the
hiring of successful apprentices by rms, which do not conduct vocational training.
The results for the e¤ects of the three di¤erent policies on aggregate income and
employment, respectively, are illustrated in Table 4.9. Again, a higher elasticity,
ela S;T = 1; 771 S;T = 0 S;T = 1; 771 size of the
(2T;Nm) increase 
T;Nm = 0 T;Nm = 5; 000 T;Nm = 5; 000 complementarity
in ... in % in %
 0:173 0:730406 0:474419 1:18343  1:77584
 0:50 income 0:730406 0:507838 1:21930  1:52984
 0:173 employ- 0:469391 0:334023 0:81044 0:874502
 0:50 ment 0:469391 0:373991 0:853341 1:18085
Table 4.9: The E¤ect of Subsidies for Di¤erent Levels of the Hiring Elasticity (2)
ela(2T;Nm), increases the e¤ect of the hiring subsidy on aggregate income and em-
ployment. Moreover, with respect to employment, the size of the complementarity
increases. With respect to aggregate income the negative size of the complementar-
ity decreases. However, compared to a variation of the hiring elasticity, ela(1T;Nm),
the e¤ects are smaller. The di¤erence can be explained by regarding eq. (4.21). The
training rate is a¤ected by the hiring rate 1T;Nm, but not by the hiring rate 
2
T;Nm.
Thus, in contrast to a higher hiring elasticity, ela(2T;Nm), a higher hiring elasticity,
ela(1T;Nm) has an additional positive e¤ect on employment and aggregate income
as it also increases the impact of the hiring subsidies on the training rate.140
Training Elasticity Next, the elasticity of the training rate, S;T , with respect to
the subsidy is modied. The results for the e¤ects of the three di¤erent policies on
aggregate income and employment are illustrated in Table 4.10. A higher elasticity of
ela S;T = 1; 771 S;T = 0 S;T = 1; 771 size of the
(S;T ) increase 
T;Nm = 0 T;Nm = 5; 000 T;Nm = 5; 000 complementarity
in ... in % in %
 0:669 0:730406 0:474419 1:18343  1:77584
 1:25 income 1:55918 0:995328 2:52677  1:08592
 0:669 employ- 0:469391 0:334023 0:81044 0:874502
 1:25 ment 0:882265 0:589173 1:49092 1:32421
Table 4.10: The E¤ect of Subsidies for Di¤erent Levels of the Training Elasticity
140The fact that the initial value for 1T;Nm (0:3975) is higher than the initial value for 
2
T;Nm
(0:3525) does not explain the di¤erence.
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the training rate, ela(S;T ), increases the e¤ects of the training subsidy on aggregate
income and employment. Moreover, with respect to employment, the size of the
complementarity increases. Compared to the previous robustness check with respect
to the hiring elasticity, there is one di¤erence, which deserves attention. The e¤ect
of a higher hiring elasticity only occurs in the presence of hiring subsidies. In
contrast, the e¤ect of a higher training elasticity also occurs in the absence of training
subsidies. A higher training elasticity causes an additional increase in the number of
people entering vocational training and thereby the number of people getting hiring
subsidies rises. Finally, given a higher training elasticity, even the e¤ect of the hiring
subsidies on employment and aggregate income increases.
4.5.4 Welfare Analysis
The critical reader may argue that aggregate income given by eq. (4.22) is not an
appropriate measure of welfare as it is not based on utility. Therefore, the impact
of the subsidies is calculated on a utility-based concept of welfare, where 
 denotes
welfare. The variation of welfare is quantied by using the concept of "consumption
equivalents".141 In particular, the variation of welfare due to a given policy reform is
quantied by asking by how much an individuals consumption has to be increased
in the absence of the policy reform so that her present value of lifetime utility equals
that under a specic policy reform. The utility function is given by:
ui;t(Ci;t) =
1
1   [Ci;t(1 + )]
1  with i = l;m; h (4.5a)
Given this, eq. (4.22) has to be modied as follows:

 = T
1
1   (wv(1 + ))
1  (4.22a)
+
P
i=m;l;h Ni
1
1   (wi (1  ti)(1 + ))
1  + Ui
1
1   (i wi (1  ti)(1 + ))
1 
Here,  is the consumption equivalent, e.g.  = 0:1 implies that if a certain sub-
sidy is implemented, an individual in the population considered will experience an
increase in welfare due to the subsidy that is equivalent to receiving a 10% higher
consumption in the initial steady state.
The impact of the subsidies on the consumption equivalent and thereby on wel-
fare is shown in Table 4.11 for di¤erent degrees of risk aversion, i.e. the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion,  is also set at 1:5 and 2, respectively.142
141This is a common concept in the literature. See e.g. Conesa and Krueger (1999).
142The values are located within a reasonable scope. According to Rodepeter (1999) and Dohmen
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These values are relatively low, but taking into account the whole calibration,
they can be justied. The period of analysis and thus the minimum duration of
unemployment in the model is one year. Thus, the risk of unemployment is much
higher than in the real world where agents could leave unemployment before the
end of a year. In reality they therefore have a higher possibility to smooth income.
Taking this into account, calibrating the utility function with a relatively low degree
of risk aversion is justied as it compensates the higher risk in the model.
S;T = 1; 771 S;T = 0 S;T = 1; 771 size of the
T;Nm = 0 T;Nm = 5; 000 T;Nm = 5; 000 complementarity
 in % for in %
 = 0 0:730406 0:474419 1:18343  1:77584
 = 1:5 0:674668 0:442559 1:10189  1:37317
 = 2 0:502534 0:336615 0:822919  1:93411
Table 4.11: The Size of the Complementarity with Respect to Welfare
The results for  = 0 correspond to the results for aggregate income in the
previous simulation. The results reveal that a higher degree of risk aversion reduces
the impact of each policy. This result can be explained by the aggregation e¤ect.
When calculating welfare according to eq. (4.22a), a higher degree of risk aversion is
equal to a relatively higher weight on low income. However, both policies reduce the
number of low-skilled people and thereby the number of people with a low income.
Finally, a higher degree of risk aversion increases the weight of the decreasing group
of people with a low income. Hence, aggregate welfare declines.
4.6 Concluding Thoughts
This chapter examines the interactions between employment policies and training
policies. In particular, it is analyzed, whether there are complementarities with
respect to income and employment. Here, the denition of complementarity is
straightforward: two policies are complementary, when the e¤ect of each policy on,
say, aggregate income is larger when it is implemented in conjunction with the other
policy than in isolation. Ignoring possible interactions could distort the evaluation
of the policies.
As an example for employment and training policies, hiring subsidies and training
subsidies are considered. They play a prominent role within the active labor mar-
ket policy in many OECD countries, where high unemployment is one of the most
pressing economic problems, especially, for the low-skilled people. In the model,
et al. (2006), the limits for CRRA are 1 and 5.
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the e¤ects of subsidies, which are expected to mitigate this problem, are analyzed.
Training subsidies are paid to employers to increase their incentive for providing
vocational training. Hiring subsidies are meant to increase the transition from ap-
prenticeship to work. They are provided for a limited period of time, in which they
drive a wedge between the income, the worker receives, and the labor costs the
employer is confronted with.
This analysis tackles, in particular, the assessment of interactions by presenting a
macro model of the labor market and the training system that allows us to quantify
each e¤ect being associated with the two subsidies when implemented in isolation
and when implemented in conjunction. Taking the possibility of interactions into
account helps to avoid distortions in the evaluation of labor market policies, policy
makers are increasingly interested in. Moreover, to make the analysis useful for
policy makers, the model takes a variety of common labor market imperfections as
given.
By evaluating the policies within a simplied model, it is shown that there are
good theoretical reasons for these policies to be complementary. The simulation
results reveal that there are signicant interactions between hiring and training sub-
sidies. However, complementarities between the two policies are quite weak or even
absent (with respect to income). When comparing the results for di¤erent institu-
tional and policy features of the economy, signicant di¤erences can be observed.
In particular, the existence of complementarities with respect to aggregate income
depends on the nancial constraints of the government. In the absence of the gov-
ernment budget constraint, there are complementarities. Independent of the results
for the specic policy examples, this analysis provides a methodology for examin-
ing policy interactions, which may be useful well beyond the bounds of hiring and
training subsidies.
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5 Conclusion
This dissertation analyzes the impact of the ongoing globalization of labor markets
and its policy implications. In particular, an enhanced global engagement of emerg-
ing economies is supposed to have important macroeconomic e¤ects. These e¤ects
have drawn increasing attention from policy makers. One signicant and already
long-lasting debate refers to the impact of an increasing globalization on wages and
employment. In this context, already Freeman (1995) asked: "Are Your Wages Set
in Beijing?" and provided a survey of the underlying controversial debate at that
time. A recent contribution by Fehr et al. (2008) concludes that in a time of ongoing
globalization, the income of low- and high-skilled workers will continue to diverge.
Besides the impact on wages and employment, the ongoing globalization is also sup-
posed to have reduced ination and increased macroeconomic activity. In all cases,
there are signicant policy implications, in particular for monetary policy and labor
market policy.
Against this background, the dissertation analyzes (i) the contribution of an
increasing global labor supply to the "Roaring Nineties"143, i.e. its impact on wages,
ination and macroeconomic activity, and the implications for monetary policy, (ii)
the impact of low-wage subsidies on skill formation, aggregate employment and
welfare given that low-wage subsidies are supposed to be a popular tool to assure
a certain income level for low-skilled and to support the employment of low-skilled
in the presence of a decreasing labor demand, and (iii) the e¤ectiveness of hiring
and training subsidies in stimulating employment and income, and in particular the
interactions between these policies.
Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of an increasing global labor supply on wages,
ination and macroeconomic activity and thereby went beyond the traditional three
explanations of the "Roaring Nineties" such as (i) good luck, (ii) nancial innova-
tions and improved inventory management techniques, and (iii) improved macro-
economic policies, i.e., in particular, a monetary policy, which focused on price
stability.
The analysis reveals that the increase in global labor supply can explain the
combination of high macroeconomic activity and low ination in recent years. The
increase in the e¤ective labor supply put downward pressure on wages and ultimately
ination. The analysis illustrates that a main transmission channel is the develop-
ment of the bargaining power of the employees in combination with the initially
143This term is often used to describe the boom at that time, see e.g. Stiglitz (2003) as well as
Krueger and Solow (2002).
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lower bargaining power of the employees in the emerging economies. Given that
workers in advanced economies can be more easily replaced by workers in emerging
economies due to increasing opportunities for trade, the bargaining power of work-
ers in advanced economies declines and thereby also the global bargaining power.
Then, also the wage and ultimately ination decline. By implication, a slowing of
labor supply growth in the future combined with an increasing bargaining power of
workers in the emerging economies would reduce the dampening impact on wages
and nally on ination. Hence, monetary policy would get a more inationary bias
and thereby lead monetary authorities to adopt a more restrictive monetary stance.
In this study, the analysis is based on labor as the only input factor of production.
The implementation of capital and thereby the analysis of the investment behavior
as an additional feature is supposed to be a challenging and interesting aspect
for future research.144
Whereas the analysis in Chapter 2 focuses on the implications for monetary
policy, the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the implications for labor market
policy.
Chapter 3 addresses low-wages subsidies as a popular policy reaction to face the
decreasing labor demand for low-skilled. It is often argued that low-wage subsidies
improve the employment situation of the low-skilled labor force as they contribute
to the reduction in the producer wages, which has a positive impact on the hiring
decision. However, the crucial dimension of the labor market performance is aggre-
gate employment. In this context and in contrast to the common literature, also
the impact of low-wage subsidies on skilled employment is taken into account in
the analysis. In particular, three channels whereby low-wage subsidies a¤ect aggre-
gate employment are examined: (i) the positive direct employment e¤ect, (ii) the
negative skill-acquisition e¤ect, and (iii) the negative government budget e¤ect. In
order to address the specic question of this chapter, the labor force in contrast
to the second chapter is di¤erentiated according to its di¤erent skill levels, which
are dened by the level of educational attainment. It is assumed that each skill level
corresponds to a certain productivity level.
The model is calibrated for Germany. The numerical analysis reveals that low-
wage subsidies signicantly reduce skilled employment. Hence, the positive e¤ect of
low-wage subsidies on low-skilled employment does not cause an increase in aggre-
gate employment to the same extent; rather the net e¤ect is small. Furthermore,
the shift from skilled to low-skilled employment reduces aggregate welfare. However,
144See e.g. Molnar et al. (2008) for a recent study on globalization and employment with a focus
on foreign direct investment.
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the size of the impact on employment depends on several aspects. Whereas the size
of the direct employment e¤ect is in particular inuenced by the hiring elasticity,
the size of the skill-acquisition e¤ect depends on the elasticity of the hiring rate, the
degree of risk aversion and the elasticity of the training rate. With respect to future
research, it may be promising to use a higher level of disaggregation with more skill
levels.
Given the ongoing globalization and its adverse impact on the demand for low-
skilled labor in advanced economies, often more than one policy instrument is imple-
mented to counteract the negative impact. In this context, Chapter 4 analyzes a spe-
cial type of labor market policy implications: the relevance of interactions between
two kind of policies. The chapter investigates whether there are complementarities
between employment policies and training policies with respect to employment and
income. The denition of complementarity is straightforward: two policies are com-
plementary, when the e¤ect of each policy on, e.g. aggregate income is greater when
it is implemented in conjunction with the other policy than in isolation. Substi-
tutability is dened as a negative complementarity. Ignoring possible interactions
could distort the evaluation of the policies.
As an example for employment and training policies, hiring subsidies and train-
ing subsidies are considered. The analysis is based on the Markov model of the
previous chapter. However, some modications of the model are necessary because
other policies are analyzed. The simulation results reveal that there are signicant
interactions between hiring and training subsidies. However, complementarities be-
tween the two policies are quite weak or even absent (with respect to income). When
comparing the results for di¤erent institutional and policy features of the economy,
signicant di¤erences can be observed. In particular, the existence of complemen-
tarities with respect to aggregate income depends on the nancial constraints of
the government. In the absence of the government budget constraint, there are
complementarities.
Independent of the results for the specic policies, which are regarded in this
chapter, the analysis provides a methodology for examining policy interactions,
which may be useful for future research well beyond the bounds of hiring and training
subsidies.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix to Chaper 2
7.1.1 Prot Maximization of the Firm
Given the prot eq. (2.11), we rst calculate the value to the rm of adding another
worker at time t (recall that: Nt+1(i) = (1  ') Nt(i) + qt Vt(i) and xt(i) = qt Vt(i)Nt(i) ):
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Next, we calculate the rst order condition with respect to the number of vacancies,
V :
@t(i)
@Vt(i)
=   qt xt(i) +  Et t;t+1 @t+1(i)
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(A1.1.2)
Finally, we derive the forward looking di¤erence equation for the hiring rate. We
combine eq. (A1.1.1) and eq. (A1.1.2) as follows:
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
= A Wt(i) + 
2
x2t (i) + (1  ')  xt(i)| {z }
=  Et t;t+1
@t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
according to. eq. (A1.1.2)
(A1.1.1a)
We substitute @t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
in eq. (A1.1.2) by eq. (A1.1.1a) for t+1 and get the forward
looking di¤erence equation for the hiring rate:
xt(i) = Et t;t+1[A Wt+1(i) + 
2
x2t+1(i) + (1  ')  xt+1(i)]
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7.1.2 Utility Maximization of the Household
Using eq. (2.15) subject to eq. (2.16), in which all nominal variables are normalized
by the price level P , we get the Lagrange function for the household, LH :
LH = Et
1P
j=0
j ln(ct+j)  %t+j
264 Pt+j ct+j +
1
1+it+j
znt+j + Pt+j tt+j
 Pt+j Wt+j nt+j   Pt+j Bt+j ut+j
  znt+j 1   Pt+j t+j
375
The rst order condition with respect to consumption is:
@LH
@ct
= Et 
j(
1
ct+j
  %t+j Pt+j) != 0
For j = 0, we get:
1
ct
= Pt %t (A1.2.1)
The rst order condition with respect to bond holding is:
@LH
@znt+j
= Et 
j ( %t+j
1
1 + it+j
) + Et 
j+1 ( %t+j+1)( 1)) != 0
For j = 0, we get:
%t
1
1 + it
=  Et %t+1 (A1.2.2)
By combining these two rst order conditions, the Euler equation can be derived.
We rewrite eq. (A1.2.2) by substituting %t by
1
ct
1
Pt
and %t+1 by
1
ct+1
1
Pt+1
according to
eq. (A1.2.1), respectively:
1
ct
1
Pt
1
1 + it
=  Et
1
ct+1
1
Pt+1
By rearranging, we get the consumption Euler equation (recall that Pt+1
Pt
= 1+t+1):
1 = (1 + it)  Et[
ct
ct+1
1
1 + t+1
]
7.1.3 Wage Determination
Sum of the Expected Future Wages for an Employee The discounted sum
of expected real future wages, WEt (i), to be received by an employee i over the life
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of the relationship at a rm renegotiating in period t is calculated as follows:
WEt (i) = Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j Wt+j(i)
= Wt
+ [(1  ') ] Et t;t+1 Wt+1(i)
+ [(1  ') ]2 Et t;t+2 Wt+2(i)
+ [(1  ') ]3 Et t;t+3 Wt+3(i)
+ ::: (A1.3.1)
At a rm renegotiating in period t, the current and future expected real wages are
given by:
Wt(i) =W

t
Et Wt+1(i) = Et
1
Pt+1
(w (1 + 
) W nt|{z}
= Wt Pt = W
;n
t
+ (1  w) W ;nt+1)
Et Wt+2(i) = Et
1
Pt+2
(w (1 + 
) W nt+1| {z }
=Et Wt+1 Pt+1
+ (1  w) W ;nt+2)
= Et
1
Pt+2
(w (1 + 
) [w (1 + )W
;n
t + (1  w) W ;nt+1] + (1  w) W ;nt+2)
= Et
1
Pt+2
(2w (1 + 
)2 W ;nt + w (1  w) (1 + ) W ;nt+1 + (1  w) W ;nt+2)
Et Wt+3(i) = Et
1
Pt+3
(w (1 + 
) W nt+2| {z }
=Et Wt+2 Pt+2
+ (1  w) W ;nt+3)
= Et
1
Pt+3
(w (1 + 
)[2w (1 + 
)2W ;nt + w(1  w)(1 + )W ;nt+1 + (1  w)W ;nt+2]
+ (1  w) W ;nt+3 )
= Et
1
Pt+3
(3w (1 + 
)3W ;nt + 
2
w(1  w)(1 + )2W ;nt+1 + w(1  w)(1 + )W ;nt+2
+ (1  w) W ;nt+3 )
:::
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By substituting Et Wt+j(i) (for j = 1; 2; :::) in eq. (A1.3.1) by the corresponding
equation above, we get:
WEt (i) =W

t
+ (1  ')  Et t;t+1 1
Pt+1
(w(1 + 
) W ;nt + (1  w) W ;nt+1)
+ [(1  ') ]2Et t;t+2 1
Pt+2
(2w(1 + 
)2 W ;nt + w (1  w)(1 + ) W ;nt+1
+ (1  w) W ;nt+2 )
+ [(1  ') ]3Et t;t+3 1
Pt+3
(3w(1 + 
)3 W ;nt + 
2
w(1  w)(1 + )2 W ;nt+1
+ w(1  w)(1 + ) W ;nt+2 + (1  w) W ;nt+3)
+ :::
By rearranging, we get:
WEt (i) =W

t
+ (1  ')  Et t;t+1 [w (1 + ) Pt
Pt+1
W t + (1  w) W t+1]
+ [(1  ') ]2 Et t;t+2 [2w(1 + )2
Pt
Pt+2
W t + w(1  w)(1 + )
Pt+1
Pt+2
W t+1
+ (1  w) W t+2 ]
+ [(1  ') ]3 Et t;t+3 [3w(1 + )3
Pt
Pt+3
W t + 
2
w(1  w)(1 + )2
Pt+1
Pt+3
W t+1
+ w(1  w)(1 + )Pt+2
Pt+3
W t+2 + (1  w) W t+3]
+ :::
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By collecting terms, we get:
WEt (i) = Et[ 1 + (1  ')  w (1 + )t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1
+ [(1  ')  w (1 + )]2t;t+2 Pt
Pt+2
+ [(1  ')  w (1 + )]3t;t+3 Pt
Pt+3
+ ::: ] W t
+ (1  w) (1  ')  Et[t;t+1 + (1  ')  w (1 + )t;t+2Pt+1
Pt+2
+ [(1  ')  w (1 + )]2t;t+3Pt+1
Pt+3
+ ::: ] W t+1
+ (1  w) [(1  ')  ]2 Et[t;t+2 + (1  ')  w (1 + )t;t+3Pt+2
Pt+3
+ ::: ]W t+2
+ (1  w) [(1  ')  ]3 Et[t;t+3 + ::: ]W t+3
+ :::
We rewrite and get:
WEt (i) = Et[1 + (1  ')  w(1 + )t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1
+ [(1  ')  w(1 + )]2t;t+2 Pt
Pt+2
+ ::: ] W t
+ (1  w) (1  ')  Et t;t+1[1 + (1  ')  w(1 + )t+1;t+2Pt+1
Pt+2
+ [(1  ')  w(1 + )]2t+1;t+3Pt+1
Pt+3
+ :::] W t+1
+ (1  w) [(1  ')  ]2 Et t;t+2[1 + (1  ')  w(1 + )t+2;t+3Pt+2
Pt+3
+ ::: ] W t+2
+ (1  w) [(1  ')  ]3 Et t;t+3[1 + ::: ] W t+3
+ :::
With
t = Et
1P
h=0
[(1  ')  w (1 + )]h t;t+h Pt
Pt+h
(A1.3.2)
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we get:
WEt (i) = t W

t
+ (1  w) (1  ')  Et t;t+1 t+1 W t+1
+ (1  w) [(1  ')  ]2 Et t;t+2 t+2 W t+2
+ (1  w) [(1  ')  ]3 Et t;t+3 t+3 W t+3
+ :::
By rearranging, we get:
WEt (i) = t W

t + (1  w) Et
1P
j=1
[(1  ')  ]j t;t+j t+j W t+j (A1.3.3)
Sum of Expected Future Wages for a Firm The discounted sum of expected
future real wage payments, W Ft (i), by a rm i renegotiating in period t over both
the existing contract and subsequent contracts is calculated as follows:
W Ft (i) = Et
1P
j=0
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
j t;t+j Wt+j(i)
= Wt
+ Et
Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
 t;t+1 Wt+1(i)
+ Et
Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
2 t;t+2 Wt+2(i)
+ Et
Nt+3(i)
Nt(i)
3 t;t+3 Wt+3(i)
+ ::: (A1.3.4)
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Again, at a rm renegotiating in period t, the current and future expected real wages
are given by:
Wt(i) =W

t
Et Wt+1(i) = Et
1
Pt+1
(w(1 + 
)W ;nt + (1  w) W ;nt+1)
Et Wt+2(i) = Et
1
Pt+2
(2w(1 + 
)2W ;nt + w(1  w)(1 + ) W ;nt+1 + (1  w)W ;nt+2)
Et Wt+3(i) = Et
1
Pt+3
(3w(1 + 
)3W ;nt + 
2
w(1  w)(1 + )2W ;nt+1 + w(1  w)(1 + )W ;nt+2
+ (1  w)W ;nt+3)
:::::
By substituting Et Wt+j(i) (for j = 1; 2; :::) in eq. (A1.3.4) by the corresponding
equation above, we get:
W Ft (i) =W

t
+ Et
Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
 t;t+1
1
Pt+1
(w(1 + 
) W ;nt + (1  w) W ;nt+1)
+ Et
Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
2t;t+2
1
Pt+2
(2w(1 + 
)2W ;nt + w(1  w)(1 + )W ;nt+1 + (1  w)W ;nt+2)
+ Et
Nt+3(i)
Nt(i)
3t;t+3
1
Pt+3
(3w(1 + 
)3W ;nt + 
2
w(1  w)(1 + )2W ;nt+1
+ w(1  w)(1 + )W ;nt+2 + (1  w)W ;nt+3 )
+ :::
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By rearranging, we get:
W Ft (i) =W

t
+ Et
Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
 t;t+1[w (1 + 
)
Pt
Pt+1
W t + (1  w) W t+1]
+ Et
Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
2 t;t+2[
2
w (1 + 
)2
Pt
Pt+2
W t + w (1  w)(1 + )
Pt+1
Pt+2
W t+1
+ (1  w) W t+2) ]
+ Et
Nt+3(i)
Nt(i)
3 t;t+3[
3
w (1 + 
)3
Pt
Pt+3
W t + 
2
w(1  w)(1 + )2
Pt+1
Pt+3
W t+1
+ w (1  w)(1 + )Pt+2
Pt+3
W t+2 + (1  w)W t+3)]
+ :::
By collecting terms, we get:
W Ft (i) = Et[1 +
Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
 w(1 + 
)t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1
+
Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
[ w(1 + 
)]2t;t+2
Pt
Pt+2
+ :::] W t
+ (1  w) Et  [Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+1 +
Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
 w(1 + 
)t;t+2
Pt+1
Pt+2
+ ::: ] W t+1
+ (1  w) Et 2[Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+2 +
Nt+3(i)
Nt(i)
 w(1 + 
)t;t+3
Pt+2
Pt+3
+ ::: ] W t+2
+ :::
Again, we rearrange and get:
W Ft (i) = Et[1 +
Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
 w(1 + 
)t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1
+
Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
[ w(1 + 
)]2t;t+2
Pt
Pt+2
+ :::]W t
+(1  w)  Et Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+1[1 +
Nt+2(i)
Nt+1(i)
 w(1 + 
)t+1;t+2
Pt+1
Pt+2
+ ::: ]W t+1
+(1  w) 2Et Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+2[1 +
Nt+3(i)
Nt+2(i)
 w(1 + 
)t+2;t+3
Pt+2
Pt+3
+ ::: ]W t+2
+ :::
With
	t(i) = Et
1P
h=0
Nt+h(i)
Nt(i)
[  w (1 + 
)]h t;t+h
Pt
Pt+h
(A1.3.5)
113
we get:
W Ft (i) = 	t(i) W

t
+ (1  w)  EtNt+1(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+1 	t+1(i) W

t+1
+ (1  w) 2 EtNt+2(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+2 	t+2(i) W

t+2
+ :::
By rearranging, we get:
W Ft (i) = 	t(i) W

t + (1  w) Et
1P
j=1
j
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+j 	t+j(i) W

t+j (A1.3.6.)
Surplus of the Worker The surplus of a worker at a rm renegotiating in period
t is given by eq. (2.20):
SEt (i) =Wt(i) Bt +  Et t;t+1[(1  ') SEt+1(i)  st SEt+1]
= Wt(i) Bt + (1  ')  Et t;t+1 SEt+1(i)  st  Et t;t+1 SEt+1
= Wt(i) Bt   st  Et t;t+1 SEt+1
+ (1  ')  Et t;t+1[Wt+1(i) Bt+1 + (1  ')  t+1;t+2 SEt+2(i)
  st+1  t+1;t+2 SEt+2]
= Et
1P
j=0
((1  ')  )j t;t+j Wt+j(i)| {z }
= WEt (i) according to eq. (A1.3.1)
+ Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j [ Bt+j   st+j  t+j;t+j+1 SEt+j+1]
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By substituting WEt (i) by eq. (A1.3.3), we get:
SEt (i) = [t W

t + (1  w) Et
1P
j=1
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j t+j W t+j]
  Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j [Bt+j + st+j  t+j;t+j+1 SEt+j+1]
= t W

t   Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j [Bt+j + st+j  t+j;t+j+1 SEt+j+1]
+ (1  w) Et
1P
j=1
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j t+j W t+j
= t W

t   Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j [Bt+j + st+j  t+j;t+j+1 SEt+j+1]
+ Et
1P
j=0
(1  w)[(1  ') ]j+1 t;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1
= t W

t   Et
1P
j=0
[ [(1  ') ]j t;t+j [Bt+j + st+j  t+j;t+j+1 SEt+j+1]
  (1  w)[(1  ') ]j+1 t;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1 ]
Finally, the surplus of the worker is:
SEt (i) = t W

t (A1.3.7)
  Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j
"
Bt+j + st+j  t+j;t+j+1 S
E
t+j+1
  (1  w) (1  ')  t+j;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1
#
Surplus of the Firm The surplus of a rm (i.e. the value of an additional worker,
SFt (i) =
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
) renegotiating in period t is given by eq. (2.21):
SFt (i) = A Wt(i) +

2
x2t (i) +  Et t;t+1
@t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
@Nt(i)| {z }
=(1 ')
= A Wt(i) + 
2
x2t (i) + (1  ')  Et t;t+1 SFt+1(i)
= Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j [A+ 
2
x2t+j(i)]  Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j Wt+j(i)| {z }
= WEt (i) according to eq. (A1.3.1)
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By substituting WEt (i) by eq. (A1.3.3), we get:
SFt (i) = Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j [A+ 
2
x2t+j(i)]
  [t W t + (1  w) Et
1P
j=1
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j t+j W t+j]
=  t W t + Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j [A+ 
2
x2t+j(i)]
  (1  w)(1  ')  Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1
=  tW t
+ Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j
"
A+ 
2
x2t+j(i)
 (1  w)(1  ')  t+j;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1
#
(A1.3.8)
An alternative expression for SFt (i) can be derived by combining the eq. (2.12) and
(2.13).
First, we rewrite eq. (2.13) as follows:
 xt(i) =  Et t;t+1
@t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
,  x2t (i) =  Et t;t+1
@t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
xt(i)
, 0 =   x2t (i) + Et t;t+1
@t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
xt(i)
Second, we include this expression into eq. (2.12). Recall that @t+1(i)
@Nt+1(i)
= SFt (i) and
@Nt+1(i)
@Nt(i)
= (1  ').
SFt (i) = A Wt(i) +

2
x2t (i) +  Et t;t+1 S
F
t+1(i) (1  ')   x2t (i) + Et t;t+1 SFt+1(i) xt(i)
= A Wt(i)  
2
x2t (i) + Et  (1  '+ xt(i)) t;t+1 SFt+1(i)
= A Wt(i)  
2
x2t (i) + Et 
Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+1 S
F
t+1(i)
= Et
1P
j=0
j
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+j [A  
2
x2t+j(i)]  Et
1P
j=0
j
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+j Wt+j(i)| {z }
= WFt (i) according to eq. (A1.3.4)
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By substituting W Ft (i) according to eq. (A1.3.6.), we get:
SFt (i) =Et
1P
j=0
j
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+j [A  
2
x2t+j(i)] (A1.3.9)
  [ 	t(i) W t + (1  w) Et
1P
j=1
j
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
t;t+j 	t+j(i) W

t+j]
Solution of the Nash Bargaining The contract wage W t is chosen to solve the
following problem:
max
W t

 = [SEt (i)]
t [SFt (i)]
1 t
The solution is calculated as follows:
@

@W t
= t [S
E
t (i)]
t 1 @S
E
t (i)
@W t
[SFt (i)]
1 t + [SEt (i)]
t (1  t) ([SFt (i)] t
@SFt (i)
@W t
!
= 0
, 0 = t [SEt (i)] 1
@SEt (i)
@W t
SFt (i) + (1  t)
@SFt (i)
@W t
According to eq. (A1.3.7), @S
E
t (i)
@W t
= t, and according to eq. (A1.3.9),
@SFt (i)
@W t
=
 	t(i). Hence, we write:
t [S
E
t (i)]
 1 t SFt (i) + (1  t) ( 	t(i)) = 0
, t t SFt (i) = (1  t) 	t(i) SEt (i)
, t SFt (i) = (1  t)
	t(i)
t
SEt (i)
, t SFt (i) =
t + (1  t) 	t(i) = t   t
t + (1  t) 	t(i) = t
SEt (i) [t + (1  t) 	t(i) = t]
, t
t + (1  t) 	t(i) = t
SFt (i) = (1 
t
t + (1  t) 	t(i) = t
) SEt (i)
Finally, the solution of the Nash bargaining is given by:
t(i) S
F
t (i) = [1  t(i)] SEt (i) with t(i) =
t
t + (1  t) 	t(i) = t
(A1.3.10)
Contract Wage Next, given eq. (A1.3.10), we substitute SFt (i) by the expression
in eq. (A1.3.8) and SEt (i) by the expression in eq. (A1.3.7). After some rearrange-
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ments, we get:
tW

t = Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j t+j(i) [A+

2
x2t+j(i)
  (1  ')(1  w) t+j;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1]
+ Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j [1  t+j(i)] [Bt+j + st+j  t+j;t+j+1 SEt+j+1
  (1  ')(1  w) t+j;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1]
,
tW

t = Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]jt;t+j t(i) [A+

2
x2t+j(i)]
+ Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j ( [1  t(i)][Bt+j + st+j  t+j;t+j+1 SEt+j+1]
  (1  ') (1  w)  t+j;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1)
,
tW

t = Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ') ]j t;t+j ( t(i) [A+

2
x2t+j(i)]
+ [1  t(i)] [Bt+j + st+j  t+j;t+j+1 SEt+j+1]
  (1  ') (1  w)  t+j;t+j+1 t+j+1 W t+j+1 )
The equation above can be written in a recursive form:
t W

t = t(i) [A+

2
x2t (i)]
+ [1  t(i)][Bt + st  Et t;t+1 SEt+1]
  (1  ') (1  w)  Et t;t+1 t+1 W t+1
+ (1  ')  Et t;t+1 t+1 W t+1
,
t W

t = t(i)[A+

2
x2t (i)]
+ [1  t(i)][Bt + st  Et t;t+1 SEt+1]
+ (1  ') w  Et t;t+1 t+1 W t+1
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By simplication, we obtain:
t W

t = W
T
t (i) + (1  ')  w Et t;t+1 t+1 W t+1
, W t =
1
t
[W Tt (i) + (1  ')  w Et t;t+1 t+1 W t+1] (A1.3.11)
where W T denotes the target wage:
W Tt (i) = t(i) [A+

2
x2t (i)] + [1  t(i)][Bt + st  Et t;t+1 SEt+1]
, W Tt (i) = t(i) [A+

2
x2t (i)] + [1  t(i)]Bt + [1  t(i)] st  Et t;t+1 SEt+1(i)
(A1.3.12)
Finally, we derive the equilibrium expression of the contract wage given by eq.
(A1.3.11). In the steady state, t;t+1 = 1. As all other variables are stationary, we
skip the time index:
W  =
1

(W T + (1  ')  w  W )
, W  = 1

W T + (1  ')  w W 
According to eq. (A1.4.5),  = 1
1 (1 ')  w , 1   (1   ')  w = 1 , (1   ') 
w = 1  1 . So, we can write:
W  =
1

W T + (1  1

) W 
, W  = W T
Target Wage The target wage, W Tt (i), given by eq. (A1.3.12), can be written
more precisely. By taking into account eq. (2.24), we can write:
W Tt = t(i)[A+

2
x2t (i)]+ [1 t(i)]Bt+ [1 t(i)] st  Et t;t+1
t+1(i)
1  t+1(i)
SFt+1(i)| {z }
= SEt+1(i)
Taking into account that @t(i)
@Nt(i)
= SFt (i) according to eq. (2.12) and (2.21), we can
rewrite eq. (2.13) as follows:
 xt(i) =  Et t;t+1 S
F
t+1(i)
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Given this, W Tt (i) can be written as follows:
W Tt (i) = t(i) [A+

2
x2t (i)] + [1  t(i)] Bt + [1  t(i)] st  xt(i) Et
t+1(i)
1  t+1(i)
(A1.3.13)
In the steady state, t;t+1 = 1 and t = t+1. As all variables are stationary, the
time index is skipped:
W T =  [A+

2
x2] + [1  ] B + s  x  (A1.3.14)
Wage Index Finally, the wage index, W , is calculated as follows:
Wt = (1  w) W t + w
1
Pt
(1 + ) Pt 1 Wt 1
, Wt = (1  w) W t + w
1 + 
1 + t
Wt 1
In the steady state,  = t =  and Wt = Wt 1 = W . So we can write:
W = (1  w) W  + w W
, W = W  (A1.3.15)
7.1.4 Iteration of the Cumulative Discount Factors
Cumulative Discount Factor of the Worker, t The cumulative discount
factor of the worker t, given by eq. (2.22), can be written as follows:
t = Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ')  w (1 + )]j Pt
Pt+j
t;t+j
, t = 1 + [(1  ')  w (1 + )] Et Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1
+ [(1  ')  w (1 + )]2 Et Pt
Pt+2
t;t+2 + :::
, t = 1 + [(1  ')  w (1 + )] Et Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1
+ [(1  ')  w (1 + )]2 Et Pt
Pt+1
Pt+1
Pt+2
t;t+1t+1;t+2 + :::
, t = 1 + [(1  ')  w (1 + )] Et Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1(1 + [(1  ') w(1 + )]1Pt+1
Pt+2
t+1;t+2 + :::)
(A1.4.1)
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Moreover:
Et t+1 = Et
1P
j=0
[(1  ')  w (1 + )]j Pt+1
Pt+1+j
t+1;t+1+j
, Et t+1 = 1 + [(1  ')  w (1 + )] Et Pt+1
Pt+2
t+1;t+2 + :: (A.1.4.2)
Next, we substitute (1 + [(1   ')  w (1 + )]1 Pt+1Pt+2t+1;t+2 + :::) in eq. (A1.4.1)
by Et t+1 according to eq. (A.1.4.2) and get:
t = 1 + [(1  ')  w (1 + )] Et Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1 t+1
, t = 1 + (1  ')  w Et 1 + 

1 + t+1
t;t+1 t+1 (A1.4.3)
Finally, we derive the equilibrium expression. With respect to the equilibrium, we
can write:
t+i;t+i+1 =
u0(ct+i+1)
u0(ct+i)
= 1 as ct+i+1 = ct+i (A1.4.4)
where c is per capita consumption.
Then, the steady state expression is calculated by rearranging eq. (A1.4.3). As all
variables are stationary, the time index is skipped:
 = 1 + (1  ')  w 1 + 

1 + 

,  = 1 + (1  ')  w 
,  = 1
1  (1  ')  w (A1.4.5)
121
Cumulative Discount Factor of the Firm, 	t The cumulative discount factor
of the rm, 	t(i), given by eq. (2.23) can be written as follows:
	t(i) = Et
1P
j=0
Nt+j(i)
Nt(i)
[  w (1 + 
)]j
Pt
Pt+j
t;t+j
, 	t(i) = 1 + Et Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]
Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1
+ Et
Nt+2(i)
Nt(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]2
Pt
Pt+2
t;t+2 + :::
, 	t(i) = 1 + Et Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]
Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1
+ Et
Nt+2(i)
Nt+1(i)
Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]2
Pt
Pt+1
Pt+1
Pt+2
t;t+1t+1;t+2 + :::
, 	t(i) = 1 + Et Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]
Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1 [1 (A1.4.6)
+
Nt+2(i)
Nt+1(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]
Pt+1
Pt+2
t+1;t+2 + :::]
Moreover:
	t+1(i) = Et
1P
j=0
Nt+1+j(i)
Nt+1(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]j
Pt+1
Pt+1+j
t+1;t+1+j
, 	t+1(i) = 1 + Et Nt+2(i)
Nt+1(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]
Pt+1
Pt+2
t+1;t+2 + :: (A1.4.7)
Then, we substitute [1 + Nt+2(i)
Nt+1(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]1 Pt+1
Pt+2
t+1;t+2 + :::] in eq. (A1.4.6) by
	t+1(i) according to eq. (A1.4.7) and get:
	t(i) = 1 + Et
Nt+1(i)
Nt(i)
[w  (1 + 
)]
Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1 	t+1(i)
, 	t(i) = 1 + [(1  ') + xt(i)] [w  (1 + )] Et Pt
Pt+1
t;t+1 	t+1(i)
, 	t(i) = 1 + [(1  ') + xt(i)] w  Et 1 + 

1 + t+1
t;t+1 	t+1(i) (A1.4.8)
Finally, the equilibrium expression is derived. In eq. (A1.4.8), all variables are
stationary, so the time index is skipped:
	 = 1 + [(1  ') + x] w  1 + 

1 + 
	
, 	 = 1 + [(1  ') + x] w  	
, 	 = 1
1  ((1  ') + x) w  (A1.4.9)
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7.1.5 Government Budget Constraint
The government budget constraint is given by:
Pt Bt Ut + Z
n
t 1 =
1
1 + it
Znt + Pt Tt
where Tt are net taxes (= total taxes   government expenditures other than unem-
ployment benets). In per capita terms, we get:
Pt Bt
Ut
Lt 1
+
Znt 1
Lt 1
=
1
1 + it
Znt
Lt 1
+ Pt
Tt
Lt 1
, Bt Ut
Lt
Lt
Lt 1
+
Znt 1
Lt 1
1
Pt
=
1
1 + it
Znt
Lt
Lt
Lt 1
1
Pt
+
Tt
Lt
Lt
Lt 1
, Bt ut (1 + gL) + z
n
t 1
Pt
=
1
1 + it
znt
Pt
(1 + gL) + tt (1 + g
L)
, Bt ut (1 + gL) = 1
1 + it
zt (1 + g
L) + tt (1 + g
L) (A1.5.1)
7.1.6 Economic System
Transition Period The following system of equations is used for the analysis of
the transitory impact of a labor supply impulse.
Employment rate:
nt =
1
1 + gL
[ (1  ') nt 1 + M ut 1 v1 t 1 ] (A1.6.1)
Unemployment rate:
ut = 1  nt (A1.6.2)
Probability for an unemployed person of nding a job:
st =
xt nt
ut
(A1.6.3)
Probability for a rm of lling a vacancy:
qt = M

ut
vt

(A1.6.4)
Forward looking di¤erence equation for the hiring rate:
 xt =  Et t;t+1 [ A Wt+1 + 
2
x2t+1 + (1  ')  xt+1 ] (A1.6.5)
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Hiring rate:
xt = qt
vt
nt
(A1.6.6)
Euler equation:
1 = (1 + it)  Et
ct
ct+1
1
1 + t+1
(A1.6.7)
Product market equilibrium:
ct = A nt   
2
x2t nt (A1.6.8)
Component of the rms discount rate:
t;t+1 =
ct
ct+1
(A1.6.9)
Cumulative discount factor of the worker:
t = 1 + (1  ')  w Et 1 + 

1 + t+1
t;t+1 t+1 (A1.6.10)
Cumulative discount factor of the rm:
	t = 1 + ((1  ') + xt) w  Et 1 + 

1 + t+1
t;t+1 	t+1 (A1.6.11)
Bargaining power of the worker:
t =
t
t + (1  t) 	t = t
(A1.6.12)
Unemployment benets:
Bt = b Wt (A1.6.13)
Target wage:
W Tt = t [A+

2
x2t ] + [1  t] Bt + [1  t] st  xt Et
t+1
1  t+1
(A1.6.14)
Contract wage:
W t =
1
t
[W Tt + (1  ')  w Et t;t+1 t+1 W t+1] (A1.6.15)
Wage index:
Wt = (1  w) W t + w
1 + 
1 + t
Wt 1 (A1.6.16)
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Nominal interest rate:
(1 + it) = [ 1 + it 1]i

(1 + i)

1 + t
1 + 
a A nt
A n
ay1 i
(A1.6.17)
Government budget constraint:
Bt ut (1 + g
L) + zt 1 =
1
1 + it
zt (1 + g
L) + tt (1 + g
L) (A1.6.18)
Ratio of bonds to output:
zt = z A nt (A1.6.19)
Average bargaining power:
t =
a   e;t
(1 + gL)t
+ e;t (A1.6.20)
Bargaining power in the emerging economies:
e;t = 0:5 t (A1.6.21)
Underlying autoregressive process:
t =  t 1 + (1  )  (1  0:5)(1  )(1 
gL
gLnew
) (A1.6.22)
In total, we have 22 unknown variables (n, u, q, v, s, x, i, c, , , 	, , B, W T ,
W , W , , t, z, , e, ) and 22 equations.
Steady State In the steady state, the model is given by the following system of
equations.
Employment rate:
n =
1
1 + gL
[ (1  ') n+ M u v1  ] (A1.6.1a)
Unemployment rate:
u = 1  n (A1.6.2a)
Probability for an unemployed person of nding a job:
s =
x n
u
(A1.6.3a)
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Probability for a rm of lling a vacancy:
q = M
u
v

(A1.6.4a)
Forward looking di¤erence equation for the hiring rate:
 x =  [ A W + 
2
x2 + (1  ')  x ] (A1.6.5a)
Hiring rate:
x =
q v
n
(A1.6.6a)
Euler equation:
1 = (1 + i)  (A1.6.7a)
Product market equilibrium:
c = A n  
2
x2 n (A1.6.8a)
Component of the rms discount rate:
 = 1 (A1.6.9a)
Cumulative discount factor of the worker:
 =
1
1  (1  ')  w (A1.6.10a)
Cumulative discount factor of the rm:
	 =
1
1  ((1  ') + x) w  (A1.6.11a)
Bargaining power of the worker:
 =

+ (1  ) 	 =  (A1.6.12a)
Unemployment benet:
B = b W  (A1.6.13a)
Target wage:
W T =  [A+

2
x2] + [1  ] B + s  x  (A1.6.14a)
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Contract wage:
W  = W T (A1.6.15a)
Wage index:
W = W  (A1.6.16a)
Nominal interest rate:
(1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + ) (A1.6.17a)
Government budget constraint:
B u (1 + gL) + z =
1
1 + i
z (1 + gL) + t (1 + gL) (A1.6.18a)
Ratio of bonds to output:
z = z A n (A1.6.19a)
Average bargaining power:
 = a (A1.6.20a)
Bargaining power in the emerging economies:
e = 0:25 in the initial steady state (exogenously given) (A1.6.21a)
= a in the new steady state (exogenously given)
Underlying autoregressive process:
 = 0:5 in the initial steady state (A1.6.22a)
= 1 in the new steady state
In total, we have 22 unknown variables (n, u, q, v, s, x, , i, c, , , 	, , B,
W T , W , W , t, z, , e, ) and 22 equations. In the initial steady state, the job
nding rate, s, is set exogenously to s = 0:45, and  is treated as an unknown value.
However, with respect to the new steady state,  is given by the value of the initial
steady state and s is treated as an endogenous variable.
7.1.7 Data
To calculate the e¤ective global labor supply, we weight the labor supply of a coun-
try or region with the corresponding export-to-GDP ratio (see for this approach
Harrigan and Balaban, 1999, as well as IMF, 2007a). The underlying data are pro-
vided by the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2008). With
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respect to the world, the e¤ective labor supply in 2005 was 129% higher than in
1980 and 81% higher than in 1990, which corresponds to an average annual growth
rate of 4:0%. Table 7.1 shows the corresponding data for the emerging economies,
i.e. China, India, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and the advanced economies
(i.e. the high-income OECD countries).
Given this, we calculate the growth rate of the e¤ective labor supply in the coun-
tries that have entered the world economy in recent decades (emerging economies)
for the period 1990-2005. With respect to the model, we assume a constant labor
supply in the advanced economies. Therefore, we normalize the e¤ective labor sup-
ply in these countries to 1 in each year. Then, the normalized e¤ective labor supply
in the emerging economies ( = sum of the e¤ective labor supply in China, India as
well as Eastern Europe and Central Asia divided by the e¤ective labor supply in the
advanced economies) is calculated for the years 1990 and 2005. The results imply
an average annual growth rate of labor supply of above 3%. Taking into account the
assumption of a constant labor supply in the advanced economies (being equal to
1), the calculation of the global growth rate yields a monthly rate of about 0:25%.
Eastern
China India Europe Advanced
and economies
Central Asia
e¤ective labor supply
1980 53; 901; 962 16; 146; 866 65; 006; 853
1990 124; 697; 720 23; 225; 316 48; 347; 136 71; 286; 513
2005 288; 707; 477 87; 532; 460 83; 025; 739 105; 964; 519
1980-2005
average annual
growth rate in % 6:9 7:0 2:0
contribution to total
growth in % points 65:4 19:9 11:4
1990-2005
average annual
growth rate in % 5:8 9:2 3:7 2:7
contribution to total
growth in % points 36:2 14:2 7:6 7:6
Table 7.1: E¤ective Labor Supply
Sources: World Bank (2008). Own calculations.
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (developing countries only): Albania, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
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Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania,
Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan.
Advanced economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Rep.), Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States.
7.1.8 Detailed Analysis of the Dynamics for the Full Model
When analyzing the reaction of the model variables to the labor supply impulse,
four phases are considered. Due to the di¤erent lagged adjustment processes, the
variables do not achieve their (local) extreme values in the same period. However,
a detailed period-by-period analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, as we are
interested in the long-term behavior of the variables. Therefore, the division into four
phases is just used as a general guideline for the analysis of the results. The phases
are determined by extreme values of several variables: the rst phase corresponds
to the rst period after the impulse, the second phase contains the periods up to
period t  10, the third phase up to t  130 and the fourth phase covers the periods
after t  130.
In the rst phase, directly after the labor supply impulse, the employment rate
decreases immediately (according to eq. (2.7)) and the unemployment rate increases.
Moreover, the adjusted bargaining power, , decreases immediately after the im-
pulse. As analyzed in detail by Gertler and Trigari (2008), the horizon e¤ect (due
to w > 0) reduces the bargaining power of the workers as it makes them more im-
patient. Therefore, the adjusted bargaining power, , is lower than the bargaining
power, . In particular, the labor supply impulse causes an immediate drop of the
adjusted bargaining power, . This reaction on its own reduces the target wage,
W T , according to eq. (2.26) and nally the aggregate wage given by the wage index,
W . However, a lower aggregate wage would increase the hiring rate, x, according
to eq. (2.14) and thereby the nding probability, s.145 Both, the increase of the
hiring rate and the increase of the job nding probability on their own cause an
increase of the target wage in the same period according to eq. (2.26). Thus, with
respect to the target wage, there are two opposing e¤ects: rst, a negative e¤ect due
to the declining bargaining power and second, a positive e¤ect due to the increasing
hiring rate and the increasing job nding probability. In the rst period, the positive
impact of the hiring rate and the nding probability, respectively, dominates. The
145Combining eq. (2.3) and eq. (2.10) provides: s = x N=U .
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target wage and nally the aggregate wage increases.
In this context, it is revealing to already regard the simulation results for w = 0.
For w = 0, there is no horizon e¤ect (i.e. t = t). In particular, there is also
no immediate drop of the adjusted bargaining power, . Therefore, the initial wage
increase for w = 0 is higher than for w > 0. Consequently, the initial increase in
the hiring rate, x, as well as of the job nding probability, s, are lower.
Also consumption per capita initially declines as  according to eq. (2.35) 
consumption per capita is positively correlated with the employment rate. Given
a declining consumption per capita (i.e. ct
ct+1
> 1), the Euler equation implies a
reduction of the interest rate, i, below the steady state level. In order to explain the
initial reaction of the ination rate, we regard the Taylor Rule. After implementing
a positive growth rate of labor supply, the output gap becomes positive. Even after
the initial negative impulse, the employment rate, n, is still above the new steady
state level, nnew. Hence, the e¤ective output, yt = A nt , is higher than the potential
output, y = A nnew. This argument on its own requires a higher interest rate,
i, i.e. an interest rate level above the steady state level. Standard macroeconomic
models assume that the interest rate targeted by the central bank (via the Taylor
rule) equals the interest rate implied by the Euler equation.146 Now, the second
factor in the Taylor rule, the ination rate, becomes relevant, as its development
makes the interest rate implications of the Taylor rule and the Euler equation,
respectively, consistent. An interest rate below the steady state level, as implied by
the Euler equation, causes a decline in the ination rate, , according to the Taylor
rule. In the presence of a positive output gap, the decline of the ination rate has
to be strong enough to be consistent with a negative interest rate.
In the second phase (t = 2 up to t  10), some variables (in particular the job
lling probability, q, the job nding probability, s, the interest rate, i, the ination
rate, , as well as the target wage, W T , and the contract wage, W ) move into
the opposite direction compared to the rst phase, whereas other variables retain
their direction. In contrast to the rst period, the increasing unemployment rate
causes an increase of the lling probability, q, and simultaneously a decline of the job
nding probability, s. Now, the declining nding rate, s, contributes to the decline
of the target wage, W T , according to eq. (2.26) and nally the aggregate wage.
The increase of the hiring rate, x, still has a positive impact on the wage, which is,
however, lower than in the rst phase and not su¢ cient to compensate the negative
e¤ects. Due to the further reduction of the employment rate, n, the positive output
146SeeWoodford (2003). Given this equalization, the Euler equation provides a direct link between
monetary policy and consumption demand.
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gap becomes smaller. Moreover, consumption per capita, c, decreases further, but
to a smaller extent (i.e. ct
ct+1
> ct+1
ct+2
> 1). Thus, the Euler equation generates an
interest rate that is still below steady state but higher than in the rst period. Given
the higher interest rate and the lower positive output gap, monetary policy following
the Taylor rule generates an ination rate that is higher than in the rst period (i.e.
less negative in this calibration framework).
In the third phase ( t  10 up to t  130), several variables change their trend.
In particular, the employment rate, n, increases, which can be explained as follows.
Due to the decreasing global bargaining power, the contract wage, W , (i.e. the
result of the Nash bargaining) and to a less extreme extent the aggregate wage
given by the wage index, W , fall signicantly. In this context, it is revealing to
already regard the simulation results for  = 0 with respect to the third phase.
In the case of a constant bargaining power, the employment rate does not increase
and, in particular, the ination rate does not decrease. Hence, with respect to the
full model, the dynamics of the bargaining power are the main driving force. In the
full model, simultaneously to the increase of the employment rate, consumption per
capita increases (i.e. ct
ct+1
< 1) but to a declining extent. The Euler equation thus
implies a decreasing interest rate. Moreover, due to the increasing employment rate,
n, the output gap increases. Given the increasing output gap and the interest rate
implication of the Euler equation, monetary policy following a Taylor Rule generates
an ination rate below steady state, in particular an ination rate, which decreases
further.
In the fourth phase (after t  130), the dominating process is again the devel-
opment of the adjusted bargaining power. However, now, the adjusted bargaining
power increases because the convergence process with respect the bargaining power
in the emerging economies dominates. The contract wage, W , and to a minor
extent  the target wage, W T , increase. Moreover, the employment rate, n, de-
creases again and converges to its new equilibrium, nnew. Hence, the output gap
becomes smaller. Simultaneously, consumption per capita also decreases, but the
decline becomes smaller in the course of time (i.e. 1 < ct+1(i)
ct+2(i)
< ct(i)
ct+1(i)
). Hence, the
interest rate starting from a level below steady state increases according to the
Euler equation (2.19) and converges to its steady state. Thus, to sum up, on the
one hand, the interest rate, as implied by the Euler equation, increases from a level
below steady state to the steady state. On the other hand, the output gap converges
to 0. Given both factors, monetary policy following a Taylor rule implies that the
ination rate has to become less negative. Hence, starting from a level below steady
state, the ination rate increases and converges to its steady state.
131
7.1.9 Results for the Full Model
Figure 7.1: Short-term Dynamics of the Full Model
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Figure 7.2: Long-term Dynamics of the Full Model
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7.1.10 Results for the Modied Model with  = 0
Figure 7.3: Short-term Dynamics of the Modied Model ( = 0)
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Figure 7.4: Long-term Dynamics of the Modied Model ( = 0)
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7.1.11 Results for the Modied Model with w = 0
Figure 7.5: Short-term Dynamics of the Modied Model (w = 0)
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Figure 7.6: Long-term Dynamics of the Modied Model (w = 0)
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7.1.12 Results for the Modied Model with i = 0
Figure 7.7: Short-term Dynamics of the Modied Model (i = 0)
138
Figure 7.8: Long-term Dynamics of the Modied Model (i = 0)
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7.1.13 Price Adjustment Costs and Money Growth Rule
In the following, a modied version of the model is presented. In particular, there
are two modications: rst, the introduction of Rotemberg price adjustment costs
(Rotemberg, 1982, 1983) and monopolistic competition and, second, the introduc-
tion of money holding in the utility function of the household and the substitution of
the Taylor rule by a money growth rule. Initially, the modications of the theoretical
model are illustrated. Then, the numerical analysis is presented.
Modications of the Theoretical Model Compared to the initial model, the
following equations change: the forward looking di¤erence equation for the hiring
rate, the equation, which determines the target wage and the government budget
constraint. Moreover, the Taylor rule is replaced by a money growth rule and two
equations are added: the equation determining the marginal costs and the money
demand equation. The derivations are illustrated in the following.
Prot Maximization of the Firm In the presence of monopolistic compe-
tition and Rotemberg price adjustment costs, the prot maximization problem is
solved as follows. Based on eq. (2.11) subject to eq. (2.4) and eq. (2.9), the
following Lagrange function for the rm, LF (i), is formed:
LF (i) = Et
1X
j=0
j t;t+j
266664
[
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j
Yt+j(i)  W
n
t+j(i)
Pt+j
Nt+j(i)  2x2t+j(i)Nt+j(i)
  
2
(
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j 1(i)
  (1 + ))2 Yt+j]
 t+j [Nt+j(i)  (1  ')Nt+j 1(i)  qt+j 1Vt+j 1(i)]
 t+j[Yt+j(i)  A Nt+j(i)]
377775
(A1.13.1)
The rst order condition with respect to employment is (recall that: xt(i) =
qt Vt(i)
Nt(i)
):
@LF (i)
@Nt+j(i)
= Et 
j t;t+j ( 
W nt+j(i)
Pt+j
+

2
x2t+j(i)  t+j + t+j A)
+ Et 
j+1 t;t+j+1 t+j+1 (1  ')
!
= 0
For j = 0, we get:
t = t A 
W nt (i)
Pt
+

2
x2t (i) + Et  t;t+1 t+1 (1  ') (A1.13.2)
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The rst order condition with respect to the number of vacancies is:
@LF (i)
@Vt(i)
= Et 
j t;t+j (  qt+j xt+j(i)) + Et j+1 t;t+j+1 ( t+j+1)( qt+j(i)) != 0
For j = 0, we get:
 xt(i) =  Et t;t+1 t+1 (A1.13.3)
In order to calculate the rst order condition with respect to the price Pt(i), Yt+j(i)
in eq. (A1.13.1) is substituted by Yt+j(
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j
) :
LF (i) = Et
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
266664
[(
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j
)1  Yt+j   W
n
t+j(i)
Pt+j
Nt+j(i)  2x2t+j(i)Nt+j(i)
  
2
(
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j 1(i)
  (1 + ))2 Yt+j]
 t+j [Nt+j(i)  (1  ') Nt+j 1(i)  qt+j 1 Vt+j 1(i)]
 t+j[(Pt+j(i)Pt+j )  Yt+j   A Nt+j(i)]
377775
The rst order condition with respect to the price is:
LF (i)
@Pt+j(i)
= Et 
j t;t+j [(1  )
P t+j(i)
P 1 t+j
Yt+j    ( Pt+j(i)
Pt+j 1(i)
  (1 + )) Yt+j
Pt+j 1(i)
  t+j ( )
P  1t+j (i)
P t+j
Yt+j ]
+ Et 
j+1 t;t+j+1 ((  ) (Pt+j+1(i)
Pt+j(i)
  (1 + )) Pt+j+1(i)
P 2t+j(i)
Yt+j+1
!
= 0
For j = 0, we get:
0 =(1  )P
 
t (i)
P 1 t
Yt    ( Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)
  (1 + )) Yt
Pt 1(i)
  t ( )
P  1t (i)
P t
Yt
+  Et t;t+1 (  ) (Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
  (1 + )) Pt+1(i)
P 2t (i)
Yt+1
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With Pt(i) = Pt, we get:
0 = (1  ) Yt
Pt
   ( Pt
Pt 1
  (1 + )) Yt
Pt 1
+ t 
Yt
Pt
+  Et t;t+1  (
Pt+1
Pt
  (1 + ))Pt+1
P 2t
Yt+1
, 0 = (1  )   ( Pt
Pt 1
  (1 + )) Pt
Pt 1
+ t 
+  Et t;t+1  (
Pt+1
Pt
  (1 + ))Pt+1
Pt
Yt+1
Yt
, 0 = (1  )   ((1 + t)  (1 + ))(1 + t) + t 
+  Et t;t+1  ((1 + t+1)   (1 + ))(1 + t+1)Yt+1
Yt
, 0 = (1  )   (t   )(1 + t) + t 
+  Et t;t+1  (t+1   )(1 + t+1) Lt+1
Lt
A
A
nt+1
nt
(7.1)
,   t  =   (t   )(1 + t) +  Et t;t+1  (t+1   )(1 + t+1) (1 + gL)
nt+1
nt
  + 1
, t = [  (t   )(1 + t)   Et t;t+1  (t+1   )(1 + t+1) (1 + gL)
nt+1
nt
+   1] = 
(A1.13.4)
In the steady state (t+j = ), the condition becomes t =
 1

, like in Krause and
Lubik (2007).
Finally, the forward looking di¤erence equation for the hiring rate can be derived.
The combination of eq. (A1.13.2) and eq. (A1.13.3) yields:
t = t A 
W nt (i)
Pt
+

2
x2t (i)+(1 ')  xt(i)| {z }
=  Et t;t+1 t+1 according to. eq. (A1.13.3)
(A1.13.2a)
Excursion:
Given the previous equation, the marginal costs can be calculated as follows:
t = t A 
W nt (i)
Pt
+

2
x2t (i) + (1  ')  xt(i)
t A =
W nt (i)
Pt
+ t  

2
x2t (i)  (1  ')  xt(i)
t =
Wt(i)
A
+
1
A
[t  

2
x2t (i)  (1  ')  xt(i)]
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The rst term on the right hand side (Wt(i)
A
) is the real wage divided by the
product of labor. The second term arises from the presence of labor market frictions
(i.e. costs of adjusting employment size). For  = 0 (and hence according to eq.
(A1.13.3) t = 0), we get: t =
Wt(i)
A
.
End of the Excursion
The substitution of t+1 in eq. (A1.13.3) by the expression in eq. (A1.13.2a) for
t+ 1 yields the modied forward looking di¤erence equation for the hiring rate:
 xt(i) =  Et t;t+1 [t+1 A 
W nt+1(i)
Pt+1
+

2
x2t+1(i) + (1  ')  xt+1(i)]| {z }
= t+1 according to. eq. (A1.13.2a)
(A1.13.5)
Besides the forward looking di¤erence equation, the equation determining the target
wage is modied as follows:
W Tt = t [t A+

2
x2t ] + [1  t] Bt + [1  t] st  xt Et
t+1
1  t+1
(A1.13.6)
Utility Maximization of the Household In the presence of money holding,
the utility maximization problem of the household is solved as follows. Initially,
money holding is introduced into the utility function as well as into the budget
constraint. Then, the modied Lagrange function for the household, LH , is given
by:
LH = Et
1P
j=0
j ( ln(ct+j) +
&
1   (mt+j)
1 
 %t+j
264 Pt+j ct+j + Pt+j mt+j +
1
1+it+j
znt+j + Pt+j tt+j
 Pt+j Wt+j nt+j   Pt+j Bt+j ut+j
 Pt+j 1 mt+j 1   znt+j 1   Pt+j t+j
375 )
The rst order condition with respect to consumption is:
@LH
@ct
= Et 
j(
1
ct+j
  %t+j Pt+j) != 0
For j = 0, we get:
1
ct
= Pt %t (A1.13.7)
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The rst order condition with respect to bond holding is:
@LH
@znt+j
= Et 
j ( %t+j
1
1 + it+j
) + Et 
j+1 ( %t+j+1)( 1)) != 0
For j = 0, we get:
%t
1
1 + it
=  Et %t+1 (A1.13.8)
By combining the two rst order conditions, the Euler equation can be derived. We
rewrite eq. (A1.13.8) by substituting %t by
1
ct
1
Pt
and %t+1 by
1
ct+1
1
Pt+1
according to
eq. (A1.13.7), respectively:
1
ct
1
Pt
1
1 + it
=  Et
1
ct+1
1
Pt+1
By rearranging, we get the consumption Euler equation (Recall that Pt+1
Pt
= 1+t+1):
1 = (1 + it)  Et[
ct
ct+1
1
1 + t+1
] (A1.13.9)
The rst order condition with respect to money holding is:
@LH
@mt+j
= Et 
j (& [mt+j]
    %t+j Pt+j) + Et j+1(  %t+j+1)(  Pt+j) != 0
For j = 0, we get:
0 = & [mt]
    %t Pt + Et  %t+1 Pt (A1.13.10)
By using eq. (A1.13.8), we can write:
0 = & [mt]
    %t Pt + %t
1
1 + it
Pt
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We substitute %t by
1
ct
1
Pt
according to eq. (A1.13.7) and get:
0 = & [mt]
    1
ct
1
Pt
Pt +
1
ct
1
Pt
1
1 + it
Pt
, 0 = & [mt]    1
ct
+
1
ct
1
1 + it
, & [mt]  = 1
ct
(1  1
1 + it
)
, & [mt]  = 1
ct
(
it
1 + it
)
, 1
&
[mt]
 = ct
1 + it
it
, mt = [& ct 1 + it
it
]1= (A1.13.11)
Money Growth Rule The Taylor rule is replaced by a money growth rule.
In particular, total nominal money balance, Mnt , is assumed to grow with the rate
gL, i.e. with the same growth rate as labor supply, L, and total output, Y :
Mnt = M
n
t 1(1 + g
L)
, Pt Mt = Pt 1 Mt 1 (1 + gL)
, Mt = Pt 1
Pt
Mt 1 (1 + gL)
, Mt = 1
1 + t
Mt 1 (1 + gL)
and in per capita terms:
, mt = 1
1 + t
mt 1 (A1.13.12)
Government Budget Constraint The modied government budget con-
straint is:
Pt Bt Ut +M
n
t 1 + Z
n
t 1 =M
n
t +
1
1 + it
Znt + Pt Tt (A1.13.13)
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and in per capita terms:
Pt Bt
Ut
Lt 1
+
Mnt 1
Lt 1
+
Znt 1
Lt 1
=
Mnt
Lt 1
+
1
1 + it
Znt
Lt 1
+ Pt
Tt
Lt 1
, Bt Ut
Lt
Lt
Lt 1
+
Mnt 1
Lt 1
1
Pt
+
Znt 1
Lt 1
1
Pt
=
Mnt
Lt
Lt
Lt 1
1
Pt
+
1
1 + it
Znt
Lt
Lt
Lt 1
1
Pt
+
Tt
Lt
Lt
Lt 1
, Bt ut (1 + gL) + m
n
t 1
Pt
+
znt 1
Pt
=
mnt
Pt
(1 + gL) +
1
1 + it
znt
Pt
(1 + gL) + tt (1 + g
L)
, Bt ut (1 + gL) +mt 1 + zt 1 = mt (1 + gL) + 1
1 + it
zt (1 + g
L) + tt (1 + g
L)
(A1.13.13a)
Numerical Evaluation
Calibration Before presenting the results of the simulations, the additional
parameter values have to be calibrated. With respect to the price adjustment costs,
the parameter  is set at 104:85; the degree of monopolistic competition  is set at 10;
these parameter values correspond to the values in Faia et al. (2009). Furthermore,
with respect to utility of money holding, we choose  = 1 (see, e.g. Merkl and
Snower, 2007) and & = 0:001.
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Results of the Simulation The following graphs illustrate the long-term and
the short-term dynamics.
Figure 7.9: Model with Price Adjustment Costs and Money Growth Rule: Long-term
Dynamics
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Figure 7.10: Model with Price Adjustment Costs and Money Growth Rule: Short-
term Dynamics
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7.2 Appendix to Chapter 3
7.2.1 Hiring Rate in the Low-Skilled Sector
The expected present value of the rms prot in period t, l;t, is calculated as
follows:
l;t = (al   wl) + [(1  'l     N) Et l;t+1   'l & l]
, l;t = (al   wl)   'l & l + (1  'l     N)Et l;t+1
, l;t = (al   wl)   'l & l + (1  'l     N)[(al   wl) + [(1  'l     N)Etl;t+2   'l& l]]
, l;t = (al   wl)   'l & l + (1  'l     N)(al   wl) + 2(1  'l     N)2Etl;t+2
  2 (1  'l     N) 'l & l
,:::
The expression can be summarized as follows:
l;t = (al   wl)
1X
j=0
j (1  'l     N)j    'l & l
1X
j=0
j (1  'l     N)j
, l;t = (al   wl)   'l & l
1   (1  'l     N)
(A2.1.1)
When calculating the hiring rate, the stochastic component,  l;t, representing an
operating cost or a productivity shock, has to be taken into account, as it is revealed
before the employment decisions are made. For a given hiring cost per worker, l,
an unemployed is hired, whenever l;t   l;t > l. By substituting l;t according
to equation (A2.1.1), and solving for the random component,  l;t, the following
equation is obtained:
l;t <
al   wl    'l & l
1   (1  'l     N)
  l
The probability of being hired is given by the following equation:
l =  l(
al   wl    'l & l
1   (1  'l     N)
  l) (A2.1.2)
Taking into account that l = c wl and & l = c' wl, the hiring rate is given by:
l =  l(
al wl  'l c' wl
1  (1 'l  N ) cwl). Finally, the expression of the hiring rate is linearized
according to a rst-order Taylor series expansion with respect to the initial steady
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state:
l;new = l;0 +  
0
l;0
[ 1 + c'  'l + c (1 +  ( 1 + + N + 'l )
1 + ( 1 + + N + 'l)
]0  (wl;new   wl;0)
+  0l;0[
1
1 +  ( 1 + + N + 'l)
]0  (al;new   al;0)
+  0l;0[ 
 (al + wl( 1 + c' (1 +  ( 1 + + N))))
(1 +  ( 1 + + N + 'l))2
]0  ('l;new   'l;0)
+  0l;0[
 ( al + wl + c' wl  'l )
(1 +  ( 1 + + N + 'l))2
]0  (N;new   N;0)
(A2.1.2a)
7.2.2 Firing Rate in the Low-Skilled Sector
For a given ring cost per worker, & l, the employee is red, when l;t   'l;t <
 & l. Substituting l;t according to equation (A2.1.1), and solving for the random
component, 'l;t, the following equation is obtained:
'l;t > & l +
al   wl    'l & l
1  (1  'l     N)
The probability of being red is given by the following equation:
'l = 1   'l(
al   wl    'l & l
1   (1  'l     N)
+ & l) (A2.2.1)
Taking into account that & l = c' wl, the ring rate is given by:
'l = 1   0'l(
al   wl    'l c' wl
1   (1  'l     N)
+ c' wl)
, 'l = 1   0'l(
al   wl    'l c' wl + (1   (1  'l     N)) c' wl
1   (1  'l     N)
)
, 'l = 1   0'l(
al   wl + (1   (1    N)) c' wl
1   (1  'l     N)
) (A2.2.2)
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Again, the expression is linearized according to a rst-order Taylor series expansion
with respect to the initial steady state:
'l;new = 'l;0    0'l;0[
 1 + c' (1 +  ( 1 + + N))
1 +  ( 1 + + N + 'l)
]0  (wl;new   wl;0)
   0'l;0[
1
1 +  ( 1 + + N + 'l)
]0  (al;new   al;0)
   0'l;0[
  (al + wl ( 1 + c' (1 +  ( 1 + + N))))
(1 +  ( 1 + + N + 'l))2
]0  ('l;new   'l;0)
   0'l;0[
 ( al + wl + c' wl  'l )
(1 +  ( 1 + + N + 'l))2
]0  (N;new   N;0)
(A2.2.2a)
7.2.3 The Labor Market States
To quantify the labor market states for the initial steady state, the "Labor Force
Statistics by educational attainment by sex and age - indicators" and the "Labor
Force Statistics by educational attainment by sex and age - composition" are used.
They are delivered by the OECD (19992005) for the years 1997 2003. As under-
lying labor force, the working age population, i.e. the group of people between 15
and 64 years, is chosen.
In a rst step, the averages for the variables "Employment/population ratio",
"Unemployment rate", "Share of the labour force" and "Share of unemployment"
are calculated. Moreover, the annual employment rates are calculated. In a sec-
ond step, the annual values for employment and unemployment for four categories
of educational attainment ("below upper secondary", "upper secondary, general",
"upper secondary, vocational" and "at least post secondary") are calculated. The
results are shown in Table 7.2.
employment unemployment sum
below upper secondary 14:3 2:4 16.7
upper secondary, general 2:8 0:3 3.1
upper secondary, vocational 46:3 4:6 50.9
at least post secondary 27:7 1:6 29.3
sum 91:1 8:9 100
Table 7.2: Values for the Initial Labor Market States
However, according to these data, the group of employed people with "below
upper secondary" education also contains the apprentices. Indeed, for the purpose
of the analysis, it has to be distinguished explicitly between those who are regularly
working and the apprentices. Based on data from the Statistisches Bundesamt (2006,
151
2008), the fraction of apprentices in the total labor force (4%) is calculated. Given
this, the level of apprentices can be quantied and the level of employed people with
"below upper secondary" education can be adjusted, correspondingly. The results
are shown in Table 7.3.
In the analysis, people with "below upper secondary" education are classied
as low-skilled, people with "upper secondary vocational" education are classied as
"medium-skilled", people with "at least post secondary" education are classied as
"high-skilled". The latter group as well as people with "upper secondary general"
education are not part of the labor force being relevant for the analysis of the
transition rates.
employment (Ni) unemployment (Ui)
low-skilled labor (i = l) 10:3 2:4
medium-skilled labor (i = m) 46:3 4:6
training (T ) 4:0  
Table 7.3: Values for the Initial Labor Market States and the Initial State of Voca-
tional Training
Given these data, the number of people leaving, S, the ring rate of the medium-
skilled employees, 'm, the number of people in the rst period of training T1 and the
death rate, , can be calculated simultaneously. This is done by using the equations
(1), (2) and (6) of the corresponding Markov matrix of the transition probabilities,
and the fact that the number of people being in vocational training is given by
T = T1
Pp
c=1(1      )c 1. Finally, all relevant values (Nm, Um, Nl, Ul, T , S and
T1) are normalized so that the sum of the relevant population is 1.
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7.3 Appendix to Chapter 4
7.3.1 Incentive for the Firm to engage in General Vocational Training
When answering the question why rms have in contrast to the initial theory (e.g.
Becker, 1964) an interest to pay for general training, two aspect are noteworthy,
the presence of ring costs and the compression of the wage structure.
(i) High ring costs can create an incentive to invest in general training. As an
employer can decide not to take over an apprentice at the end of the training phase,
but faces considerable costs when ring a regular employee, the rm may be willing
to invest in vocational training. Such a training may provide an employment test,
employers are willing to pay for (Harho¤ and Kane, 1993).
(ii) Another reason for the willingness of the rm to pay for general training
can be given by a compressed wage structure. This aspect is analyzed in detail by
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). As there is a reason to believe that this is an essential
aspect in Germany, the theoretical background based on Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999) is shown in the following.
Assume that the amount of training is a continuous variable, . The product of
the worker, a(), as well as the wage, w(), are functions of the amount of training.
The worker gets a wage, which corresponds to the outside option o(). Given that
there are no frictions, there is w() = o() = a(). The prot of the employer is
 = a()  w() = 0. The employer has no incentive to invest in general training:
a higher amount of general human capital raises the productivity but to the same
extent also the wage, thus the prot is not a¤ected; in this example the prot is
even zero.
Next, it is assumed that there is a compressed wage structure. In particular, it is
assumed that there are some kind of mobility costs() with0() > 0. Hence, the
outside option of the worker is o() = a() (). Again, the worker gets a wage
corresponding to the outside option: w() = o() = a()  (). As 0() > 0,
the wage structure is compressed, which is illustrated by the fact that @w()
@
< @a()
@
.
Now, the prot of the rm is given by  = a()   w() = () = (). As the
prot increases with , the rm has an interest to invest in general training.
Next, the wage is assumed to be the result of a Nash bargain. Moreover, in a
rst step, it is assumed that there are no ring costs, i.e. c' = 0. In the presence of
unemployment benets, the wage being the result of a Nash bargain is calculated
as follows:
w() =

1   +  a()
where  is the replacement rate and  is the bargaining power of the employee.
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Thus, the prot of the rm, (), can be calculated as follows:
() = a()  w() = a()(1  
1   + )
Thus, for @()
@
> 0, an increase in the amount of training, , has a positive impact
on the prot of the rm. This implies that 1   
1 +
!
> 0, which is fullled for
 < 1 and  < 1. The rst condition,  < 1, implies that the rm must be able
to capture a fraction of the prot in the bargaining process. The second condition
again stresses what has already been mentioned. Here,  < 1 is the replacement
rate, but in a more general interpretation it can also be seen as the ratio of the
outside option relative to the wage. The lower , the higher is the compression of
the wage structure. Taking also ring costs into account (i.e. c' > 0), the condition
to be fullled is 
1 + c' < 1. For the calibration, with  = 0:20, c' = 0:6 and
m = 0:6825, the condition is satised.
Finally, a short numerical exercise is delivered, showing that rms in the model
framework have an incentive to invest in general training. During the training phase,
the rm realizes a loss: (av   wv   kv)
P3
c=1 
c 1(1      )c 1 =  17; 7023 EUR.
With a probability 1T;N (1      )3 = 0:33, the successful apprentice will stay in
the rm, which has conducted the vocational training. Then, the former apprentice
will generate a prot of 175; 381 EUR (according to eq. (4.9)), which has to be
discounted by the factor p = 0:89. The overall surplus is 34; 471 EUR. Thus, the
rm has an incentive to engage in general vocational training.
7.3.2 A Simple Model with a Government Budget Constraint
In contrast to the benchmark model, the following one is a 2-period model. To-
gether with some additional properties ( = 0,  = 0), the simplication allows for
an analytical solution even in the presence of the government budget constraint.
The workers possible labor market states are illustrated in Figure 7.11: training
T , medium-skilled employment Nm, medium-skilled unemployment Um, low-skilled
employment in period 1 and 2, N1l and N
2
l , respectively, and nally low-skilled un-
employment in period 1 and 2, U1l and U
2
l , respectively. At the end of the second
period, all people die. The number of deaths is assumed to be equal to the number
of people leaving school (S = Nm + Um + N2l + U
2
l ). Hence, the labor force is a
constant. A person leaving school is hired with probability S;T as apprentice and
with probability (1  S;T )l as low-skilled employee. The residual fraction remains
unemployed. A trained person becomes a medium-skilled employee in the second
period with probability T;N . For the sake of simplicity, low-skilled people are as-
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school
training
low-skilled employment
low-skilled unemployment
low-skilled employment
low-skilled unemployment
medium-skilled employment
medium-skilled unemployment
?S,T
(1 – ?S,T) ?l
1 – ?T,N
?T,N
(1 – ?S,T) (1 – ?l)
Figure 7.11: The Dynamic Structure of the Simple Model
sumed to not change their labor market state in the second period. Given all this,
the following expressions for the steady state are obtained:
N1l = (1  S;T ) l ( Nm + Um +N2l + U2l ) (A3.2.1)
U1l = (1  S;T )(1  l) ( Nm + Um +N2l + U2l ) (A3.2.2)
Nm = T;N T (A3.2.3)
Um = (1  T;N) T (A3.2.4)
N2l = N
1
l (A3.2.5)
U2l = U
1
l (A3.2.6)
Moreover, the total labor force is normalized to 1:
1 = T +Nm + Um +N
1
l + U
1
l +N
2
l + U
2
l (A3.2.7)
Given these equations, the steady state expressions for each labor market state as
a function of the transition rates, can be calculated: Nm = 0:5 S;T T;N , Um = 0:5
S;T (1   T;N), T = S;T2 , N1l = N2l = 0:5 (1   S;T ) l and nally U1l = U2l = 0:5
(1  S;T )(1  l).
With respect to the random cost , a uniform distribution with a lower limit of
0 is assumed. For the sake of simplicity, hiring and ring costs are ignored. The
hiring rate T;N and the training rate S;T , which are a¤ected by the subsidies can
be derived by adjusting the expression in eq. (4.17) and eq. (4.21), respectively,
with respect to the number of periods; moreover kv = 0. The hiring rate is given
by:
T;N =
am   wm + T;Nm
+T;Nm
(A3.2.8)
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and the training rate is given by:
S;T =
av   wv + S;T +  T;N (am   wm + T;Nm )
+S;T
(A3.2.9)
where wm = am , which is given by eq. (4.14) for  = 0, m = 0 and c' = 0.
Given these expression, the labor markets states can be written as functions of the
subsidies.
In order to determine aggregate income, each labor market state has to be linked
with the corresponding income. As by assumption m = l = 0, the values
associated with unemployment are 0. In the case of training the income corresponds
to the wage wv. In the absence of taxes, aggregate income is calculated as follows:
 = T wv +Nm wm + (N
1
l +N
2
l ) wl (A3.2.10)
By substituting the variables presenting the labor market states in eq. (A3.2.10)
by their steady state expressions and by substituting the hiring rate T;N and the
training rate S;T by the corresponding equations derived above, an expression of
aggregate income, , as a function of the two subsidies, is obtained. Then, the cross
derivative of aggregate income with respect to the two subsidies can be calculated:
@2 
@ T;Nm @ S;T
=
am 
2 +T;Nm
+S;T
(A3.2.11)
The cross derivative is unambiguously positive. Hence, the two subsidies are com-
plementary with respect to aggregate income.
Next, taxes are introduced. In the presence of the taxes, aggregate income is calcu-
lated as follows:
 = T wv +Nm wm (1  t) + (N1l +N2l ) wl (1  t) (A3.2.12)
Moreover, the government budget constraint is given by:
t (Nm wm + (N
1
l +N
2
l ) wl) = T 
S;T +Nm 
T;Nm (A3.2.13)
Hence, the tax rate, t, is given by:
t = (T S;T +Nm 
T;Nm ) = (Nm wm + (N
1
l +N
2
l ) wl) (A3.2.13a)
The variables presenting the labor market states in eq. (A3.2.12) and in eq. (A3.2.13a),
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respectively, are substituted by the corresponding steady state expression. Then, t
in eq. (A3.2.12) is substituted by the modied expression in eq. (A3.2.13a). Again,
the result is an expression for the aggregate income, , being a function of the two
subsidies. The cross derivative of aggregate income with respect to the two subsidies
is calculated:
@2 
@S;T T;Nm
=
am ( 2   1  2  (1  ))  2 (1 + ) T;Nm
2 +T;Nm
+S;T
(A3.2.14)
=
am 
2 +T;Nm
+S;T
+
am ( 2  + 1)(  1)  2 (1 + ) T;Nm
2 +T;Nm
+S;T
This equation shows the contrast to the cross derivative in the absence of the gov-
ernment budget constraint, which is given by the last term on the right-hand side.
The additional term is unambiguously negative. For a plausible parameter value
(  0:75 if  = 1) the total term is denitively negative. Hence, in the presence of
the government budget constraint, there are no complementarities with respect to
income.
7.3.3 The Derivation of the Cross Derivative
To derive the cross derivative of the income,  , with respect to the subsidies, eq.
(4.22) has to be rewritten. This is done in four steps. First, T as well as Ni and
Ui for i = l;m; h, are substituted in eq. (4.22) by the corresponding steady state
expressions. They can be derived by solving eq. (4.3) for Zt = MTt  Zt and
taking into account that T = T1
Pp
c=1(1      )c 1. Second, the training rate,
S;T , is substituted according to eq. (4.21) and the hiring rates 
1
T;Nm and 
2
T;Nm are
substituted according to eq. (4.17) for T;Nm = 
1
T;Nm and eq. (4.18). Third, the
wages, wi, are substituted according to eq. (4.14) for i = l;m; h. Finally, there is
(i) ti = 0 for i = l;m; h, (ii)  = 0, (iii) p = 1 and (iv)  = 0. Hence, the result is
an expression for aggregate income, , being an explicit function of the subsidies,
S;T and T;Nm , as well as of the limits of the uniform distributions.
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